Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00151-CR
Generoso Polendey Taclibon, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 52nd District Court of Coryell County, Texas Senior Judge Roy Sparkman, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 21-26856
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Generoso Polendey Taclibon of the first-
degree felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). The jury assessed punishment at seventy-five
years’ confinement, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. In three
issues, Taclibon argues that (1) the trial court denied his right to present a
meaningful defense by excluding his proffered evidence, (2) the State relied on false testimony to secure a conviction, and (3) the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for new trial. We affirm.
A. Background
Because there is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will
only briefly discuss the underlying facts. Taclibon’s daughter, E.T., and
Kennedy Carter became best friends when they were approximately eight
years old. 1 Kennedy was frequently at the Taclibon’s house and spent the night
there multiple times. The Taclibons considered Kennedy to be a part of their
family.
Kennedy, who was sixteen years old at the time of trial, testified that the
first incident with Taclibon occurred when he was giving her and E.T. a
piggyback ride. Kennedy explained that when Taclibon put her down, he
touched her private parts over her clothes. She thought it might have been an
accident, but it began happening on a regular basis after that first incident.
Kennedy stated that initially Taclibon would touch her privates over her
clothes, but that it escalated over time. Kennedy testified that when she would
spend the night with E.T., Taclibon would come into the bedroom at night, pull
down her pants and underwear, and touch her privates with his hand and
1 We will refer to the complainant as Kennedy Carter, the pseudonym at trial. We will refer to all other minors by their initials.
Taclibon v. State Page 2 mouth. Kennedy said that on one occasion, Taclibon took her into the guest
room of his house and tried to put his male part into her privates.
Kennedy described a time when she and Taclibon were in E.T.’s closet
and Taclibon had removed her pants and underwear and was touching her
privates with his mouth and hand. Kennedy said that Taclibon’s son came into
the room and asked what was happening. Kennedy told him that Taclibon was
helping her look for something. Taclibon’s son testified at trial that he saw
Kennedy and his father in E.T.’s closet and that he told E.T. what had
happened. He did not remember saying that Kennedy was not wearing pants.
E.T. testified that her brother told her about seeing Kennedy and Taclibon in
the closet. She acknowledged that she had told a police officer that her brother
said Kennedy did not have on pants, but she maintained that she only told the
detective what he wanted to hear.
Kennedy testified that Taclibon had touched her inappropriately for
several years. When she was thirteen years old, Kennedy told her coach at
school what Taclibon had been doing to her. Kennedy and her parents went
that same day to the police station to report the abuse. On July 22, 2021,
Taclibon was indicted for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young
child. He was tried before a jury for that offense, and the trial ended in a
mistrial when the jurors could not reach a unanimous verdict.
Taclibon v. State Page 3 Sometime after the original indictment, Taclibon’s niece also made an
allegation against him. She testified at trial that when she was nine years old,
Taclibon rubbed her private part in an aggressive manner when he was helping
her dry off after getting out of the swimming pool. Her mother reported the
incident to the police.
A superseding indictment was filed on March 21, 2024. That indictment
included seven counts:
Count 1: continuous sexual abuse of a child, Counts 2 and 3: indecency with a child by contact, Counts 4 and 5: aggravated sexual assault of a child, Count 6: indecency with a child, Count 7: aggravated sexual assault of a child.
Count 1 included the allegation that Taclibon touched the genitals of his niece. 2
The jury convicted Taclibon of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child,
and this appeal followed.
B. Issue One
In his first issue, Taclibon argues that the trial court’s erroneous
exclusion of evidence prevented him from presenting a meaningful defense as
guaranteed through the due process clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
2 Taclibon does not raise any argument on appeal concerning his niece.
Taclibon v. State Page 4 1. Authority
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016). “Appellate courts will uphold a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
of evidence as long as the trial court’s ruling was at least within the ‘zone of
reasonable disagreement.’ ” Page v. State, 213 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
Rule of Evidence 403 allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence if the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
TEX. R. EVID. 403.
