General Electric Co. v. Steinberger

208 F. 699, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1263
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedOctober 9, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 208 F. 699 (General Electric Co. v. Steinberger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Electric Co. v. Steinberger, 208 F. 699, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).

Opinion

CHATFIELD, District Judge.

The present suit is brought under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3392), by which an applicant is given “remedy by bill in equity” “whenever a patent on application is refused” by the Commissioner or by the court of the District of Columbia “upon appeal.” Adverse parties must have notice, and it necessarily follows, if the defeat of the applicant has been the outcome of an interference proceeding, or based upon a determination that some other applicant is the original inventor or is entitled to the patent, that the successful applicant is a necessary party to the bill in equity, and a decree therein in favor of the-plaintiff will carry a determination of invalidity or lack of right in the record patentee. Laas v. Scott (C. C.) 161 Fed. 122. The resultant proceedings in the Patent Office will necessarily be the issuance of a. patent to the plaintiff and a cancellation of the grant by letters patent previously issued.

On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, the case is heard in the nature of a review, and the finding of fact of the Commissioner must be considered from the standpoint of the record as made on the-appeal.

[1] But, in a proceeding under section 4915, the testimony is taken de novo, and, while the record may be identical with that in the Patent Office, nevertheless the court must make its own findings upon the testimony. In so doing, it must treat the conclusions of the Commissioner of Patents and of the Court of Appeals as findings of a tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to the matters determined in the Patent Office, or upon appeal therefrom, and, in so far as these determinations are shown to have been made upon the same facts as those presented to the court in the action under section 4915, they should not be disturbed unless shown to be plainly and unmistakably erroneous. Laas v. Scott, supra; Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corporation, 166 Fed. 288, 92 C. C. A. 206; Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U. S. 120, 14 Sup. Ct. 772, 38 L. Ed. 657.

The plaintiff’s case has to be proved only by a preponderance of testimony, but it must be testimony which the court believes, and that belief involves proving to the court’s satisfaction that the findings of the Patent Office were incorrect. All reasonable doubt must be removed and thorough conviction must be had. Such is believed to be-the doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 120, 21 L. Ed. 821, Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 689, 6 Sup. Ct. 970, 29 L. Ed. 1017, and Morgan v. Daniels, supra.

In the present action a large amount of testimony has been offered to show, upon the present record, the entire transaction and all the [701]*701material acts of the parties concerned therewith, both in and out of the Patent Office, and with respect to matters having to do with the rights to the patents involved, even, though the Patent Office proceedings did not contain testimony of the same sort. In some instances this additional testimony is offered as newly discovered evidence. In some instances the new testimony is presented to explain and rebut the conclusions of the Patent Office, upon the record which was before it. In some instances the new testimony is offered as to matters which were not thought relevant or necessary for presentation to the Patent Office in the previous hearing.

In general it must be held that all such testimony is competent and must be considered by the court in the action under section 4915, but in so far as the conclusions of the Patent Office, as sustained on appeal, are treated as a fair determination, upon similar testimony, and hence as being valid unless plainly erroneous, and in so far as the parties to the interference proceeding may have been estopped from asserting things inconsistent with their claims before the Patent Office, this court will not use the additional proofs in reaching a conclusion on the right to the patent, until it has determined whether the defeated party is in a position to contest further, or to give additional testimony about, the matters thus previously determined.

So far as the subject-matter of the action is concerned, the record proceedings introduced in evidence, and the discussion of the questions presented therein, it is unnecessary to restate here what has been so well expressed in the various opinions that must be read as a part of the consideration. These opinions show clearly the various record dates and steps of the transactions, and the discussion in the present case will take them up from the evidence in this action, bearing thereon. These various opinions will be used, therefore, as if their statements had been set forth in full. The first Buck & Hewlett application generally will be referred to as the “abandoned Buck & Hewlett application,” the patent issued to Steinberger, as the result of the interference (No. 904,370), will be referred to as the “Steinberger patent,” and the sole application by Hewlett for certain claims of the Buck & Hewlett application will be called the “Hewlett application.”

The earliest of these opinions on the merits of the application was rendered November 2, 1911, by the Kxaminer of Interferences, after final hearing upon the 13th of April of that year, and determines that Steinberger was not entitled to a patent for the device covered by certain counts which had been put into interference by the office and accepted by both Steinberger and the plaintiffs in the present action.

It will be seen that in the present case these counts broadly apply or can be readmpon a structure having annular flanges, corrugations, or rings, projecting from the face of the disk, on opposite sides of the disk, and set at any angle to the face of the disk. But each of these annular flanges, as shown in the exhibits, in the drawings, and in the testimony both before the Patent Office and the court, are slightly thicker at the point of union with the disk, have in general parallel sides, and each pair of flanges, while generally “opposite” one another, yet inclose an angle of substantially 90 degrees between the [702]*702sides away from the axis and some 270 degrees between the sides toward the axis instead of being opposite in direction; that is, 180 degrees away, from each other.

It appears that Steinberger, in the Exhibit Y5, as well as in other patents issued to him, and as shown in various patents of the prior art, understood and used the water-shedding properties of such a flange, and that he, or any other person with the intelligence of an ordinary mechanic, could have appreciated the effect of two such flanges upon opposite sides of the disk, as distinguished from two flanges opposite to each other; that is, in the same general plane or extending at an angle of 180 degrees from each other.

As has been said, the drawing Y5 and the claims of the Steinberger patent as actually issued and as finally allowed by the Patent Office point out this fact. In the same way the Hewlett application and the Hewlett drawing (Exhibit 10c), as also the abandoned Buck & Hewlett application, show what are called “obliquely projecting flanges on opposite sides of the periphery,” and the drawings of the abandoned Buck & Hewlett application contain (Figs.

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Bluebook (online)
208 F. 699, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-electric-co-v-steinberger-nyed-1913.