FILED APRIL 14, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
GENIE JAMES, ) No. 41202-4-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ALASKA AIRLINES, SEDGWICK ) CLAIMS & DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) AND INDUSTRIES, ) ) Respondents. )
HILL, J. — Genie James appeals the superior court’s order granting Alaska
Airlines’ motion to dismiss her appeal from a decision of the Board of Industrial Appeals
(Board) on jurisdictional grounds for failing to comply with RCW 51.52.110. Although
James acknowledges that she mistakenly referenced the wrong order in her notice of
appeal, she argues she actually complied with the statute. We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
James, an Alaska Airlines flight attendant, sustained a work-related injury in
March 2021. The following year, the Department of Labor and Industries (Department)
filed an order allowing James’s claim for benefits related to that injury. The Department
thereafter issued various orders that James appealed to the Board. After hearing the No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
appeals, the industrial appeals judge issued a proposed decision and order on January 9,
2024 (January proposed order). James petitioned the Board to review the January
proposed order. The Board did so and issued an order denying the petition on March 6,
2024 (March order):
2 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
On April 1, 2024, James filed a notice of appeal with the superior court:
James filed an amended notice of appeal the next day. The only difference
between the notices was the addition of the Department as a party.
In January 2025, Alaska Airlines filed a motion to dismiss James’s appeal.
Alaska Airlines argued dismissal was proper because the superior court lacked appellate
jurisdiction because James’s notice designated the Board’s January proposed order for
3 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
appeal, but that order was not appealable and the March 2024 order was now final and
binding because James failed to appeal it within 30-days, as required by
RCW 51.52.110. In response, James acknowledged her error and filed a motion to
amend.
The superior court granted Alaska Airlines’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the
court did not have jurisdiction because James failed to appeal the final order within 30-
days and RCW 51.52.110 required actual compliance with the timing requirement.
Having found it did not have jurisdiction, the court did not consider James’s motion to
James now timely appeals the superior court’s decision.
ANALYSIS
The question before the court is one of jurisdiction, which we review de novo.
Long Painting Co. v. Donkel, 14 Wn. App. 2d 582, 587, 471 P.3d 893 (2020). Under the
Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW which provides an exclusive remedy for
injured workers, the Department has original jurisdiction and the superior court has
appellate jurisdiction. Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d 194, 197, 796 P.2d 412 (1990);
see RCW 51.52.110; Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 587. The superior court may
properly exercise its appellate jurisdiction when a party files a notice of appeal from the
4 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
Board’s final decision with the superior court within 30-days from the date on which the
party learns of the final order. RCW 51.52.110 reads:
[W]ithin thirty days after a decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review upon such appeal has been communicated to such worker . . . such worker . . . may appeal to the superior court. If such worker . . . fails to file with the superior court its appeal as provided in this section within said thirty days, the decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review or the final decision and order of the board shall become final. Such appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the board. If the case is one involving a self-insurer, a copy of the notice of appeal shall also be served by mail, or personally, on such self-insurer.
See also Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d at 197-98.
As she did before the superior court, James acknowledges that she mistakenly
designated the Board’s January proposed order for appeal. Notwithstanding this
acknowledgement, James argues that the superior court had appellate jurisdiction because
she complied with RCW 51.52.110’s timing and service requirements and substantially
complied with the content requirement. Since her notice of appeal conveyed a clear
intent to appeal the Board’s final decision and order, she argues the superior court should
have disregarded her error under RALJ 2.6(f) and allowed her to amend her notice.
Alaska Airlines responds that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance. Since the
5 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
30-day time limit to appeal the March order has long since passed, Alaska Airlines argues
James can no longer appeal the Board’s decision.
To support its argument that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance, Alaska
Airlines cites Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 584. In that case, Long Painting
Company (LPC) appealed a final decision of the Board to the superior court. LPC
electronically filed the notice of appeal in the final days within which it had to appeal the
order under RCW 51.52.110. Three days later, after the expiration of the 30-day filing
period, the superior court notified LPC that the filing had been rejected because the local
court rules did not permit the electronic filing of administrative appeals. LPC appealed
the superior court’s decision to Division One of this court, arguing that the superior court
erred in rejecting its notice of appeal because it substantially complied with the
requirements of RCW 51.52.110.
