IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2022 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2021-SC-0258-MR 2021-SC-0269-MR
GEOFFREY M. YOUNG APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2021-CA-0541 SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 20-CI-00609
HONORABLE JEREMY MATTOX, SCOTT APPELLEE CIRCUIT COURT, JUDGE
AND
AMY MCGRATH REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This case is an appeal of the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of
mandamus directed to the Scott Circuit Court. The writ sought to require the
trial judge to file Geoffrey Young’s, the Appellant’s, motion for sanctions, to
hold a hearing on the motion, and to decide the motion without delay, even
though the underlying case had already been appealed. Young contended the
trial judge’s order impermissibly interferes with the ministerial duties of the
Scott Circuit Court Clerk. Amy McGrath (McGrath), the Real Party in Interest,
filed a response to Young’s appeal arguing the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the law regarding a petition for a writ of mandamus.
For the following reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 28, 2020, Young filed a petition in the Scott Circuit Court
challenging the ballot status of McGrath in the 2020 election for the United
States Senate in Kentucky. In his petition, Young requested an evidentiary
hearing, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. He argued McGrath was
not a bona fide candidate under KRS1 118.176. He also claimed McGrath acted
unlawfully in gaining the Democratic Party nomination in violation of KRS
118.105. Accordingly, Young requested McGrath be struck from the ballot and
any votes for McGrath in the November 2020 election not count.
McGrath immediately moved to dismiss Young’s action. She claimed: (1)
the doctrine of res judicata barred Young’s allegations; (2) the statute of
limitations applied; (3) Young failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction over the action. McGrath also
moved for sanctions against Young under CR2 11.
Young then attempted to file a response to McGrath’s motion to dismiss
along with his own request for CR 11 sanctions against McGrath. He noticed a
hearing for October 20, 21, or 22 of 2020. The circuit court refused to file
Young’s pleading, returning it to him with a note. The note advised him to
notice the motion for November 5, 2020. Young refiled his motion, noticing it
for November 5, 2020.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 On December 17, 2020, the circuit court entered two orders. First, the
court denied Young’s motion challenging the ballot status of McGrath and
dismissed Young’s petition. Second, the court granted McGrath’s motion for CR
11 sanctions, but denied Young’s motion for CR 11 sanctions. The circuit court
ordered Young pay $25,550.93.
Subsequently, Young filed motions to vacate the December orders. He
requested a new trial and CR 11 sanctions against McGrath. On February 18,
2021, the circuit court denied both of Young’s motions. Almost immediately,
Young appealed the circuit court’s February 18, 2021 order.
On April 26, 2021, Young attempted to file another motion for CR 11
sanctions against McGrath. The circuit court returned Young’s motion,
claiming the court no longer had jurisdiction on the matter because the
underlying case was on appeal. Young, nonetheless, attempted to argue his
motion for CR 11 sanctions at a motion hour on May 6, 2021. Young claims the
circuit court would not hear his motion and refused to issue a written order for
him to appeal.
On May 12, 2021, Young filed a petition for a writ of mandamus,
requesting the Court of Appeals order the circuit judge to file Young’s April 26,
2021 motion.3 He also requested for the court to order the circuit judge to not
interfere with the ministerial duties of the circuit clerk. McGrath filed a
response.
3 Young’s petition in the lower courts was styled as a “Petition for Relief Against Abuses of Discretion.” Because Young, pro se, requested the Court of Appeals make the circuit court take certain actions, the Court of Appeals considered his petition a writ of mandamus.
3 On June 25, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued an order on Young’s
underlying appeal. The Court of Appeals declared the matter moot since
McGrath had lost her election to the United States Senate. Thus, all motions
and all sanctions were denied.
The Court of Appeals also issued an order denying Young’s petition for a
writ of mandamus and denying McGrath’s request for damages. The court
concluded that when Young appealed the February 18, 2021 order the circuit
court lost jurisdiction. As a result, Young’s petition failed to meet the
requirements necessary for granting a writ. Young appealed as a matter of right
to this Court.4
II. ANALYSIS
The issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 568 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Ky.
