Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-12868 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-00633-GKS-KRS
GENE T. JACOBS, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRUCE D. CHADBOURNE, JR., an individual,
Defendant,
UNUM GROUP CORPORATION, in its individual capacity and as controlling parent of its wholly owned subsidiary, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, a Delaware corporation, f.k.a. UNUM Provident Corporation, THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Maine corporation,
Defendants-Appellees. Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 2 of 7
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(May 3, 2018)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gene Jacobs brought state law claims against the defendants, Unum Group
Corporation and the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, after he did not receive
the amount of monthly benefits he thought he was entitled to receive under his
disability insurance policy. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Jacobs appeals, contending that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants on his promissory estoppel claims.
I.
In 1986 Jacobs purchased disability insurance from the defendants. In
procuring the insurance he used the services of an independent broker, Bruce
Chadbourne. Two years later Jacobs approached Chadbourne about adding
lifetime coverage to the policy. The defendants issued Jacobs a “Lifetime Total
Disability Benefit Rider,” which stated that the defendants will pay benefits if the
insured’s disability begins before age 65 and continues until age 65. It also
provided that Jacobs’ maximum monthly insurance benefit of $5,000 would
2 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 3 of 7
decrease 10 percent for each year after age 55 until age 65, meaning that if he
became totally disabled at, for example, 64 years old, his monthly benefit would be
reduced by 90 percent. In 1992 Jacobs requested, and the defendants approved, an
increase of the policy’s maximum monthly benefit from $5,000 to $5,300.
In early 2003 Jacobs called the defendants to confirm the benefits in his
disability policy, and in April the defendants faxed Chadbourne a letter outlining
Jacobs’ benefits. The fax cover sheet described the letter as a “summary outlining
the benefits currently provided by the above referenced disability policy(s).” The
letter provided the policy’s issue date, the monthly premium, and the maximum
monthly benefit of $5,300. It did not mention the lifetime rider or the 10 percent
reductions described in that rider. The letter concluded: “This letter does not
replace the actual contract issued to you previously by the Paul Revere Life
Insurance Company. If you have any questions pertaining to this letter, please feel
free to contact us . . . .”
In December 2011 Jacobs submitted a claim for total disability benefits
based on a date of disability of November 15, 2011, which was less than a month
before he turned 65. 1 The defendants accepted his claim and began paying benefits
1 On November 10, 2011 — five days before the onset of Jacobs’ disability — Jacobs emailed Chadbourne asking him to follow up with the defendants about another letter he had received about his disability policy. That same day Chadbourne emailed Jacobs and his wife, stating that certain benefits “are removed from the policy on your birthday, per the contract, so if you want to get disabled, you need to do it by your birthday while you still have lifetime coverage.”
3 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 4 of 7
to him. After the payments were reduced by 90 percent based on Jacobs’ age on
the date of disability (64 years old), he sued the defendants asserting promissory
estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims based on their failure to mention
in the 2003 letter the lifetime rider’s reductions. Both sides moved for summary
judgment, and the district court granted the defendants’ motion and denied Jacobs’
motion. This is his appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Liebman
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment
is proper when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Jacobs. See Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1299.
III.
A.
Jacobs contends that the district court erred by charging him with
knowledge of the contents of his insurance policy. He argues that because Florida
law does doesn’t require an insured to read an insurance policy, he shouldn’t have
been charged with knowledge of his policy’s terms.
Even though Jacobs was not required by law to read the contract, see
Blumberg v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 51 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1951), under Florida
4 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 5 of 7
law he is still charged with knowledge of the contract’s contents, 2 see Allied Van
Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 351 So. 2d 344, 347–48 (Fla. 1977) (“It has long been held
in Florida that one is bound by his contract. Unless one can show facts and
circumstances to demonstrate that he was prevented from reading the contract, or
that he was induced by statements of the other party to refrain from reading the
contract, it is binding.”). Put simply, Florida law assumes that a party to a contract
knows the terms of the contract but does not require that a party read it. See
Stonebraker v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 166 So. 583, 584 (Fla. 1936)
(“The insured was a party to the contract. The evidence shows that the contract
was in his possession during the whole time from the date of delivery until insured
died. . . . [U]nder this state of facts the insured was bound by the terms expressed
in the contract and is charged with knowledge of the provisions of the contract.”).
Because Jacobs, as the insured, was a party to the contract, and because he had the
policy and the lifetime rider in his possession, the district court did not err in
charging him with knowledge of the contents of his policy.
2 That general rule applies to all types of contracts, including disability insurance policies like the one at issue here. See, e.g., id. (contract for shipment of goods); Kimbal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 10 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. 1942) (group life insurance policy); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Hoxie, 176 So. 480, 481 (Fla. 1937) (indemnity insurance policy); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Benton, 467 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla.
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Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-12868 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-00633-GKS-KRS
GENE T. JACOBS, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRUCE D. CHADBOURNE, JR., an individual,
Defendant,
UNUM GROUP CORPORATION, in its individual capacity and as controlling parent of its wholly owned subsidiary, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, a Delaware corporation, f.k.a. UNUM Provident Corporation, THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Maine corporation,
Defendants-Appellees. Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 2 of 7
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(May 3, 2018)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gene Jacobs brought state law claims against the defendants, Unum Group
Corporation and the Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, after he did not receive
the amount of monthly benefits he thought he was entitled to receive under his
disability insurance policy. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Jacobs appeals, contending that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants on his promissory estoppel claims.
I.
