General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bates (In Re Bates)

161 B.R. 965, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16782, 1993 WL 529575
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 30, 1993
Docket93 C 0773
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 161 B.R. 965 (General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bates (In Re Bates)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bates (In Re Bates), 161 B.R. 965, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16782, 1993 WL 529575 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HOLDERMAN, District Judge:

This matter has come before this court on appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appellant General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) appeals Judge Eugene R. WedofPs order of January 6, 1993 granting debtor/appellee Brenda Bates’ motion to avoid appellant GMAC’s wage deduction lien under section 522(f) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). For the reasons stated below, this court affirms the decision of the bankruptcy court.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts in this matter are undisputed. On August 2,1991, GMAC obtained a judgment against the debtor in the amount of $6,584.52 plus court costs. On June 25,1992, GMAC attempted to collect this judgment by instituting a wage deduction proceeding under Illinois law. GMAC filed an affidavit for wage deduction order causing a wage deduction summons to be served on the debtor’s employer. 1 Under Illinois law, service of a wage deduction summons imposes a lien on the debtor’s deducted wages. 2

The return date for the wage deduction summons was October 9, 1992. 3 However, the debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 27, 1992. Consequently, the state court never entered a wage deduction order in this case. Prior to the debtor filing the petition for relief in bankruptcy, the debtor’s employer had deducted $312.87 of the debtor’s wages pursuant to the wage deduction summons. The debtor’s employer is still holding that $312.87 of the debtor’s wages pursuant to the wage deduction summons.

After filing the petition for relief in bankruptcy, the debtor claimed the $312.87 of deducted wages as exempt property pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b), Ill.Rev.Stat. 110, para. 12-1001(b), which entitles a debtor to claim an exemption not exceeding $2,000 in personal property. The debtor sought to avoid GMAC’s wage deduction lien pursuant to Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, *967 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 4 The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s motion to avoid GMAC’s wage deduction lien.

ANALYSIS

The facts are undisputed in this case. Appellant GMAC raises on appeal only questions of law. Therefore, this court reviews the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo. In the Matter of UNR Industries, Inc., 986 F.2d 207, 208 (7th Cir.1993).

Appellant GMAC argues that the debtor’s motion to avoid its lien on her deducted wages should be denied because the debtor retained no property interest in the deducted wages; the debtor is no longer permitted to avoid a lien on wages under Illinois law; and the debtor cannot avoid an Illinois wage deduction lien under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

I. The Debtor’s Interest in the Deducted Wages

Appellant argues that the prepetition service of a wage deduction summons, pursuant to Illinois wage deduction law, divested the debtor of her property interest in the properly deducted wages. Therefore, appellant contends, the deducted wages never became part of the debtor’s estate, and the debtor could not claim them as exempt property under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected appellant’s argument and held that the entry of a wage deduction order, not the service of summons, deprives a debtor of her interest in deducted wages. In re Bates, 148 B.R. 541 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.1993). The holding of the bankruptcy court in this case is consistent with the decisions in In re Garcia, 155 B.R. 173 (N.D.Ill. 1993); Bryant v. General Electric Credit Corp., 58 B.R. 144, 145 (N.D.Ill.1986); In re Waltjen, 150 B.R. 419, 423 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993); and In re Weatherspoon, 101 B.R. 533, 541 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989).

This court also rejects GMAC’s argument and finds that the debtor retained a property interest in the deducted wages until the entry of a wage deduction order. The Illinois wage deduction statute has not clearly defined what property interest a debtor retains in her wages after the service of a wage deduction summons. However, it is apparent to this court that the debtor retains some interest in the deducted wages after the service of the wage deduction summons because, under Illinois law, until the entry of a wage deduction order, the debtor has a statutory right to request a hearing to dispute the propriety of the wage deduction. See 735 ILCS 5/12-811(b), Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-811(b). If the debtor has standing to challenge the propriety of the wage deduction, the debtor must retain some property interest in the deducted wages. See In re Garcia, 155 B.R. 173, 175 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (citing Bryant v. General Electric Credit Corp., 58 B.R. 144, 145 (N.D.Ill.1986)).

GMAC also argues that because the debt- or’s wages in this case were being “properly” withheld (not subject to any exemption), the debtor has no property interest in these wages because under the Illinois wage deduction statute the debtor could never reclaim properly deducted wages. The court agrees with GMAC’s conclusion, however, the court finds that GMAC’s conclusion is based on a faulty assumption. GMAC assumes that the debtor’s wages were properly deducted. Until the debtor and the debtor’s other creditors, aside from GMAC, have had the opportunity to have a hearing regarding the propriety of the wage deduction and the court enters a wage deduction order, there can be no certainty regarding whether the debtor’s wages were properly withheld.

Because a state court has never entered a wage deduction order in this case, the propriety of the wage deduction has not been determined and the debtor has retained a property interest in the deducted wages. That property interest of the debtor became part of the debtor’s estate when she filed for bankruptcy.

II. Exemptions Under Illinois Law

GMAC argues that even if the debtor has a property interest in the deducted wages, un *968 der Illinois law, she is prevented from exempting the wages withheld pursuant to the wage deduction summons. The court disagrees with appellant GMAC’s assessment of Illinois property exemption law.

Under Illinois personal property exemption law, 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b), Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 110, paras.

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Bluebook (online)
161 B.R. 965, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16782, 1993 WL 529575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-acceptance-corp-v-bates-in-re-bates-ilnd-1993.