2016). As explained in Southern Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs:
[C]ourts are decidedly loath to grant writs as a specter of injustice always hovers over writ proceedings. This specter is ever present because writ cases necessitate an abbreviated record which magnifies the chance of incorrect rulings that would prematurely and improperly cut off the rights of litigants.
413 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, this Court has a two-class analysis in writ cases.
Writ cases are divided into two classes, which are distinguished by whether the lower court allegedly is (1) acting without jurisdiction (which includes beyond its jurisdiction), or (2) acting erroneously within its jurisdiction . . . . When a writ is being sought under the second class of cases, a writ
4 McGrath did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ denial of damages against Young.
4 may be granted upon a showing . . . that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. There is, however, a narrow exception to the irreparable harm requirement. Under this exception, certain special cases will allow a writ to be issued in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury . . .
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IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2022 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2021-SC-0258-MR 2021-SC-0269-MR
GEOFFREY M. YOUNG APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2021-CA-0541 SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 20-CI-00609
HONORABLE JEREMY MATTOX, SCOTT APPELLEE CIRCUIT COURT, JUDGE
AND
AMY MCGRATH REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This case is an appeal of the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of
mandamus directed to the Scott Circuit Court. The writ sought to require the
trial judge to file Geoffrey Young’s, the Appellant’s, motion for sanctions, to
hold a hearing on the motion, and to decide the motion without delay, even
though the underlying case had already been appealed. Young contended the
trial judge’s order impermissibly interferes with the ministerial duties of the
Scott Circuit Court Clerk. Amy McGrath (McGrath), the Real Party in Interest,
filed a response to Young’s appeal arguing the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the law regarding a petition for a writ of mandamus.
For the following reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 28, 2020, Young filed a petition in the Scott Circuit Court
challenging the ballot status of McGrath in the 2020 election for the United
States Senate in Kentucky. In his petition, Young requested an evidentiary
hearing, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. He argued McGrath was
not a bona fide candidate under KRS1 118.176. He also claimed McGrath acted
unlawfully in gaining the Democratic Party nomination in violation of KRS
118.105. Accordingly, Young requested McGrath be struck from the ballot and
any votes for McGrath in the November 2020 election not count.
McGrath immediately moved to dismiss Young’s action. She claimed: (1)
the doctrine of res judicata barred Young’s allegations; (2) the statute of
limitations applied; (3) Young failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction over the action. McGrath also
moved for sanctions against Young under CR2 11.
Young then attempted to file a response to McGrath’s motion to dismiss
along with his own request for CR 11 sanctions against McGrath. He noticed a
hearing for October 20, 21, or 22 of 2020. The circuit court refused to file
Young’s pleading, returning it to him with a note. The note advised him to
notice the motion for November 5, 2020. Young refiled his motion, noticing it
for November 5, 2020.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 On December 17, 2020, the circuit court entered two orders. First, the
court denied Young’s motion challenging the ballot status of McGrath and
dismissed Young’s petition. Second, the court granted McGrath’s motion for CR
11 sanctions, but denied Young’s motion for CR 11 sanctions. The circuit court
ordered Young pay $25,550.93.
Subsequently, Young filed motions to vacate the December orders. He
requested a new trial and CR 11 sanctions against McGrath. On February 18,
2021, the circuit court denied both of Young’s motions. Almost immediately,
Young appealed the circuit court’s February 18, 2021 order.
On April 26, 2021, Young attempted to file another motion for CR 11
sanctions against McGrath. The circuit court returned Young’s motion,
claiming the court no longer had jurisdiction on the matter because the
underlying case was on appeal. Young, nonetheless, attempted to argue his
motion for CR 11 sanctions at a motion hour on May 6, 2021. Young claims the
circuit court would not hear his motion and refused to issue a written order for
him to appeal.
On May 12, 2021, Young filed a petition for a writ of mandamus,
requesting the Court of Appeals order the circuit judge to file Young’s April 26,
2021 motion.3 He also requested for the court to order the circuit judge to not
interfere with the ministerial duties of the circuit clerk. McGrath filed a
response.