Rule of Evidence 412 provides that in prosecutions for sexual assault
offenses, reputation or opinion evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior
and specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual behavior are generally
not admissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 412. However, Rule 412 provides an
exception which reads in part:
(b) Exceptions for Specific Instances. Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s past sexual behavior is admissible if: (1) the court admits the evidence in accordance with subdivisions (c) and (d); (2) the evidence: (A) is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence offered by the prosecutor;
Taclibon v. State Page 5 (B) concerns past sexual behavior with the defendant and is offered by the defendant to prove consent; (C) relates to the victim’s motive or bias; (D) is admissible under Rule 609; or (E) is constitutionally required to be admitted; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
TEX. R. EVID. 412.
Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that a party may not inquire into or
offer extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of the witness’s conduct in
order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. TEX. R.
EVID. 608(b).
2. Discussion
Taclibon specifically complains that the trial court erred by excluding
evidence of (1) false allegations of sexual abuse made by Kennedy, (2) Kennedy
wanting to be a part of the 97% Club, (3) Kennedy’s texts about having a sugar
daddy, and (4) Kennedy “catfishing” other people.
Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion
in limine regarding the complained of evidence and granted the State’s motion.
The following day, before hearing testimony, the trial court again had a lengthy
discussion on the admissibility of the evidence, specifically evidence of
catfishing. The trial court expressed concern over any evidence of catfishing
and instructed Taclibon’s counsel not to reference catfishing in front of the jury.
The trial court noted it would revisit its ruling if catfishing became relevant.
Taclibon v. State Page 6 The trial court further expressed concern over any evidence of the 97% Club in
relation to Rule 403, noting that it would be confusing to the jury.
At the end of the first day of testimony, the trial court again considered
the admission of the complained of testimony. The trial court allowed Taclibon
to present testimony from E.T. in support of his argument. E.T. explained that
the 97% Club referred to women who had been sexually harassed or assaulted.
She stated that Kennedy talked about the club “like she wanted to be a part of
it.” E.T. also said that Kennedy had told her she catfishes people, meaning
that she uses a different persona to talk to someone. She testified that
Kennedy had talked to her about sugar daddies and that it was “weird.” E.T.
also testified that Kennedy had made other allegations of sexual abuse.
The trial court determined that any evidence of Kennedy wanting to be
a member of the 97% Club was inadmissible under Rule 403, noting that the
testimony was speculative because it was based upon E.T.’s belief that
Kennedy wanted to be a part of the club. The trial court also ruled that
evidence of catfishing, sugar daddies, and prior allegations would not be
allowed into evidence.
The next day, the trial court further explained its reasoning in excluding
the evidence. The trial court stated that based upon what it had heard so far,
the evidence on those topics would be precluded by Rules 403, 412, or 608(b).
The trial court further noted that some of the evidence was purely speculative
Taclibon v. State Page 7 and would be confusing to the jury. Taclibon’s counsel argued that the trial
court’s rulings amounted to a constitutional violation by precluding him from
presenting his defensive theories.
The next day of trial, the trial court again considered the complained of
evidence. After reviewing a defense exhibit that appeared to be a screenshot
of a text message attributed to Kennedy that said she had a sugar daddy, the
trial court determined that the evidence could raise the issue of motive for her
filing her complaint. There had been testimony that Taclibon had given
Kennedy a phone after her parents had punished her by taking away her
phone. Taclibon presented evidence that he demanded Kennedy return the
phone. The trial court reasoned that if Kennedy considered Taclibon to be her
sugar daddy, and he took the phone away, that could be motive for her filing
the complaint. The trial court stated it would allow limited evidence of
Kennedy’s use of the term “sugar daddy.”
The trial court permitted Taclibon to present evidence for his bill of
exception. A.J. testified that she does not remember testifying previously that
Kennedy had catfished people. She also could not recall what Kennedy said
about the 97% Club. A.J. also offered vague testimony about Kennedy making
a prior accusation that a teenage boy had raped her. Taclibon called E.T. to
testify for the bill of exception. She again stated that Kennedy had told her
that she had catfished someone. She also recalled Kennedy making an
Taclibon v. State Page 8 accusation that a teenage boy had sexually assaulted her. E.T. also testified
about two other boys who Kennedy had accused of inappropriate sexual
behavior. E.T. said that she had asked other people about those accusations,
and they said they were false. E.T. further testified that Kennedy had talked
about the 97% Club and “[i]t’s like she wanted to be a part of it.” According to
E.T., Kennedy also had said that she had sugar daddies.
