General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Fletcher

Supreme Court of North Carolina

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Fletcher

162 S.E. 234, 202 N.C. 170, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 454

Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided January 27, 1932·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

CONNOR, ,T.

On its appeal to this Court, plaintiff relies on its assignments of error Dased on its exceptions to tbe rulings- of tbe judge of tbe Superior Court on its appeal from tbe judgment of tbe county court witb respect to its exceptions at tbe trial pertinent to tbe third issue. In view of tbe admissions in tbe pleadings, this is tbe determinative issue in this action. Tbe execution by tbe defendant of tbe negotiable instrument sued on in this action, its transfer by tbe endorsement of tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company for value and before maturity to tbe plaintiff, and tbe payment of tbe amount of said instrument by tbe defendant to tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company, after its transfer and before its maturity, are admitted. Tbe defense interposed by tbe defendant is that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, for tbe collection of said instrument, and that therefore tbe payment of tbe same by tbe defendant to tbe said Buick Company discharged tbe defendant from liability on tbe instrument.

There was evidence at tbe trial tending to show that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, as alleged in tbe answer; this evidence witb evidence offered by tbe plaintiff to tbe contrary was submitted to tbe jury under instructions which are free from error.

*172 ’ The judgment is affirmed under the authority of Credit Co. v. Greenhill, 201 N. C., 609, 161 S. E., 72; Bank v. Howell, 200. N. C., 637, 158 S. E., 203, and Buckner v. C. I. T. Corporation, 198 N. C., 698, 153 S. E., 254. In these cases it is held that where there is evidence tending to show that an alleged agent has repeatedly collected money upon debts owed to the alleged principal, and the alleged principal has received the money collected by the alleged agent, and applied the same as payments on his debts, the inference is permissible that an agreement to that effect had been made by and between them, and that the evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of agency. This principle is applicable in the instant case. There was no error in the judgment affirming the judgment of the county court.' It is Affirmed.

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CONNOR, ,T.

On its appeal to this Court, plaintiff relies on its assignments of error Dased on its exceptions to tbe rulings- of tbe judge of tbe Superior Court on its appeal from tbe judgment of tbe county court witb respect to its exceptions at tbe trial pertinent to tbe third issue. In view of tbe admissions in tbe pleadings, this is tbe determinative issue in this action. Tbe execution by tbe defendant of tbe negotiable instrument sued on in this action, its transfer by tbe endorsement of tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company for value and before maturity to tbe plaintiff, and tbe payment of tbe amount of said instrument by tbe defendant to tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company, after its transfer and before its maturity, are admitted. Tbe defense interposed by tbe defendant is that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, for tbe collection of said instrument, and that therefore tbe payment of tbe same by tbe defendant to tbe said Buick Company discharged tbe defendant from liability on tbe instrument.

There was evidence at tbe trial tending to show that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, as alleged in tbe answer; this evidence witb evidence offered by tbe plaintiff to tbe contrary was submitted to tbe jury under instructions which are free from error.

*172 ’ The judgment is affirmed under the authority of Credit Co. v. Greenhill, 201 N. C., 609, 161 S. E., 72; Bank v. Howell, 200. N. C., 637, 158 S. E., 203, and Buckner v. C. I. T. Corporation, 198 N. C., 698, 153 S. E., 254. In these cases it is held that where there is evidence tending to show that an alleged agent has repeatedly collected money upon debts owed to the alleged principal, and the alleged principal has received the money collected by the alleged agent, and applied the same as payments on his debts, the inference is permissible that an agreement to that effect had been made by and between them, and that the evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of agency. This principle is applicable in the instant case. There was no error in the judgment affirming the judgment of the county court.' It is Affirmed.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Fletcher, 162 S.E. 234, 202 N.C. 170, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 454 (N.C. 1932).

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