Gennett v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Gennett v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance

178 S.E. 87, 207 N.C. 640, 1935 N.C. LEXIS 229

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJanuary 28, 1935

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 178 S.E. 87 (Gennett v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Gennett v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance, 178 S.E. 87, 207 N.C. 640, 1935 N.C. LEXIS 229 (N.C. 1935).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.,

after stating the case: The evidence was amply sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Guy v. Ins. Co., 206 N. C., 118, 172 S. E., 885; Baker v. Ins. Co., 206 N. C., 106, 172 S. E., 882; Misskelley v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 496, 171 S. E., 862; Mitchell v. Assurance Society, 205 N. C., 721, 172 S. E., 497; Bulluck v. Ins. Co., 200 *642 N. C., 642, 158 S. E. 185. The witnesses differed sharply in their observations and conclusions. This made it a matter for the twelve.

It will be observed that plaintiff's disability arises out of an incurable disease, diabetes mellitus, which calls for careful treatment and close observation, to prevent its progressing and causing death. It is the part of wisdom, so his physician thinks, that plaintiff refrain from the ordinary exactions of a fixed employment to insure his living. Such total and permanent disability, we apprehend, was reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the policies in suit were written. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 68 Fed. (2d), 676; Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Asso. v. Mathis, 142 So. (Miss.), 494.

The principle announced in Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E. 845, that one who receives $40 a month as a court crier cannot be regarded as wholly disabled “from pursuing any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit,” is neither controlling nor applicable to the facts of the present record, for it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that attending school is pursuing an occupation for remuneration or profit. U. S. v. Scott, 50 Fed. (2d), 773. Likewise, the cases of Boozer v. Assur. Society, 206 N. C., 848, and Buckner v. Ins. Co., 172 N. C., 762, 90 S. E., 897, are distinguishable.

The case presents but little more than an issue of fact. Upon sharply conflicting evidence, this has been found in favor of the plaintiff. The rulings of the Superior Court are free from reversible error.

The other matters debated on briefs are not sufficient to affect the result.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.,

after stating the case: The evidence was amply sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Guy v. Ins. Co., 206 N. C., 118, 172 S. E., 885; Baker v. Ins. Co., 206 N. C., 106, 172 S. E., 882; Misskelley v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 496, 171 S. E., 862; Mitchell v. Assurance Society, 205 N. C., 721, 172 S. E., 497; Bulluck v. Ins. Co., 200 *642 N. C., 642, 158 S. E. 185. The witnesses differed sharply in their observations and conclusions. This made it a matter for the twelve.

It will be observed that plaintiff's disability arises out of an incurable disease, diabetes mellitus, which calls for careful treatment and close observation, to prevent its progressing and causing death. It is the part of wisdom, so his physician thinks, that plaintiff refrain from the ordinary exactions of a fixed employment to insure his living. Such total and permanent disability, we apprehend, was reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the policies in suit were written. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 68 Fed. (2d), 676; Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Asso. v. Mathis, 142 So. (Miss.), 494.

The principle announced in Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E. 845, that one who receives $40 a month as a court crier cannot be regarded as wholly disabled “from pursuing any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit,” is neither controlling nor applicable to the facts of the present record, for it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that attending school is pursuing an occupation for remuneration or profit. U. S. v. Scott, 50 Fed. (2d), 773. Likewise, the cases of Boozer v. Assur. Society, 206 N. C., 848, and Buckner v. Ins. Co., 172 N. C., 762, 90 S. E., 897, are distinguishable.

The case presents but little more than an issue of fact. Upon sharply conflicting evidence, this has been found in favor of the plaintiff. The rulings of the Superior Court are free from reversible error.

The other matters debated on briefs are not sufficient to affect the result.

Affirmed.

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178 S.E. 87, 207 N.C. 640, 1935 N.C. LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gennett-v-jefferson-standard-life-insurance-nc-1935.

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