General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Teefy Pontiac Co. (In re Teefy Pontiac Co.)

16 B.R. 425, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5075
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 13, 1982
DocketBankruptcy No. 81-02569G; Adv. No. 81-1254G
StatusPublished

This text of 16 B.R. 425 (General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Teefy Pontiac Co. (In re Teefy Pontiac Co.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Teefy Pontiac Co. (In re Teefy Pontiac Co.), 16 B.R. 425, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5075 (Pa. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION

EMIL F. GOLDHABER, Bankruptcy Judge:

The issue presented is whether the plaintiff has perfected, nonavoidable security interests in the automotive parts inventory and in the dealership assets and equipment of the debtor which secure the debt owed to the plaintiff under a wholesale security agreement by which the plaintiff financed the debtor’s purchase of cars for sale or lease by its dealership. We conclude that the plaintiff has such perfected and nonavoidable security interests and that those security interests secure the debt owed to the plaintiff by the debtor under the wholesale security agreement.

The facts of the instant case are as follows: 1 Teefy Pontiac Company (“the debt- or”) was in the business of selling and leasing new and used cars for almost 50 years before it filed a petition for a reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) on July 2, 1981. To finance that car dealership, the debtor entered into several agreements with General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”). The Wholesale Security Agreement, executed by the debtor and GMAC on May 21, 1976, provided that GMAC would advance money to car manufacturers on behalf of the debtor for the acquisition of new and used cars and that GMAC would have a security interest in all such cars and the proceeds thereof for the money so advanced. On October 18, 1979, and again on January 20, 1981, the debtor and GMAC executed security agreements whereby GMAC obtained a security interest in the debtor’s automotive parts and accessories inventory and the proceeds thereof (“parts inventory”). That security interest was duly perfected on January 26, 1981. On October 18,1979, the parties also executed a security agreement whereby GMAC obtained a security interest in the debtor’s dealership assets and equipment, machinery and shop equipment, parts and accessory equip[427]*427ment, furniture and fixtures, signs and small tools and miscellaneous supplies and the proceeds thereof (“the equipment”). That security interest was duly perfected on October 22, 1979.

On September 21, 1981, GMAC filed the instant complaint seeking, inter alia, relief from the automatic stay to permit it to foreclose its security interests in the parts inventory and the equipment of the debtor. The parties stipulated to several facts, including (1) that the value of the parts inventory is between $100,000.00 arid $130,-000.00 and (2) that the property in question is not necessary to the debtor’s reorganization because the debtor’s business has terminated. At the trial held herein, the witness for GMAC stated that the debt due to GMAC was $129,000.00 excluding attorneys’ fees and the costs incurred by it in selling the debtor’s inventory.2

In its answer and at the trial held herein, the debtor raised as defenses to the complaint: (1) that the security interest of GMAC in the parts inventory of the debtor did not secure the debt owed by the debtor to GMAC for the financing of new GM cars because there were no documents to support those transactions as required by the security agreement for the parts inventory; and (2) that the security interest of GMAC in the debtor’s equipment is voidable by the debtor pursuant to § 544 of the Code.

With respect to the debtor’s first defense, the relevant language of the security agreement in question provides that GMAC shall have a security interest in the parts inventory:

In consideration of GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, hereinafter called GMAC, extending credit to Teefy by or through accepting, purchasing, discounting or otherwise acquiring any instrument or document, including (Without limiting the generality of the foregoing) any promissory note, draft, trust receipt or other form of security document, hereinafter collectively referred to as the obligation, executed in connection with GMAC financing of new or used products under the GMAC Wholesale Plan for the Dealer.

The debtor admits that the above language gives GMAC a security interest in the parts inventory to secure the financing by GMAC of used cars and cars acquired from the American Motors Corporation (“AMC”) because that financing was evidenced by certain written security documents. However, the débtor asserts that the above language does not give GMAC a security interest in that property to secure the financing of new General Motors (“GM”) cars because that financing was not evidenced by any written security documents. Instead, that financing was done exclusively by computer transactions between GMAC and GM.

We disagree with the debtor’s assertion because we find that it was the agreement of the parties that any debt owed to GMAC on account of the financing of any car under the wholesale security agreement was to be further secured by the security interest given to GMAC in the debtor’s parts inventory. This finding is evident from the testimony presented at the trial herein. The witness for GMAC stated that the security agreement in question (which was executed in 1979 and again in 1981) was intended to give GMAC additional security for all of its financing of the debtor’s car dealership. The president of the debtor conceded that GMAC had demanded such additional security and admitted that the majority of the debtor’s business was in GM ears (5 out of 6 cars sold or leased by the debtor were GM cars). In addition, the debtor’s president testified that, since 1976, under the terms of the parties’ wholesale floor plan financing arrangement, GMAC would provide financing for GM cars by computer transactions between GMAC and [428]*428GM and that the debtor would receive evidence of that financing through monthly statements. The debtor at no time objected to that method of financing and never indicated (until the instant proceeding) that it understood the additional security agreement not to secure the majority of the debt owed by it to GMAC. Furthermore, we conclude that the Wholesale Security Agreement executed by the parties in 1976, which grants a security interest to GMAC in all of the debtor’s cars, is itself a “document ... executed in connection with GMAC financing of new or used products under the GMAC Wholesale Plan for the Dealer” so as to be within the scope of the security agreement covering the debtor’s parts inventory. In light of the above, we conclude that the security interest granted to GMAC in the debtor’s parts inventory secures the debt owed to GMAC for the financing of GM cars, as well as AMC cars and used cars.

With respect to the debtor’s second defense, we deduce that GMAC’s security interest in the debtor’s equipment is not avoidable pursuant to § 544(a) of the Code. That section provides:

(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by—
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;

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Bluebook (online)
16 B.R. 425, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-acceptance-corp-v-teefy-pontiac-co-in-re-teefy-pontiac-paeb-1982.