STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
07-1299
GENEVA VIDRINE, ET AL.
VERSUS
JASON T. LAFLEUR, LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, AND LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
********** APPEAL FROM THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EVANGELINE, 67,352-B HONORABLE THOMAS F. FUSELIER, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
J. DAVID PAINTER JUDGE
Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Ezell, J. and Genovese, J., concur in the result.
Frank M. Walker, Jr. Plauche, Smith & Nieset P.O. Drawer 1705 Lake Charles, LA 70602 Counsel for Defendant-Appellant: Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company
Jason M. Welborn Joseph F. Gaar, Jr. J.P. D’Albor Attorneys at Law P.O. Drawer 2069 Lafayette, LA 70502 Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees: Geneva and Winston Vidrine PAINTER, Judge.
Plaintiffs, Geneva and Winston Vidrine, filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking a declaration that a farm liability policy issued to Defendant, Jason LaFleur,
provided coverage for an automobile accident based on allegations that Mr. LaFleur
negligently attached his utility trailer to his pick-up truck. The trial court granted the
motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2005, Mr. LaFleur was driving his pick-up truck on U.S. Highway
167. Attached to his truck was a utility trailer carrying an all terrain vehicle (ATV).
Mr. LaFleur was en route from one farm field to another, and, according to Mr.
LaFleur, he intended to use the ATV to check the water levels in certain rice fields.
The utility trailer became detached from the truck and struck Mrs. Vidrine’s vehicle,
which was also traveling on Highway 167. Mrs. Vidrine allegedly suffered severe
injuries in the accident.
Mrs. Vidrine and her husband filed suit against Mr. LaFleur and his automobile
insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Company (Farm Bureau). Farm Bureau
has apparently accepted coverage for the accident, and this policy is not at issue in
this appeal. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau
Casualty), which provided a farm liability policy to Mr. LaFleur, was added as a
defendant some time later. Farm Bureau Casualty denied coverage based upon an
“automobile use” exclusion in the policy. Farm Bureau Casualty filed a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of coverage, which the trial court denied on August
16, 2006, on the basis of a finding that there was a material factual dispute as to the
applicability of the exclusion to the subject accident. Both this court and the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Farm Bureau Casualty’s applications for writs.
1 Almost a year later, on May 31, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Farm Bureau Casualty’s coverage. The trial court granted
the motion, finding that coverage did apply to this particular situation. This appeal
followed. Finding that there still exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding
coverage, we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs de
novo, using the same criteria as the trial court. Hines v. Garrett, 04-806 (La.
6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764. We must determine whether any genuine issues of material
fact exist and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C). In this case, the inquiry on de novo review involves three
questions: (1) whether the exclusion is clear and unambiguous; (2) whether the
exclusion applies to the facts of this case; and (3) whether there is a clear and
unambiguous exception to the exclusion that is applicable to the facts of this case.
Ambiguous terms in an insurance contract are construed liberally in favor of the person claiming coverage. Westerfield v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600 (La.1986). An ambiguity in an insurance policy is said to exist when the pertinent provision can be reasonably construed in two different ways. McCarthy v. Berman, 95-1456 (La.02/28/96), 668 So.2d 721. . . .
The interpretation of an insurance policy is usually a legal question that can be properly resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Miller v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 01-2907, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 08/20/03), 859 So.2d 159, 162, writ denied, 03-2643 (La.12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1159. However, with respect to summary judgments relating to coverage issues, the Louisiana Supreme Court has said that summary judgment may not be rendered declaring lack of coverage unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion under which coverage could be afforded. Westerfield [v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600, 605 (La.186)]. Even though the Westerfield case was decided before the changes to La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 made summary judgments favored under the law, this particular holding has continued to be followed. See Jessop v. City of Alexandria, 2003-1500 (La.App. 3 Cir. 03/31/04), 871 So.2d 1140 citing
2 Miller, v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 01-2907, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 08/20/03), 859 So.2d 159, 162.
Proshee v. Shree, Inc., 04-1145, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05) 893 So.2d 939, 942.
Farm Bureau Casualty contends that the following exclusion contained in the
policy excludes coverage for this accident:
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
....
e. Aircraft, motor vehicle, recreational motor vehicle, motorized bicycle or tricycle.
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of:
(1) Ownership or entrustment to others of any aircraft, “motor vehicle,” “recreational motor vehicle,” motorized bicycle or tricycle by an “insured”;
(2) Maintenance, use, operation, or “loading or unloading” of any aircraft, “motor vehicle,” “recreational motor vehicle,” motorized bicycle or tricycle by any “insured” or any other person;
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that the following exception to the exclusion
applies:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this exclusion do not apply to:
(f) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising from a “recreational motor vehicle” while used for “farming” purposes at the time of the “occurrence.”
