General Motors Corporation v. Dailey

93 F.2d 938, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2925
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 8, 1937
Docket7644, 7645
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 93 F.2d 938 (General Motors Corporation v. Dailey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Corporation v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2925 (6th Cir. 1937).

Opinion

ALLEN, Circuit Judge.

Appeal and cross-appeal from decree awarding damages by way of reasonable royalty for infringement of patent No. 855,970, issued June 4, 1907, to Walter P. Pearson. The Pearson patent, during the period in controversy, was owned by Charles C. Blackmore, who also owned a patent for an accompanying device for vehicle curtain support, No. 985,105, issued to himself. The patented article consisted of supporting rods for automobile curtains fastened to the doors of the old type of open car, so that the curtains would swing with the doors. The Pearson patent was held valid in this court in the case of Collins v. Hupp Motor Car Corporation, 22 F.(2d) 27.

This action was begun at law by Jeffrey N. Collins, whom Blackmore had constituted his exclusive agent to represent him in all dealings with manufacturers of automobiles. Collins joined Blackmore as a plaintiff, alleging that Blackmore had refused to sue. 1 Blackmore, prior to the filing of the petition herein, assigned his entire right, title and interest in any claim or demand which he might have against the assignee growing out of its use of the Pearson patent to General Motors Corporation, and released and discharged the assignee from all liability growing out of its use of the invention. In the first trial a motion was made to transfer the case to the equity side of the court, which motion was denied. On appeal this court held [General Motors Corporation v. Blackmore, 53 F.(2d) 725] that the motion should have been sustained because an action could not be maintained at law in which Blackmore was joined as plaintiff after having executed the assignment and release to General Motors Corporation. The cause was remanded for equity trial, and for determination of reasonable royalty. On the retrial the court found royalty of fifteen cents per car to be reasonable, and allowed interest on the award from the date of the expiration of the patent.

The principal contentions of appellant are that the rate of royalty is too high, and that the date from which interest runs on the award should be the date of the decree rather than the date of expiration of the patent. The cross-appeal assigns as error the failure of the court to allow damages for wilful infringement.

*940 The Rate of Reasonable Royalty

The infringement of the patent is not questioned. The number of cars on which the devices were used by General Motors Corporation as original equipment was 486,093. 55,265 infringing curtain rods were used by General Motors Corporation for service during the same period. The trial court determined that in view of the wide range of royalties paid for the device, and taking into consideration the element of quantity of production, the reasonable royalty was 15 cents per car, and 3% cents per rod for the structures used in service. Appellant contends that this rate is too high because of its great quantity production and because a lower license rate than 15 cents was given to certain licensees. Appellee, while not assigning error to the rate of royalty, contends that the reasonable rate of royalty for the device, in the absence of disturbing price factors such as the general infringement alleged to have existed, was 25 cents per car.

No established royalty is shown. In their original written contract Collins and Blackmore agreed to demand not less than 20 cents per car for license to manufacture. Blackmore manufactured the rods and sold them direct to automobile manufacturers. Collins was to introduce the rods and put them on the market. It soon developed that Blackmore could' not manufacture rods in a sufficient quantity to meet the demand, and Collins arranged with Diamond Manufacturing Company, the predecessor of Motor Products Corporation, to supply the rods. Collins made an alternative proposition to automobile manufacturers, offering them either a license at the rate of 25 cents per car, or that they buy the rods from Motor Products Corporation. This company manufactured the rods, sold and delivered them, and from the prices which it received it paid Collins 25 cents per roadster and 30 cents per touring car. Collins then remitted one-half of this amount to Blackmore. During the years 1915 to 1923 inclusive, Motor Products Corporation sold the device to more than 50 automobile manufacturers, and to 63 automobile top, body and trim companies. The rates of 25 cents and 30 cents were paid by Motor Products Corporation to Collins on all sets until November, 1919, after which time it lowered its rate to 20 cents per car, or five cents per rod. Infringement was then beginning to be general. 2 These rates were paid to Collins irrespective of the prices charged by Motor Products Corporation.

On the former appeal [53 F.(2d) 725, 730] it was declared that these sales were made by Collins and not by Motor Products Corporation, and that the amounts of 25 cents and 30 cents respectively were not royalties, but profits. The court stated that evidence of profits 'made upon sales of the patented device was not admissible in absence of further evidence as to the portion of such profits reasonably to be attributed to the patent and the portion fairly to be ascribed to the production of the rods as a separate manufacturing enterprise. Appellee contends that in the retrial additional evidence was introduced which supports a finding that the payments by Motor Products Corporation were reasonably attributable to the Pearson patent, and constituted royalty.

We think this record supports appellee’s contention. The new testimony introduced herein shows that the sales were made not by Collins, but by Motor Products Corporation. There was no partnership between Collins, Blackmore,and Motor Products Corporation, and no agency relationship existed between the corporation and Blackmore. The entire operation of manufacture and sale was carried on by Motor Products Corporation. Collins’ arrangement was merely to introduce the rods to the trade, not to make thg sale. He never made a second call on the automobile manufacturer unless some engineering difficulty arose. Motor Products Corporation determined whether credit should bé extended, made and delivered the rods, sent out the invoices, and then accounted for royalties to Collins, who divided the sums received with Blackmore upon an equal basis, the total amount received being $148,767.06. Tags provided by Collins were applied to the rods to indicate the patent number. 3

*941 Also Motor Products Corporation was licensed to perform this operation. On inquiry from Diamond Manufacturing Company, the predecessor of Motor Products Corporation, which had received an order for rods from the Hupp Motor Car Corporation, and knew the rods were patented, written authority was given by Blackmore to manufacture the curtain carriers on any and all orders turned over by Collins. At about the same time Collins and the manager of Diamond Manufacturing Company agreed verbally that the company should make the rods for Collins and sell them at a price including a royalty of 25 cents on a roadster and 30 cents on a touring car. Not only were rods sold on orders from Collins, but over the period of several years, with the acquiescence of Collins and Blackmore, rods were manufactured and sold by Motor Products Corporation on repeat orders which did not come from Collins.

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Bluebook (online)
93 F.2d 938, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 2925, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-corporation-v-dailey-ca6-1937.