Gentle v. Shalala, SHHS

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 29, 1994·No. 93-2160·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


March 28, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2160

KENNETH GENTLE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant, Appellee.

__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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___________________

Sandra L. Smales, on brief for appellant.
________________
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Charlene A.
_________________ ____________
Stawicki, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jessie M. Klyce,
________ _______________
Assistant Regional Counsel, Region I, Department of Health and
Human Services, on brief for appellee.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. Appellant/claimant Kenneth Gentle appeals
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the affirmance by the district court of the denial by the

Secretary of Health and Human Service of his application for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income. Gentle, who has a long history of drug and substance

abuse, sustained a work related injury to his lower back in

1989. After the Social Security Administration denied his

request for benefits, a hearing was conducted before an

Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] in 1991. The ALJ determined

that medical evidence established that claimant had "severe

chronic low back pain, a history of substance abuse, and a

borderline personality disorder." Applying the sequential

analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1520, see also
___ ____

Goodermote v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 690
__________ _________________________________________

F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982), the ALJ found that these

conditions constituted a severe impairment but were not

deemed to be presumptively disabling since they did not meet

or equal any impairment found in the Listings of Impairments,

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ also

determined that, in light of these impairments, Gentle could

not perform his past work. However, the ALJ did find that

Gentle retained the "residual functional capacity for the

full range of sedentary work . . . reduced [only] by a need

to alternate between sitting or standing." A vocational

expert [VE] identified various skilled and semi-skilled jobs

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which could be performed sitting or standing at will. Based

on Gentle's exertional capacity for sedentary work, as well

as his age, education and work experience, "in conjunction

with claimant's non-exertional impairments," the ALJ

concluded that Gentle was "not disabled" and could perform

the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs the VE had identified.

We review this decision only to determine whether it is

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

42 U.S.C. 405(g); Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &
______________ ______________________

Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Gentle argues first that the ALJ erred in relying on an

incorrect definition of sedentary work in her determination

that he was not disabled. According to Gentle, sedentary

work requires the ability to sit for long period of times,

whereas the ALJ found that Gentle was required to alternate

between sitting and standing. Gentle relies in particular on

Social Security Ruling [SSR] 83-12, which states, in part,

that an individual who must alternate between sitting and

standing is "not functionally capable of doing . . . the

prolonged sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary

work." See also Rosado v. Secretary of Health and Human
___ ____ ______ _______________________________

Services, 807 F.2d 292, 293 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Shiner
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v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Mass. 1985) (quoting
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Benko v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 698, 704 (D. N.H. 1982)))
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("'a determination that a claimant is able to perform

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sedentary work "must be predicated upon a finding that the

claimant can sit most of the day, with occasional

interruptions of short duration"'"). He further notes that

the ALJ found him capable of performing semi-skilled and

unskilled jobs. Yet, according to SSR 83-12, "[u]nskilled

jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot

ordinarily sit or stand at will."

Gentle's argument is misdirected. The ALJ did not find

that Gentle could do a full range of sedentary work. Rather,

she found that Gentle was not disabled because he could do

the jobs the VE had identified. Moreover, in making this

finding, the ALJ followed the directives of SSR 83-12. In a

situation like Gentle's where a claimant needs to

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Related

Shiner v. Heckler
608 F. Supp. 481 (D. Massachusetts, 1985)
Benko v. Schweiker
551 F. Supp. 698 (D. New Hampshire, 1982)