We find that the exclusion is clear and unambiguous and applies to the facts
of this case. Thus, the third issue as to whether the exception to the exclusion applies
is the crux of the case. The trial judge concluded that the “arising from” language
found in the exception to the exclusion was ambiguous and, therefore, had to be
3 interpreted in favor of coverage. Farm Bureau Casualty argues that for the exception
to be applicable, two criteria must be met: (1) the bodily injury must “arise from” the
recreational motor vehicle, and (2) the injuries must “arise from” the recreational
motor vehicle while it is being used for farming purposes at the time of the
occurrence. Farm Bureau Casualty argues that Mrs. Vidrine’s injuries do not arise
from the ATV but rather from Mr. LaFleur’s alleged negligent connection/attachment
of his trailer to his pick-up truck or from a defective hitch. Farm Bureau Casualty
also points out that the ATV did not become unhitched from the truck; it was the
trailer which became unhitched; and it was the trailer which struck Mrs. Vidrine’s
vehicle.
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STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
07-1299
GENEVA VIDRINE, ET AL.
VERSUS
JASON T. LAFLEUR, LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, AND LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
********** APPEAL FROM THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EVANGELINE, 67,352-B HONORABLE THOMAS F. FUSELIER, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
J. DAVID PAINTER JUDGE
Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Ezell, J. and Genovese, J., concur in the result.
Frank M. Walker, Jr. Plauche, Smith & Nieset P.O. Drawer 1705 Lake Charles, LA 70602 Counsel for Defendant-Appellant: Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company
Jason M. Welborn Joseph F. Gaar, Jr. J.P. D’Albor Attorneys at Law P.O. Drawer 2069 Lafayette, LA 70502 Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees: Geneva and Winston Vidrine PAINTER, Judge.
Plaintiffs, Geneva and Winston Vidrine, filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking a declaration that a farm liability policy issued to Defendant, Jason LaFleur,
provided coverage for an automobile accident based on allegations that Mr. LaFleur
negligently attached his utility trailer to his pick-up truck. The trial court granted the
motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2005, Mr. LaFleur was driving his pick-up truck on U.S. Highway
167. Attached to his truck was a utility trailer carrying an all terrain vehicle (ATV).
Mr. LaFleur was en route from one farm field to another, and, according to Mr.
LaFleur, he intended to use the ATV to check the water levels in certain rice fields.
The utility trailer became detached from the truck and struck Mrs. Vidrine’s vehicle,
which was also traveling on Highway 167. Mrs. Vidrine allegedly suffered severe
injuries in the accident.
Mrs. Vidrine and her husband filed suit against Mr. LaFleur and his automobile
insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Company (Farm Bureau). Farm Bureau
has apparently accepted coverage for the accident, and this policy is not at issue in
this appeal. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau
Casualty), which provided a farm liability policy to Mr. LaFleur, was added as a
defendant some time later. Farm Bureau Casualty denied coverage based upon an
“automobile use” exclusion in the policy. Farm Bureau Casualty filed a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of coverage, which the trial court denied on August
16, 2006, on the basis of a finding that there was a material factual dispute as to the
applicability of the exclusion to the subject accident. Both this court and the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Farm Bureau Casualty’s applications for writs.
1 Almost a year later, on May 31, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Farm Bureau Casualty’s coverage. The trial court granted
the motion, finding that coverage did apply to this particular situation. This appeal
followed. Finding that there still exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding
coverage, we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs de
novo, using the same criteria as the trial court. Hines v. Garrett, 04-806 (La.
6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764. We must determine whether any genuine issues of material
fact exist and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C). In this case, the inquiry on de novo review involves three
questions: (1) whether the exclusion is clear and unambiguous; (2) whether the
exclusion applies to the facts of this case; and (3) whether there is a clear and
unambiguous exception to the exclusion that is applicable to the facts of this case.
Ambiguous terms in an insurance contract are construed liberally in favor of the person claiming coverage. Westerfield v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600 (La.1986). An ambiguity in an insurance policy is said to exist when the pertinent provision can be reasonably construed in two different ways. McCarthy v. Berman, 95-1456 (La.02/28/96), 668 So.2d 721. . . .
