General Storage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

General Storage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

576 So. 2d 768, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1481, 1991 WL 22574

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedFebruary 26, 1991

DocketNo. 90-2664

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 576 So. 2d 768 (General Storage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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General Storage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 576 So. 2d 768, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1481, 1991 WL 22574 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied based upon the respondent’s concession, which we accept, that any factual determinations made in the non-jury mortgage foreclosure action will have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as to any of the issues to be determined by the jury on the petitioners’ third-party complaint against the FDIC as receiver. See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 733, 162 So. 323, 329 (1935); Couch Constr. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 537 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1989); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982); see also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 783 (5th Cir.1989); Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1988); FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Center, 791 F.2d 215, 218-21 (1st Cir.1986); American Surety Co. v. Normandy State Bank, 237 Mo.App. 39, 167 S.W.2d 436 (1943). Given this concession, we conclude that the petitioners’ right to a jury trial on the third-party complaint was not violated below by scheduling the mortgage foreclosure action for trial before the trial on the third-party complaint. Compare Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So.2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

Certiorari denied.

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PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied based upon the respondent’s concession, which we accept, that any factual determinations made in the non-jury mortgage foreclosure action will have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as to any of the issues to be determined by the jury on the petitioners’ third-party complaint against the FDIC as receiver. See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 733, 162 So. 323, 329 (1935); Couch Constr. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 537 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1989); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982); see also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 783 (5th Cir.1989); Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1988); FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Center, 791 F.2d 215, 218-21 (1st Cir.1986); American Surety Co. v. Normandy State Bank, 237 Mo.App. 39, 167 S.W.2d 436 (1943). Given this concession, we conclude that the petitioners’ right to a jury trial on the third-party complaint was not violated below by scheduling the mortgage foreclosure action for trial before the trial on the third-party complaint. Compare Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So.2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

Certiorari denied.

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576 So. 2d 768, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1481, 1991 WL 22574, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-storage-corp-v-federal-deposit-insurance-corp-fladistctapp-1991.

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