A.R. testified for the bill of exception that Kennedy had said that she had
sugar daddies. She also recalled Kennedy making an allegation of sexual
abuse against a boy. A.R. was unsure if she believed Kennedy about the
allegation. A.R. did not recall Kennedy making allegations against other boys.
J.S. testified that she had not heard about Kennedy making allegations against
the three boys.
Kennedy also testified in the bill of exception. She denied making any
allegation of sexual abuse against two of the boys. Regarding the third boy,
she said that he had put his hand on her knee and made her uncomfortable,
but that she did not make an allegation of sexual abuse. She denied talking to
any of her friends about the 97% Club. She acknowledged that she had talked
to her friends about having a sugar daddy. She explained that her friends were
the ones who used the word “sugar daddy” and that she had used it in a joking
manner.
Taclibon v. State Page 9 After Taclibon presented his evidence, the trial court ruled that the
evidence of prior allegations made by Kennedy was inadmissible under Rules
412 and 608(b). The trial court found that the evidence on the 97% Club was
inadmissible because it was too speculative. The trial court further continued
its prior ruling with respect to catfishing. The trial court did allow limited
questioning on Kennedy’s use of the word “sugar daddy.”
Taclibon argues that the trial court’s ruling excluded otherwise relevant,
reliable evidence which formed such a vital portion of his case that it effectively
precluded him from presenting a defense. He maintains that the complained
of evidence was key to his defense because it went to Kennedy’s credibility.
False Allegations of Sexual Abuse
Taclibon sought to introduce evidence that Kennedy had made false
allegations against three boys after her initial accusation against him. A
criminal trial is designed to find the truth about a specific incident, not to
decide whether someone has lied in the past about being raped. Hammer v.
State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Prior false allegations of
rape do not tend to prove or disprove any of the elements of the charged sexual
offense. Id. A sexual assault complainant is not a volunteer for an exercise in
character assassination. Id. However, evidence of false prior accusations may,
under certain circumstances, be admissible to show a victim’s motive or bias
against the defendant. Id. at 565-56.
Taclibon v. State Page 10 While evidence of prior accusations of sexual abuse may be admissible to
impeach the credibility of a complainant, there must be a showing that such
evidence is probative. Aleman v. State, No. 07-23-00142-CR, 2024 WL 952066,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 5, 2024, no pet.); Lempar v. State, 191 S.W.3d
230, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref’d). In order to be considered
probative, there must be evidence that the prior accusations were similar to
the accusations in the instant case and that the prior accusations were false.
See Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Aleman, 2024
WL 952066 at *3; Lempar, 191 S.W.3d at 239.
There is no evidence that the prior allegations were similar to the
accusations against Taclibon. The proffered testimony about the other
allegations was vague. Only E.T. testified as to all three allegations, and her
testimony did not establish that the allegations were similar to those against
Taclibon. All three allegations were against teenage boys and involved a single
encounter. Kennedy’s allegations against Taclibon, a 67-year-old man,
involved years of sexual abuse that started when she was eight years old and
continued until she reported it at age thirteen. In addition, Kennedy denied
making the allegations. There was no evidence that Kennedy reported any
other allegations to the police or other authorities and that they were proven
to be false. See Biggers v. State, No. 10-16-00064-CR, 2017 WL 1540708 at *4
(Tex. App.—Waco April 26, 2017, no pet.).
Taclibon v. State Page 11 Because the evidence of the other allegations was not similar to the
allegations against Taclibon and were not proven to be false, the evidence was
not probative. Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 226. The evidence does not show Kennedy’s
motive or bias. See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 566. Moreover, Taclibon agreed
that at least one of the allegations would be inadmissible under Rule 412. We
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence
of false allegations. See Biggers, 2017 WL 1540708 at *4.