The interpretation of an insurance policy is usually a legal question that can be properly resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Miller v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 01-2907, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 08/20/03), 859 So.2d 159, 162, writ denied, 03-2643 (La.12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1159. However, with respect to summary judgments relating to coverage issues, the Louisiana Supreme Court has said that summary judgment may not be rendered declaring lack of coverage unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion under which coverage could be afforded. Westerfield [v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600, 605 (La.186)]. Even though the Westerfield case was decided before the changes to La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 made summary judgments favored under the law, this particular holding has continued to be followed. See Jessop v. City of Alexandria, 2003-1500 (La.App. 3 Cir. 03/31/04), 871 So.2d 1140 citing
2 Miller, v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 01-2907, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 08/20/03), 859 So.2d 159, 162.
Proshee v. Shree, Inc., 04-1145, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05) 893 So.2d 939, 942.
Farm Bureau Casualty contends that the following exclusion contained in the
policy excludes coverage for this accident:
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
....
e. Aircraft, motor vehicle, recreational motor vehicle, motorized bicycle or tricycle.
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of:
(1) Ownership or entrustment to others of any aircraft, “motor vehicle,” “recreational motor vehicle,” motorized bicycle or tricycle by an “insured”;
(2) Maintenance, use, operation, or “loading or unloading” of any aircraft, “motor vehicle,” “recreational motor vehicle,” motorized bicycle or tricycle by any “insured” or any other person;
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that the following exception to the exclusion
applies:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this exclusion do not apply to:
(f) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising from a “recreational motor vehicle” while used for “farming” purposes at the time of the “occurrence.”
We find that the exclusion is clear and unambiguous and applies to the facts
of this case. Thus, the third issue as to whether the exception to the exclusion applies
is the crux of the case. The trial judge concluded that the “arising from” language
found in the exception to the exclusion was ambiguous and, therefore, had to be
3 interpreted in favor of coverage. Farm Bureau Casualty argues that for the exception
to be applicable, two criteria must be met: (1) the bodily injury must “arise from” the
recreational motor vehicle, and (2) the injuries must “arise from” the recreational
motor vehicle while it is being used for farming purposes at the time of the
occurrence. Farm Bureau Casualty argues that Mrs. Vidrine’s injuries do not arise
from the ATV but rather from Mr. LaFleur’s alleged negligent connection/attachment
of his trailer to his pick-up truck or from a defective hitch. Farm Bureau Casualty
also points out that the ATV did not become unhitched from the truck; it was the
trailer which became unhitched; and it was the trailer which struck Mrs. Vidrine’s
vehicle. Thus, Farm Bureau Casualty contends that the injuries could not “arise
from” the use of the ATV.
To resolve the issue of whether a given occurrence falls within the automobile exclusion, the supreme court has developed a two-tier procedure. First, through duty-risk analysis, the court must determine whether the insured’s conduct of which the plaintiff complains is a legal cause of the accident. If so, then the court must determine whether that conduct arose out of the use of the vehicle. Carter v. City Parish Govt. of EBR, 423 So.2d 1080 (La.1982); McKenzie & Johnson, Insurance (15 La.Civil Law Treatise) § 65. In order for the conduct to arise out of use, the automobile must be essential to the theory of liability; the specific duty breached by the insured must flow from use of the automobile. If the duty existed independently of the automobile, then liability does not arise out of use even though the duty could have been discharged by the use of an automobile. Carter v. City Parish Govt., supra; LeJeune v. Allstate, 365 So.2d 471 (La.1978); McKenzie & Johnson, supra.
Jones v. Louisiana Timber Co., Inc., 519 So.2d 333, 335-36 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1988).
We find the Jones case to be instructive here in that in order for the exception
to be applicable, the injuries must arise from the use of the ATV. We do not agree
with the trial judge that the “arising from” language in the exception to the exclusion
is ambiguous. We are compelled to agree with Farm Bureau Casualty’s argument that
the “arising from” language is limited by the “while used for” language. Plaintiffs,
4 as movers, bear the burden of proof to establish each fact essential to their claim and
that their claim is within the insurance policy coverage. Regency Motors of Metairie,
L.L.C. v. Hibernia-Rosenthal Ins. Agency, L.L.C., 03-1312 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/04),
868 So.2d 905, writ denied, 04-753 (La. 5/7/04), 872 So.2d 1087 (citing Gandy v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n, 98-215 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/14/98), 721 So.2d 34, writ
denied, 98-2836 (La. 1/15/99), 736 So.2d 208). They have not met this burden.
Thus, we find that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. We
hereby reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and remand the
matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Geneva and Winston Vidrine.