In addressing LPC’s argument, Division One analyzed whether LPC actually
complied with the filing requirements under RCW 51.52.110 and determined it did not.
The court then considered whether the doctrine of substantial compliance applied to the
statute’s requirement to file the notice of appeal within 30-days. The LPC court
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FILED APRIL 14, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
GENIE JAMES, ) No. 41202-4-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ALASKA AIRLINES, SEDGWICK ) CLAIMS & DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) AND INDUSTRIES, ) ) Respondents. )
HILL, J. — Genie James appeals the superior court’s order granting Alaska
Airlines’ motion to dismiss her appeal from a decision of the Board of Industrial Appeals
(Board) on jurisdictional grounds for failing to comply with RCW 51.52.110. Although
James acknowledges that she mistakenly referenced the wrong order in her notice of
appeal, she argues she actually complied with the statute. We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
James, an Alaska Airlines flight attendant, sustained a work-related injury in
March 2021. The following year, the Department of Labor and Industries (Department)
filed an order allowing James’s claim for benefits related to that injury. The Department
thereafter issued various orders that James appealed to the Board. After hearing the No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
appeals, the industrial appeals judge issued a proposed decision and order on January 9,
2024 (January proposed order). James petitioned the Board to review the January
proposed order. The Board did so and issued an order denying the petition on March 6,
2024 (March order):
2 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
On April 1, 2024, James filed a notice of appeal with the superior court:
James filed an amended notice of appeal the next day. The only difference
between the notices was the addition of the Department as a party.
In January 2025, Alaska Airlines filed a motion to dismiss James’s appeal.
Alaska Airlines argued dismissal was proper because the superior court lacked appellate
jurisdiction because James’s notice designated the Board’s January proposed order for
3 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
appeal, but that order was not appealable and the March 2024 order was now final and
binding because James failed to appeal it within 30-days, as required by
RCW 51.52.110. In response, James acknowledged her error and filed a motion to
amend.
The superior court granted Alaska Airlines’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the
court did not have jurisdiction because James failed to appeal the final order within 30-
days and RCW 51.52.110 required actual compliance with the timing requirement.
Having found it did not have jurisdiction, the court did not consider James’s motion to
James now timely appeals the superior court’s decision.
ANALYSIS
The question before the court is one of jurisdiction, which we review de novo.
Long Painting Co. v. Donkel, 14 Wn. App. 2d 582, 587, 471 P.3d 893 (2020). Under the
Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW which provides an exclusive remedy for
injured workers, the Department has original jurisdiction and the superior court has
appellate jurisdiction. Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d 194, 197, 796 P.2d 412 (1990);
see RCW 51.52.110; Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 587. The superior court may
properly exercise its appellate jurisdiction when a party files a notice of appeal from the
4 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
Board’s final decision with the superior court within 30-days from the date on which the
party learns of the final order. RCW 51.52.110 reads:
[W]ithin thirty days after a decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review upon such appeal has been communicated to such worker . . . such worker . . . may appeal to the superior court. If such worker . . . fails to file with the superior court its appeal as provided in this section within said thirty days, the decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review or the final decision and order of the board shall become final. Such appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the board. If the case is one involving a self-insurer, a copy of the notice of appeal shall also be served by mail, or personally, on such self-insurer.
See also Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d at 197-98.
As she did before the superior court, James acknowledges that she mistakenly
designated the Board’s January proposed order for appeal. Notwithstanding this
acknowledgement, James argues that the superior court had appellate jurisdiction because
she complied with RCW 51.52.110’s timing and service requirements and substantially
complied with the content requirement. Since her notice of appeal conveyed a clear
intent to appeal the Board’s final decision and order, she argues the superior court should
have disregarded her error under RALJ 2.6(f) and allowed her to amend her notice.
Alaska Airlines responds that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance. Since the
5 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
30-day time limit to appeal the March order has long since passed, Alaska Airlines argues
James can no longer appeal the Board’s decision.