97% Club
Kennedy denied talking to any of her friends about the 97% Club. A.J.
said that Kennedy had mentioned the club, but she could not remember what
she had said about it. E.T. believed that Kennedy wanted to be a part of the
club. The trial court determined that the evidence was speculative. We agree.
E.T.’s testimony that it was “like” Kennedy wanted to be a part of the club does
not establish that Kennedy lied about such allegations. Even if the evidence
was relevant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying its
admission under Rule 403 as its probative value was outweighed by the danger
of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 403.
Kennedy’s Reference to a Sugar Daddy
The trial court allowed Taclibon to question Kennedy about having a
sugar daddy for the limited purpose of showing a motive to make the
allegations after Taclibon took away a phone that he had given to her. Taclibon
Taclibon v. State Page 12 was able to introduce evidence that Kennedy had said in a text message that
she had a sugar daddy. Kennedy admitted she wrote the text and explained
that it was a joke. It is not clear what other evidence concerning a sugar daddy
Taclibon sought to introduce. Taclibon was able to present evidence of a sugar
daddy as it related to Kennedy’s motive to fabricate the allegation. We cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in relation to evidence of a
sugar daddy.
Catfishing
Taclibon sought to introduce evidence that Kennedy had engaged in
catfishing—using a false identity to deceive others. A.J. testified that she does
not know anyone who catfishes people. She did not remember testifying
previously that Kennedy had catfished people and she could not say it is true
that Kennedy had catfished people. E.T. stated that Kennedy told her she
catfished people.
There was no evidence that Kennedy engaged in catfishing Taclibon or
that it was relevant for any purpose other than to attack Kennedy’s credibility.
Therefore, evidence that Kennedy engaged in catfishing would be a specific
instance of conduct prohibited by Rule 608(b). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying admission of the evidence.
Taclibon argues that he was prevented from presenting a vital portion of
his defense that Kennedy was fabricating the allegations. However, he argued
Taclibon v. State Page 13 in both his opening and closing statements that Kennedy was lying. He was
allowed to present testimony that Kennedy’s reputation for truthfulness was
not good. He also pointed out multiple discrepancies in her testimony.
The record shows that the trial court carefully considered Taclibon’s
arguments on multiple occasions throughout the trial. Based upon the record
before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the complained of evidence. We overrule the first issue.
C. Issue Two
In his second issue, Taclibon contends that the State knowingly relied on
Kennedy’s false testimony to secure a conviction in violation of his right to due
process.
1. Authority
A defendant’s due-process rights can be violated when the State uses
false testimony to obtain a conviction, regardless of whether it does so
knowingly or unknowingly. Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 459 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). To constitute a due-process violation, the testimony need not be
perjured; rather, “false” testimony will suffice. Id. at 460. Although the
caselaw frequently refers to “perjured” testimony, the offending testimony
need not be perjured; the question is instead whether the testimony, taken as
a whole, gives the jury a false impression. Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200,
208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex.
Taclibon v. State Page 14 Crim. App. 2011). Further, to constitute a due-process violation, the record
must show that the testimony was material, meaning that there is a
“reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.
Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 208.
Taclibon specifically argues that the State relied on false testimony or
evidence in two instances. The first involved a statement by Kennedy that she
could never make up anything like this. The second involved a defense exhibit
that Taclibon maintains shows a discrepancy between Kennedy’s screenshot of
a text message sent to her by Taclibon and the actual phone records.
During trial, there was testimony that during her sexual assault exam,
Kennedy stated, “I don’t even know how to lie about something like that.”
During the cross-examination of Kennedy, Taclibon’s counsel asked her, “Is it
accurate that you said you didn’t know how to lie about this situation?”
Kennedy responded that she would never lie about this situation. Taclibon
argued to the trial court that he had extrinsic evidence that Kennedy had made
a false allegation against one of the boys. As discussed in the first issue, the
trial court did not allow Taclibon to present evidence of any other allegations.
