Geo Feick & Sons Co. v. Blair

26 F.2d 540, 58 App. D.C. 168, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7729, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3713, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1414
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMay 7, 1928
DocketNo. 4660
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 26 F.2d 540 (Geo Feick & Sons Co. v. Blair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Geo Feick & Sons Co. v. Blair, 26 F.2d 540, 58 App. D.C. 168, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7729, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3713, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1928).

Opinion

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from the decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals affirming a decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a proceeding for the redetermination of income and profits taxes for the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, in the amounts of $873.90, $1,351.12, and $2,509.26, respectively.

Prom the findings of fact contained in the opinion of the Board, it appears that appellant petitioner, an Ohio corporation, was organized in 1916, and took over the personal business of George Peick, Sr. When he transferred the business to the corporation, the assets were valued at $20,000. Two of his sons contributed $2,000 each, and the capital stock was issued 150 shares to George Peick, Sr., and 50 shares each to the two sons. Peick, Sr., transferred one qualifying share each to his wife, and daughter, respectively.

At the time of the organization of the corporation, it was agreed that the salary allowed the sons, excepting $20 per week for one and $25 per week for the other, should remain in the business, and that the father should not draw any salary. The agreement was that they would wait and “leave all the assets they could accumulate, leave them in the business for awhile so that we would not have to borrow money to relieve the burden at that time. All dividends were to be added to the business.”

Under this agreement, at the directors’ meeting at the end of each year, it was determined the amount which should be credited to each of the accounts; and each of the individuals paid income tax on the amount so determined and credited on the books of the corporation. The corporation kept personal accounts for each of the individuals, and the share of the surplus dividends and the portions of the salary that remained in the business were credited to each of the individuals. The amounts so found were charged on the [541]*541liability side of the balance sheet as being the amounts due the officers and stockholders. The records of the corporation contained no entry to the effect that the accumulated salaries and dividends were to be kept in the business. This was done through the oral agreement between the three individual officers. The amounts shown each year on the books to be due to each of the individual stockholders, and standing to their credit, were not represented by notes, and no interest was paid on the amounts.

On December 31,1918, there had been accumulated $13,818; on December 31, 1919, $26,522; on December. 31, 1920, $44,106— representing the accumulated dividends and undrawn salaries which had been credited to the three individual stockholders on the books of the corporation. In its income and profits tax returns for the years in question, the amount so credited to its stockholders were returned as invested capital.

Upon auditing the returns, the Commissioner excluded the above amounts from “invested capital” and treated it as subject to taxation under the head of “borrowed money.”

It is conceded by the Assistant Attorney General that the amount of accumulated dividends should not'be excluded from appellant’s invested capital. This concession is based on the authority of Eaton v. English & Mersick Co. (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 54; Flynn, Collector, v. Hass Bros. (C. C. A.) 20 F.(2d) 510; Davidson & Case Lumber Co. v. Motter (D. C.) 14 F.(2d) 137. In the Eaton Case, as in the present case, the surplus “was invested in machinery, material, and process, manufactured stock on hand, in accounts due from, customers, and in cash, all of which was essential to the operation of the business.”

Whether the accumulated dividends and salaries in this case are to be treated as invested capital is to be determined by the provisions of section 326 of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057 (Comp. St. § 63367/ioi), and the same section of the Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 274 (Comp. St. § 6336%6Í), which provide as follows:

“Section 326' (a). That as used in this title the term ‘invested capital’ for any year means (except as provided in subdivision (b) and (e) of this section):

“(1) Actual cash bona fide paid in for stock or shares;

“(2) Actual cash value of tangible property, other than cash, bona fide paid in for stock or shares, at the time of such payment; • * *

“(3) Paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits; not including surplus and undivided profits earned during the year; * * #

“(b) As used in this title the term ‘invested capital’ does not include borrowed capital.”

“Section 325 (a). That as used in this title * * * the term ‘borrowed capital’ means money or other property borrowed, whether represented by bonds, notes, open accounts, or otherwise.” (Comp. St. § 6336%eh (a).

By section 1303 of the Act of 1921 (26 USCA § 1254; Comp. St. § 6371%ce), “The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, is hereby authorized to make all needful rales and regulations for the enforcement of the provisions of this act.”

In article 813 of Regulations 62, it is provided: “Thus indebtedness to stockholders actually canceled and left in the business would ordinarily constitute paid-in surplus, while amounts left in the business representing salaries of officers in excess of their actual withdrawals, or deposit accounts in favor of partners in a partnership succeeded by the corporation, will be considered paid-in surplus or borrowed capital according to the facts of the particular case. The general principle is that if interest is paid or is to be paid on any such amount, or if the stockholder’s or officer’s right to repayment of such amount ranks with or before that of the general creditors, the amount so left with the corporation must be considered as borrowed capital and to be so treated in computing invested capital.”

We have no criticism to make upon this regulation, since it does not apply to the present ease. The Board has found that the amounts “were not represented by notes, and no interest was paid on the amounts.” It is elementary law that before title to a dividend passes to the stockholder there must be a declaration of a dividend; and the fund for its payment must be separated from the capital or surplus profits of the corporation. When this is done, it becomes the-property of the stockholder, and a debt of the corporation on which the stockholder may recover, and it is likewise exempt from action by creditors of the corporation. Cook, in his work on Corporations (7th Ed.) vol. 2, § 541, states the law as follows: “When a dividend out of the earnings of a company has been regularly declared and is due, it becomes immediately the individual property of the stockholder. There is at once a severance, for the use and benefit of the members of the corporation, of so much of the accumulated earnings as are declared; and the dividend [542]*542thereafter exists as a separate fund distinct from the capital stock or surplus profits. It then becomes the absolute property of the stockholders.”

It is clear, as conceded by the counsel for the government, that the surplus dividends under the agreement of the stockholders in this case remained the property of the corporation to be used in its business, and as such a part of its invested capital.. In respect of the agreement of the stockholders and the bookkeeping entries, the Supreme Court, under similar circumstances, in the ease of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 209, 40 S. Ct. 189, 194 (64 L. Ed. 521, 9 A. L. R.

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26 F.2d 540, 58 App. D.C. 168, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7729, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 3713, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/geo-feick-sons-co-v-blair-cadc-1928.