In 1986 Jacobs purchased disability insurance from the defendants. In
procuring the insurance he used the services of an independent broker, Bruce
Chadbourne. Two years later Jacobs approached Chadbourne about adding
lifetime coverage to the policy. The defendants issued Jacobs a “Lifetime Total
Disability Benefit Rider,” which stated that the defendants will pay benefits if the
insured’s disability begins before age 65 and continues until age 65. It also
provided that Jacobs’ maximum monthly insurance benefit of $5,000 would
2 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 3 of 7
decrease 10 percent for each year after age 55 until age 65, meaning that if he
became totally disabled at, for example, 64 years old, his monthly benefit would be
reduced by 90 percent. In 1992 Jacobs requested, and the defendants approved, an
increase of the policy’s maximum monthly benefit from $5,000 to $5,300.
In early 2003 Jacobs called the defendants to confirm the benefits in his
disability policy, and in April the defendants faxed Chadbourne a letter outlining
Jacobs’ benefits. The fax cover sheet described the letter as a “summary outlining
the benefits currently provided by the above referenced disability policy(s).” The
letter provided the policy’s issue date, the monthly premium, and the maximum
monthly benefit of $5,300. It did not mention the lifetime rider or the 10 percent
reductions described in that rider. The letter concluded: “This letter does not
replace the actual contract issued to you previously by the Paul Revere Life
Insurance Company. If you have any questions pertaining to this letter, please feel
free to contact us . . . .”
In December 2011 Jacobs submitted a claim for total disability benefits
based on a date of disability of November 15, 2011, which was less than a month
before he turned 65. 1 The defendants accepted his claim and began paying benefits
1 On November 10, 2011 — five days before the onset of Jacobs’ disability — Jacobs emailed Chadbourne asking him to follow up with the defendants about another letter he had received about his disability policy. That same day Chadbourne emailed Jacobs and his wife, stating that certain benefits “are removed from the policy on your birthday, per the contract, so if you want to get disabled, you need to do it by your birthday while you still have lifetime coverage.”
3 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 4 of 7
to him. After the payments were reduced by 90 percent based on Jacobs’ age on
the date of disability (64 years old), he sued the defendants asserting promissory
estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims based on their failure to mention
in the 2003 letter the lifetime rider’s reductions. Both sides moved for summary
judgment, and the district court granted the defendants’ motion and denied Jacobs’
motion. This is his appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Liebman
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment
is proper when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Jacobs. See Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1299.
III.
A.
Jacobs contends that the district court erred by charging him with
knowledge of the contents of his insurance policy. He argues that because Florida
law does doesn’t require an insured to read an insurance policy, he shouldn’t have
been charged with knowledge of his policy’s terms.
Even though Jacobs was not required by law to read the contract, see
Blumberg v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 51 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1951), under Florida
4 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 5 of 7
law he is still charged with knowledge of the contract’s contents, 2 see Allied Van
Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 351 So. 2d 344, 347–48 (Fla. 1977) (“It has long been held
in Florida that one is bound by his contract. Unless one can show facts and
circumstances to demonstrate that he was prevented from reading the contract, or
that he was induced by statements of the other party to refrain from reading the
contract, it is binding.”). Put simply, Florida law assumes that a party to a contract
knows the terms of the contract but does not require that a party read it. See
Stonebraker v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 166 So. 583, 584 (Fla. 1936)
(“The insured was a party to the contract. The evidence shows that the contract
was in his possession during the whole time from the date of delivery until insured
died. . . . [U]nder this state of facts the insured was bound by the terms expressed
in the contract and is charged with knowledge of the provisions of the contract.”).
Because Jacobs, as the insured, was a party to the contract, and because he had the
policy and the lifetime rider in his possession, the district court did not err in
charging him with knowledge of the contents of his policy.
2 That general rule applies to all types of contracts, including disability insurance policies like the one at issue here. See, e.g., id. (contract for shipment of goods); Kimbal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 10 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. 1942) (group life insurance policy); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Hoxie, 176 So. 480, 481 (Fla. 1937) (indemnity insurance policy); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Benton, 467 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (contract to open brokerage account); Sutton v. Crane, 101 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (contract to purchase real property).
5 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 6 of 7
B.
Jacobs next contends that, in granting summary judgment to the defendants
on his promissory estoppel claims, the district court erred by weighing the
evidence. He fails to point to any instances in the district court’s order where the
court weighed any of the evidence. In any event, the court’s order shows that the
court did not weigh the evidence but instead found that Jacobs failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that the defendants “misrepresented [his] coverage
amounts or otherwise perpetrated fraud or other injustice sufficient to support [his]
promissory estoppel claims.” And for that reason, the court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on those claims.
Jacobs also says the court “ignored” the evidence showing that he relied on
the 2003 letter. It didn’t. Instead, the court concluded that the evidence in the
record was insufficient to show that the defendants made promises in the 2003
letter that they “should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance
on [Jacobs’] part.” And for that reason, the court declined to address “whether and
to what extent [he] read the 2003 Letter and detrimentally relied on
representations” in it. Because the district court did not have to address whether
Jacobs relied on the 2003 letter, it did not “ignore” any evidence he presented
about his reliance on it.
6 Case: 17-12868 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 7 of 7
Jacobs lastly argues that the district court disregarded the changes he made
in his errata sheet to his deposition testimony. But the district court relied on a
portion of his deposition testimony that Jacobs never “corrected” or changed in the
errata sheet. In any event, the changes Jacobs made in his errata sheet were not
merely corrective changes but instead substantive changes that contradicted his
deposition testimony. As a result, even if the district court had disregarded those
changes, it would not have been error for it to do so. See Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc.,
628 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases holding that an errata sheet
is to be used for corrective changes, not contradictory or substantive changes, to
deposition testimony).
AFFIRMED.