Taclibon argues on appeal that the State knew Kennedy had made a
false accusation leaving a false impression on the jury that goes to the heart of
the issue, Kennedy’s credibility. However, Kennedy denied making any
Taclibon v. State Page 15 allegations of sexual abuse against the boys. There is no extrinsic evidence
that Kennedy made a false allegation. Taclibon relies on E.T.’s testimony and
the vague testimony of another witness as extrinsic evidence of a false
allegation. The record shows a conflict in evidence rather than a false
allegation. Discrepancies in testimony do not show perjury. Losada v. State,
721 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). There is nothing in the record to
show that the State conspired to present false testimony. See id.
The State admitted an exhibit of a screenshot from Kennedy’s phone that
depicted text messages from Taclibon to Kennedy. In one of the messages,
Taclibon stated, “I think I deserve some love from all these. I’m stressed.”
Taclibon introduced an exhibit that he maintains shows the text message
pattern in the phone records does not match the pattern on the screenshot
image.
A police officer testified at trial Kennedy had deleted some of the text
messages that Taclibon had sent to her. Kennedy also testified that she had
deleted text messages from Taclibon because she did not want her parents to
see them. However, there is nothing to indicate that the deleted text messages
were favorable to Taclibon’s defense. There was also no evidence that the text
message in the screenshot was false. Taclibon does not appear to dispute that
he sent the message but rather argues that there is a message missing from
the pattern.
Taclibon v. State Page 16 The record does not support Taclibon’s argument that the State
conspired to present false evidence. See id. Because the jury was aware that
Kennedy had deleted some text messages from Taclibon, the jury was not left
with a false impression. See Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 208. The jury, as the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be afforded to their
testimony, was able to resolve any issue concerning Kennedy’s credibility
concerning deleting text messages. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). On the record before us, we cannot conclude that there
is a “reasonable likelihood” that the evidence was false or that it affected the
jury’s judgment. Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 208. We overrule Taclibon’s second
issue.
D. Issue Three
In his third issue, Taclibon argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for new trial.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse
of discretion standard. Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014). We do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment, but
rather we determine whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Id. A trial judge abuses his discretion in denying a motion for
new trial when no reasonable view of the record could support his ruling. Id.
Taclibon v. State Page 17 2. Discussion
The trial court held a hearing on Taclibon’s motion for new trial, and
Taclibon had witnesses available to testify. The trial court would not allow
live testimony and ordered affidavits to be submitted within ten days of the
date of the hearing.
At the hearing, Taclibon argued that the verdict was contrary to the law
and evidence because Kennedy’s testimony was proven to be false as it related
to the deleted text messages and false allegations made against the three boys.
He also argued that he was denied his right to present a defense and cross-
examine witnesses because the trial court refused to admit his evidence of
(1) Kennedy’s false allegations against the three boys, (2) Kennedy’s references
to having a sugar daddy, and (3) Kennedy engaging in catfishing. The State
responded that the trial court’s rulings at trial were based upon the same
arguments that Taclibon was making at the hearing.
After the hearing, Taclibon filed affidavits from three individuals.
Taclibon had offered the testimony of all three of those individuals during trial
for his bill of exception. J.S. stated in her affidavit that her testimony at trial
“was not completely accurate.” She stated that Kennedy had told her that she
had been sexually abused by one of the boys, but J.S. knew it was not true.
Taclibon’s investigator stated in his affidavit that he had discovered through
his investigation that Kennedy had made false allegations against the three
Taclibon v. State Page 18 boys. A.R. stated in her affidavit that Kennedy had told her that she had been
sexually assaulted by one of the boys. The trial court reviewed the affidavits
but allowed the motion for new trial to be overruled by operation of law.
Taclibon argues on appeal that the trial court’s decision was
“unreasonable in light of the affidavits which cast a serious shadow over
[Kennedy’s] credibility.” However, none of the affidavits present any new
evidence. The trial court had previously considered the evidence of Kennedy’s
false allegations against the three boys and ruled that it was inadmissible. We
concluded in the first issue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding that evidence. Because Taclibon’s arguments in support of his
motion for new trial were based upon the same evidence offered at trial that
we found to be properly excluded, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Taclibon’s motion for new trial. See id. We overrule the
third issue.
E. Conclusion
Having overruled all of Taclibon’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Taclibon v. State Page 19 MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 5, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do not publish CRPM
Taclibon v. State Page 20