General Tire & Rubber Co., Mayfield Division v. Rule

479 S.W.2d 629, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 312
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMarch 31, 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 479 S.W.2d 629 (General Tire & Rubber Co., Mayfield Division v. Rule) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Tire & Rubber Co., Mayfield Division v. Rule, 479 S.W.2d 629, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 312 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

EDWARD P. HILL, Jr., Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment affirming an opinion and order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board awarding ap-pellee Gerald Rule compensation for fifty percent (50%) permanent partial disability for 400 weeks by reason of a back injury Rule claims he sustained April 27, 1970. Also awarded were temporary total disability benefits, 32 days of which are questioned on this appeal. We affirm.

Appellant divides its argument into three parts, the second and third parts of which are that the findings of the Board on temporary total as well as on permanent partial disability are not supported by the evidence. The first argument is that the Board erred in the interpretation of the evidence on the question of the permanency of Rule’s disability. It argues that there is no positive evidence that the disability is permanent.

The admitted facts are these: Appellee Rule, a 30-year-old high-school graduate, worked for appellant nearly eight years before his claimed injury as a result of lifting a heavy object. The claimed injury occurred about 10:40 a. m. He reported to the plant nurse where he was given aspirin. After lunch hour, he complained his condition worsened and was sent to the plant infirmary. From there he was removed to the Fuller-Gilliam Hospital in Mayfield, Kentucky, where he remained for treatment for a period of five days. The resident physician at this hospital referred Rule to Dr. E. Jeff Justis, Jr., an [631]*631orthopedic surgeon on the staff of .the Campbell Clinic in Memphis, Tennessee.

Appellee Rule returned to work July 13, 1970, but on July 22, 1970, he had to leave work. On August 7, 1970, he again consulted Dr. Justis and reported that he had resumed work but shortly thereafter he had had a “flare-up.” After this Rule consulted his attorney who directed him to Dr. Kenton D. Leatherman of Louisville, Kentucky, also an orthopedic surgeon.

Dr. Justis diagnosed Rule’s condition as “lumbosacral strain.”

Dr. Leatherman’s diagnosis agreed that Rule had received a “lumbosacral sprain with a low grade disk lesion at the L-5 level.” He explained “low grade disk lesion” as “involvement of the lumbosacral disk without necessarily a so-called ruptured disk.”

Appellant insinuates that Rule complained of two or three back injuries previous to the claimed injury of April 1970, and Dr. Leatherman testified that Rule gave a history of a previous back injury “six or seven years ago.”

Appellant’s first argument is that the Board’s findings of fact state that Dr. Leatherman testified that Rule had a 50% permanent partial disability “to the body as a whole”; whereas, his testimony cannot be so construed, as it states: “[I]t would be my opinion that this man presently is fifty percent disabled on a functional impairment basis.”

That Rule has some disability, or did have when the medical evidence was given, there can be little doubt. The real ground of contention is on the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding of permanency. Inasmuch as appellant’s third argument requires the weighing of the evidence on this question, we shall return later in this opinion to this proposition. However, we should comment here on appellant’s first argument as it concerns the Board’s finding of permanency of the disability in the face of Dr. Leatherman’s testimony that Rule’s 50% permanent partial disability was “functional.” First of all, it should be noted that it is the function of the Board to translate “functional” disability into “occupational” disability. See Adkins v. Caney Branch Coal Co., Ky., 459 S.W.2d 771 (1970). The Board had before it the record which disclosed the physical requirements of claimant’s occupation and other evidence of other factors important to a determination of occupational disability.

Up to this writing, neither this court nor the Workmen’s Compensation Board has catalogued the factors that should govern the Board in determining “occupational” disability. Obviously some of those factors would be the physical requirements of the employment, the nature of the injury as it may affect the ability of the injured man to perform the particular duties of his employment, and the age of the claimant. There may be others.

The Board was not bound to fix Rule’s occupational disability at the same percentage as the medical evidence established his functional disability, although it did just that. The Board could have, in the exercise of a sound discretion, fixed occupational disability below, the same as, or greater than the functional disability shown in the medical evidence. Kilgore v. Goose Creek Coal Company, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 78, and Adkins v. Caney Branch Coal Company, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 771.

We next discuss appellant’s argument that the Board erred in allowing compensation for temporary total disability from November 6, 1970, to December 8, 1970. This sounds like peanuts, especially when it is recognized that appellant’s argument in this respect is based on the alleged failure of claimant to comply with a policy of the company regarding the contents of a letter from a doctor, required by appellant before it would put claimant [632]*632back to work. It is not shown that claimant was notified or aware of the policy of the company. We find no merit in this argument.

Finally we come to appellant’s argument that the evidence does not support the award finding that claimant’s disability was permanent. In order that this argument be given fair consideration, it will be necessary to quote from the evidence.

Dr. Kenton D. Leatherman, introduced as a witness by Rule, gave the following testimony:

“13 — Doctor, will you state whether or not you have an opinion at this time as to whether or not Mr. Rule would be able to engage in any work which would require heavy manual labor such as lifting, bending, stooping or repetitive motion ?
“A — Yes. In my opinion this man should not engage in any activities of this type and should continue with the use of the back brace and should do only light duty activity.
“14 — All right. Now, Doctor, have you at this time arrived at any rating of his impairment — medical impairment function?
“A — Yes, it would be my opinion that this man presently is fifty per cent disabled on a functional impairment basis.
“IS — Does this extend to the body as a whole ?
“A — Yes, sir; it would.
* * * * * *
“17 — Has he, in your opinion, reached maximum improvement?
“A — No, sir; he has not.
* * * * * *
“38 — Yes. But now you don’t believe he had reached his maximum as far as improvement ?
“A — That’s right.
* jjS ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“47 — Do you anticipate that the patient will completely recover from an injury of this type?

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Bluebook (online)
479 S.W.2d 629, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 312, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-tire-rubber-co-mayfield-division-v-rule-kyctapp-1972.