3 Young’s petition in the lower courts was styled as a “Petition for Relief Against Abuses of Discretion.” Because Young, pro se, requested the Court of Appeals make the circuit court take certain actions, the Court of Appeals considered his petition a writ of mandamus.
3 On June 25, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued an order on Young’s
underlying appeal. The Court of Appeals declared the matter moot since
McGrath had lost her election to the United States Senate. Thus, all motions
and all sanctions were denied.
The Court of Appeals also issued an order denying Young’s petition for a
writ of mandamus and denying McGrath’s request for damages. The court
concluded that when Young appealed the February 18, 2021 order the circuit
court lost jurisdiction. As a result, Young’s petition failed to meet the
requirements necessary for granting a writ. Young appealed as a matter of right
to this Court.4
II. ANALYSIS
The issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 568 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Ky.
2016). As explained in Southern Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs:
[C]ourts are decidedly loath to grant writs as a specter of injustice always hovers over writ proceedings. This specter is ever present because writ cases necessitate an abbreviated record which magnifies the chance of incorrect rulings that would prematurely and improperly cut off the rights of litigants.
413 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, this Court has a two-class analysis in writ cases.
Writ cases are divided into two classes, which are distinguished by whether the lower court allegedly is (1) acting without jurisdiction (which includes beyond its jurisdiction), or (2) acting erroneously within its jurisdiction . . . . When a writ is being sought under the second class of cases, a writ
4 McGrath did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ denial of damages against Young.
4 may be granted upon a showing . . . that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. There is, however, a narrow exception to the irreparable harm requirement. Under this exception, certain special cases will allow a writ to be issued in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury . . . provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.
Id. at 926.
In this case, we must consider whether the requirements of the second
class of writs have been met. The first-class is irrelevant as the Scott Circuit
Court was the correct venue to challenge McGrath’s bona fides as a candidate
for office. KRS 118.176(2). Moreover, the impetus behind Young’s seeking a
writ of mandamus is to compel the circuit court to hear and rule upon his
motion for sanctions, an action unquestionably conceding the circuit court’s
jurisdiction. Since Young concedes the jurisdiction of the Scott Circuit Court,
he must show that (1) the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously;
(2) he has no adequate remedy by appeal; and (3) he would suffer great and
irreparable injury if denied relief. Alternatively, Young, lacking great and
irreparable injury, must prove a great miscarriage of justice will be perpetuated
if the writ of prohibition is not granted.
“[U]ltimately, the decision whether or not to issue a writ of prohibition is
a question of judicial discretion. So review of a court’s decision to issue a writ
is conducted under the abuse-of-discretion standard. That is, we will not
reverse the lower court’s ruling absent a finding that the determination was 5 arbitrary, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Appalachian
Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2016) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). In this case, Young fails to meet the requirements
necessary to be granted a writ of the second class, as he did not lack an
adequate remedy by appeal.
“‘No adequate remedy by appeal’ means that any injury to the Appellants
‘could not thereafter be rectified in a subsequent proceeding of the case.’”
Independent Ord. of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 614-15 (Ky. 2005)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Lack of an adequate remedy by
appeal is an absolute prerequisite to the issuance of a writ under this second
category.” Id. at 615. It is “the one requirement that is set in stone and
unavoidable.” Gilbert v. McDonald-Burkman, 320 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Ky. 2010).
Young had already appealed the underlying action at the time he filed his
petition for a writ of mandamus. It was by his own actions the circuit court lost
jurisdiction in the case and subsequently denied his April 26 CR 11 motion. It
must be noted had the circuit court heard and acted upon that motion,
McGrath would have had grounds for petitioning for a writ of mandamus
herself, since the circuit court would have been acting outside of its
jurisdiction. Moreover, Young will experience no great injustice or irreparable
harm as a result of the writ being denied since the underlying case has already
been declared moot and dismissed as a result of McGrath losing the senatorial
election in 2020.
6 III. CONCLUSION
In this case, Young failed to show a lack of adequate remedy on appeal or
a great injustice and irreparable harm would occur by denial of the writ.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Geoffrey M. Young, pro se
APPELLEE:
Hon. Jeremy Mattox
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
Patrick R. Hughes Kathleen C. Tranter Dressman Benzinger LaVelle PSC