Gentry v. City of Fort Lauderdale

125 F.2d 52, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4310
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 27, 1942
DocketNo. 9923
StatusPublished

This text of 125 F.2d 52 (Gentry v. City of Fort Lauderdale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gentry v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 125 F.2d 52, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4310 (5th Cir. 1942).

Opinion

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from an order entered in the City of Fort Lauderdale, municipal composition proceeding, denying a petition filed by holders of refunding bonds of 1936 to compel the city to increase its tax levies for the years 1939-40, 1940-41. The complaint of the petition was that the levies the city had made for those years were short of those required by the plan of composition on the faith of which complainants had accepted the bonds. The defense as to the levy for 1939-40, was that prior thereto, the city had purchased and retired $67,000 of refunding bonds and under [53]*53the retirement provision of Section 6,1 of the plan of composition, it was entitled to reduce by that amount, the levy required by that section for that year. The defense as to 1940-41 was the same as to the $67,000 of purchased bonds, and in addition that it was entitled to reduce the required levy by the amount of excess or surplus cash in the sinking fund and an amount estimated as collections to be made on delinquent tax levies in that year

The district judge, agreeing with petitioners that the plan required that the levies be made as set out in it, agreed with the city that under the enforcement provision of Section 6, the levies in each of the tax years were subject to be reduced by $67,000 on account of the purchased bonds, but holding that except as provided in Section 6, the levies were not subject to reduction, he rejected the city’s claim to a further reduction of the amount of excess or surplus cash in the sinking fund, and the estimated collections from delinquent levies. Finding that for 1939-40, $123,406.-70, had been levied instead of the $200,000 required, and that after allowing for the $67,000 of purchased bonds, there was a deficit of $9,923.28, and that for 1940-41, there was a levy of only $153,578.51 instead of $250,000, as provided in the plan, and that after again allowing credit for the $67,000 of purchased bonds, there was a sinking fund deficit of $29,421.49 for that year with a total for the two years of $39,-014.75, he ordered this deficit made good. The city thereafter agreeing in lieu of an additional levy, to retire and retiring additional bonds in excess of that amount, the petitions for coercive levy were denied.

Petitioners are here insisting that, in so ruling, the district judge has completely misapprehended and misapplied the credit clause of the retirement provision of Section 6, and has in effect deprived them of valuable contract rights specifically accorded them thereunder. The city on its part insists that the allowance in each year of the $67,000 bond credit against the required levy is based on a correct construction and application of Section 6, but if it is not and the crediting clause of Section 6 applies only beginning with the years 1945-46, still appellants may not complain of the order. For it recognizes and affirms the obligation of the city to provide the sinking fund as required by the plan, and requires its discharge in each year by making either the full levy required or its equivalent, the full levy less bonds actually retired.

We agree with appellants that the retirement provision of Section 6 of the plan relates not at all to, has no connection with, the years in question in this suit, and that the order of the court giving them such application is erroneous. Section 6,2 the [54]*54sinking fund section of the plan, is clearly and simply written, without uncertainty or ambiguity and its meaning and effect are plain.

It is appellants’ contention, and with this the district judge agreed, that the requirements of Section 6 for sinking fund levies are essential requirements of the plan and the fact, which the city seeks to make much of, that when the plan was entered into the collections were low and since have greatly ' increased, and if the levies provided for are made as provided, more money will be raised than in the beginning was thought possible, is without legal significance. It is their further contention with which the district judge agreed, that except as affected by the retirement provisions of Section 6, the levies the section provides for must be made as provided in it. Appellants insisted below that this clause had no application to the years in question or to any years prior to 1945-46, while the city insisted and the district judge agreed, that its provisions could and should be applied to the retirement of bonds in the earlier years and the order appealed from was entered in an attempted application of this provision.

We think it plain that this was error. It is clear that the words of the Retirement Clause, “if in any fiscal year the commission has maintained its schedule of retirements as in the above paragraphs”, refer to the positive schedule the section sets up for the year 1945-46 and afterward. They cannot be applied negatively in the way the city contended for and the district judge gave them effect, to years prior thereto, by a holding that since there were no compulsory retirement provisions for the earlier years, all voluntary retirements made therein must be considered retirements in excess of requirements within the meaning of the section. What the parties intended to effect and what the clause in question effects is an agreement modifying the requirements for principal levies in the years in which principal retirements are compulsory by crediting against them bonds already retired by the city in excess of the amounts required to be retired. It has no application to, it cannot be invoked in support of, the action of the city in reducing the sinking fund levies in the prior years by the amount of bonds it has retired.

It does not follow though that because wrongly based the order must be reversed. Appellants must show more than merely academic error. They must show injury to them as the result of it. Appelants realizing that this is so, point to the great reduction in the sinking fund, (6 times $67,000, $396,000) and therefore in the security of their bonds which will result if, under the rule established by the order, 3 the sinking fund levy required for each year prior to 1945-46, the first retirement year, is reduced by $67,000, the amount of the retired bonds. Urging upon us that these sinking fund levies are of the essence of this agreement and that the order, to the extent of the continuing, credit in each year, does away with them, appellants insist that damage has been shown.

If there were in question only the credit in the year 1939-40, so that the $67,000 of bonds retired was credited only once, and if it appeared that the money used to retire these bonds had come not from the [55]*55sinking fund but from other sources as was permissible under the plan, it would be difficult to see how appellants sustained damage by the action of the court in allowing the city to reduce the sinking fund levy in that year by the amount of bonds retired from sources other than the sinking fund, and in each succeeding year by the amount of additional bonds so retired, and if this were the effect of the order we should not disturb it. For the city’s credit and therefore the position of plaintiffs as its bondholders would be just as much strengthened by the retirement of bonds in that way as by the levy of taxes to retire them. But the evidence not only does not establish that these retirements were made from sources outside the sinking fund, but as far as it goes, it points to the sinking fund as the source.

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Bluebook (online)
125 F.2d 52, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gentry-v-city-of-fort-lauderdale-ca5-1942.