Gentle v. Shalala, SHHS
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
March 28, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2160
KENNETH GENTLE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
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___________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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Sandra L. Smales, on brief for appellant.
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Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Charlene A.
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Stawicki, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jessie M. Klyce,
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Assistant Regional Counsel, Region I, Department of Health and
Human Services, on brief for appellee.
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__________________
Per Curiam. Appellant/claimant Kenneth Gentle appeals
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the affirmance by the district court of the denial by the
Secretary of Health and Human Service of his application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income. Gentle, who has a long history of drug and substance
abuse, sustained a work related injury to his lower back in
1989. After the Social Security Administration denied his
request for benefits, a hearing was conducted before an
Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] in 1991. The ALJ determined
that medical evidence established that claimant had "severe
chronic low back pain, a history of substance abuse, and a
borderline personality disorder." Applying the sequential
analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1520, see also
___ ____
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 690
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F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982), the ALJ found that these
conditions constituted a severe impairment but were not
deemed to be presumptively disabling since they did not meet
or equal any impairment found in the Listings of Impairments,
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ also
determined that, in light of these impairments, Gentle could
not perform his past work. However, the ALJ did find that
Gentle retained the "residual functional capacity for the
full range of sedentary work . . . reduced [only] by a need
to alternate between sitting or standing." A vocational
expert [VE] identified various skilled and semi-skilled jobs
-2-
which could be performed sitting or standing at will. Based
on Gentle's exertional capacity for sedentary work, as well
as his age, education and work experience, "in conjunction
with claimant's non-exertional impairments," the ALJ
concluded that Gentle was "not disabled" and could perform
the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs the VE had identified.
We review this decision only to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
42 U.S.C. 405(g); Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &
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Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Gentle argues first that the ALJ erred in relying on an
incorrect definition of sedentary work in her determination
that he was not disabled. According to Gentle, sedentary
work requires the ability to sit for long period of times,
whereas the ALJ found that Gentle was required to alternate
between sitting and standing. Gentle relies in particular on
Social Security Ruling [SSR] 83-12, which states, in part,
that an individual who must alternate between sitting and
standing is "not functionally capable of doing . . . the
prolonged sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary
work." See also Rosado v. Secretary of Health and Human
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Services, 807 F.2d 292, 293 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Shiner
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v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Mass. 1985) (quoting
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Benko v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 698, 704 (D. N.H. 1982)))
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("'a determination that a claimant is able to perform
-3-
sedentary work "must be predicated upon a finding that the
claimant can sit most of the day, with occasional
interruptions of short duration"'"). He further notes that
the ALJ found him capable of performing semi-skilled and
unskilled jobs. Yet, according to SSR 83-12, "[u]nskilled
jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot
ordinarily sit or stand at will."
Gentle's argument is misdirected. The ALJ did not find
that Gentle could do a full range of sedentary work. Rather,
she found that Gentle was not disabled because he could do
the jobs the VE had identified. Moreover, in making this
finding, the ALJ followed the directives of SSR 83-12. In a
situation like Gentle's where a claimant needs to
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Related
Miguel A. ROSADO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee
807 F.2d 292 (First Circuit, 1986)
Victor J. Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
955 F.2d 765 (First Circuit, 1991)
Shiner v. Heckler
608 F. Supp. 481 (D. Massachusetts, 1985)
Benko v. Schweiker
551 F. Supp. 698 (D. New Hampshire, 1982)