Genser v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.

169 F.2d 136, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2191
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 10, 1948
DocketNo. 439
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 169 F.2d 136 (Genser v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Genser v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 169 F.2d 136, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2191 (eca 1948).

Opinion

McAllister, judge.

Complainant operated a slaughterhouse in Imperial Valley, California. As required by law, he applied to the appropriate division of the Department of Agriculture for an official grader to grade his meat. An official grader was provided by the Department of Agriculture and on certain specified days each week this grader reported to the complainant and graded the meat that had been slaughtered. On or about December 26, 1945, the United States Department of Agriculture notified the complainant that “the services of an official grader are not immediately available and until such services are available you are permitted to grade all the beef, veal and lamb slaughtered in your plant, in accordance with OPA Maximum Price Regulation 169 and Revisions.” No official grader was furnished the complainant until January 21, 1946. During that period complainant graded his meat and submitted the proper records to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for December, 1945, showing that the meat killed between December 26 and December 31, 1945, had been graded by tire slaughterer under Section 1364.411(c) (2) (i) Maximum Price Regulation 1691 by reason of his inability to obtain an official grader during that period. Complainant was paid by the respondent for the month of December 1945 the full subsidy provided under sub-paragraph (d) of Section 7003.5 Revised Regulation No. 3, Defense Supplies Corporation2 as though all meat slaughtered during that month had been graded by an official grader of the Department of Agriculture.

[138]*138Complainant subsequently submitted subsidy claim to respondent for the accounting period of January, 1946, showing that for the period from January 1, to January 21, 1946, the said complainant had graded his own meat in accordance with the provisions of Section 1364.411(c) (2) (i), but the respondent refused to pay the subsidy provided under subparagraph (d) of Rev. Regulation No. 3 DSC, for the period from January 1, to January 21, 1946, but paid to the complainant the lower subsidy provided by subparagraph (e).

Upon refusal of respondent to pay the subsidy claimed, complainant filed protest with respondent, which was denied, and thereafter petitioned this court for a review of respondent’s determination.3

Complainant contends that under a proper interpretation of Section 7003.5, Revised Regulation No. 3, he should have been paid under the provisions of subparagraph (d) thereof for the entire period during which the United States Department of Agriculture was unable to provide him with an official grader, and that the order refusing to pay him under subparagraph (d) was invalid.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, respondent, insists that the meaning of the regulations in question is clear and unambiguous and leaves no room for construction and interpretation. It is, therefore, submitted that because complainant graded his meat, he is not entitled to the higher subsidy granted to slaughterers whose meat was graded by an official grader of the United States Department of Agriculture but is confined to the lesser subsidy allowed to self-graders.

Complainant has not attacked the validity of the regulations. He contends that if they are interpreted according to the contention of respondent, they would be invalid, because unreasonable, unjust, •and contrary to the intent and purposes of the price control laws; but he submits that, properly interpreted, the regulations are valid and consonant with the objectives and purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act.4 The controversy thus presents a question of interpretation enmeshed with validity. Although the question of interpretation is ordinarily not cognizable by this court, nevertheless, where it is contended ' that the interpretation which the Administrator has adopted renders invalid a regulation which, if properly interpreted, would be valid, the court must pass upon the meaning of the regulation before coming to the question of validity. See Alan Levin Foundation v. Bowles, Em.App.E.C.A.1945, 152 F.2d 467, Conklin Pen Co. v. Bowles, Em.App.E.C.A.1946, 152 F.2d 764. What we have before us, then, is tire complainant’s protest against the determination of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation that he is not entitled to the full subsidy under Section 7003.5(d) of Revised Regulation No. 3, Defense Supplies Corporation, but only to the lesser subsidy under subsection (e) of that regulation. In [139]*139order to decide whether the determination, or order, of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was in accordance with law, we have to interpret and apply the underlying regulation on which complainant’s subsidy claim was denied. Since the protest did not challenge the validity of the provisions of the regulation, we must take them, as written, as the law of the case; and merely interpret them to see whether, under their terms as properly interpreted, complainant has made out a case for the higher subsidy. It the interpretation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was correct, then we would have to dismiss the present complaint, for, accepting the regulations as the governing law, we would be obliged to say that the subsidy claim was properly denied. If, however, such an interpretation would render the regulation invalid as arbitrary and discriminatory, or subject to grave doubts as to validity, while the interpretation contended for by complainant would avoid such doubts or conclusions of invalidity, and accord with reasonable construction, in keeping with the purposes of the Price Control Act, we would adopt the interpretation for which complainant contends. As presented by complainant’s contention, the controversy brings before us the issue whether the regulations as interpreted by respondent, are invalid, or whether valid according to the interpretation of complainant.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the interpretation of the regulation, we revert to the statement of the case. The factual situation in somewhat more detail than has been above set forth, is this: Complainant, a slaughterer of the higher grades of meat, had, as a result of his application duly filed, an official grader of the Department of Agriculture at his plant for the purpose of grading his meat. As a result of such grading of the meats, complainant was entitled to a cash subsidy of $3.00 per hundredweight on the highest grade of meat slaughtered by him, and less on a descending scale, for five other grades of meat. On December 26, 1945, complainant was informed by the Department of Agriculture that the services of the official grader were not immediately available, “and until such services are available you are permitted to grade all beef, veal and lamb slaughtered in your plant, in accordance with O.P.A. maximum price regulations 169 and revisions. For the purpose o£ clarification, we wish to state that slaughterers operating with a letter of exemption from requirements of an official grader assume the responsibility of correct interpretation and application of the Federal Grade Standards as set forth in the above stated regulations.” On January 21, 1946, the Department of Agriculture informed complainant that “we will resume grading effective Thursday, January 24, 1946 as per old schedule.” Later, on May 7, 1946, the Department of Agriculture disclosed the reason why the official grader had not been available.

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81 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1948)

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Bluebook (online)
169 F.2d 136, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/genser-v-reconstruction-finance-corp-eca-1948.