To support its argument that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance, Alaska
Airlines cites Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 584. In that case, Long Painting
Company (LPC) appealed a final decision of the Board to the superior court. LPC
electronically filed the notice of appeal in the final days within which it had to appeal the
order under RCW 51.52.110. Three days later, after the expiration of the 30-day filing
period, the superior court notified LPC that the filing had been rejected because the local
court rules did not permit the electronic filing of administrative appeals. LPC appealed
the superior court’s decision to Division One of this court, arguing that the superior court
erred in rejecting its notice of appeal because it substantially complied with the
requirements of RCW 51.52.110.
In addressing LPC’s argument, Division One analyzed whether LPC actually
complied with the filing requirements under RCW 51.52.110 and determined it did not.
The court then considered whether the doctrine of substantial compliance applied to the
statute’s requirement to file the notice of appeal within 30-days. The LPC court
recognized that substantial compliance with procedural rules can invoke appellate
jurisdiction but opined “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance does not save a party
from the failure to comply with statutory time limits, such as the 30-day filing and service
6 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
requirements of RCW 51.52.110.” Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 588. Echoing our
state’s Supreme Court, the LPC court recognized “‘it is impossible to substantially
comply with a statutory time limit in the same way. It is either complied with or it is
not.’”(quoting City of Seattle v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 116 Wn.2d 923, 928, 809 P.2d
1377 (1991)).
While we agree Long Painting requires actual compliance with the 30-day filing
and service requirements, substantial compliance may otherwise still grant a superior
court appellate jurisdiction. While the definition is not entirely helpful, “‘[s]ubstantial
compliance has been defined as actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to
every reasonable objective of [the] statute.’” City of Seattle, 116 Wn.2d at 928 (quoting
In re Habeas Corpus of Santore, 28 Wn. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702 (1981)). Perhaps
more helpful is the purpose behind the doctrine of substantial compliance, which
recognizes there is a distinct preference “‘to allow appeals to proceed to a hearing on the
merits in the absence of serious prejudice to other parties.’” Black v. Dep’t of Lab. &
Indus., 131 Wn.2d 547, 552, 933 P.2d 1025 (1997) (quoting Hoirup v. Empire Airways,
69 Wn. App. 479, 483, 848 P.2d 1337 (1993)).
The question becomes whether James’s notice of appeal complied with the timing
and service requirements of RCW 51.52.110 and otherwise substantially complied with
7 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
the statute, such that Alaska Airlines was not prejudiced by the notice’s deficiency. We
conclude that it did.
Under the statute, an “appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court
a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director
and on the [B]oard.” RCW 51.52.110. It is undisputed that James filed her amended
notice of appeal within 30-days of when she learned of the Board’s final order and that
she timely served the notice of appeal on all necessary parties. James’s error resides in
the language of the notice, not in its timing or service, and RCW 51.52.110 does not
require specific language to be used in the notice of appeal for the superior court to obtain
appellate jurisdiction.
Instead, the defect is akin to an error under RALJ 2.6 (a)(3) for incorrectly
designating “each decision which the party wants reviewed.” When such an error occurs,
“[t]he superior court will disregard defects in the form of a notice of appeal if the notice
clearly reflects an intent by a party to seek review.” RALJ 2.6(f). This rule can be
applied in principle in this case.
Under ordinary circumstances, timely filing and serving a notice of appeal is
meaningless if it does not give the opposing party fair notice as to what is being appealed.
However, that is not the situation here. Although James incorrectly referenced the
January proposed order in her notice of appeal to the superior court, the notice correctly
8 No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines
listed the proper parties, claim number, and docket numbers, and indicated James was
appealing “each and every part of said Decision and Order.” Clerk’s Papers at 1. While
this language referred to her designation of the January proposed order, James’s intent
was clear. The Board’s final decision and order (March order) specifically adopted the
January proposed order as its final decision without alteration. Under these
circumstances, James’s timely filing and service perfected her appeal and Alaska Airlines
was not prejudiced by James’s error. Therefore, the superior court has appellate
jurisdiction to hear James’s appeal.
We reverse the superior court’s dismissal of James’s appeal.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Hill, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ __________________________________ Staab, C.J. Murphy, J.