Gene M. Munson v. Merit Systems Protection Board

318 F.3d 1358, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1762, 2003 WL 215426
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedFebruary 3, 2003
Docket02-3171
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 318 F.3d 1358 (Gene M. Munson v. Merit Systems Protection Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gene M. Munson v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 318 F.3d 1358, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1762, 2003 WL 215426 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Opinion

LINN, Circuit Judge.

Gene M. Munson (“Munson”) seeks review of a final decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing as untimely his appeal of the constructive denial by the Department of Commerce (“agency”) of Munson’s request for reconsideration of the denial of a within-grade increase scheduled for October 2, 1994. See Munson v. Dep’t of Commerce, 90 M.S.P.R. 583 (M.S.P.B.2002) (“Final Decision”). The Board dismissed Munson’s appeal as untimely because it was filed over two years and seven months late and there was no good cause for the delay. Because the Board’s decision is not in accordance with law, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Munson has been employed since 1974 by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), an office within the agency, as a patent examiner. Federal employees, such as Munson, are entitled to within-grade increases after prescribed periodic waiting periods if their work is of an “acceptable level of competence as determined by the head of the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a) (1994). On October 2, 1994, Munson completed his then applicable three-year waiting period for a within-grade increase. In a decision dated December 12, 1994, but not served on Mun-son until January 5, 1995 (“the original denial”), the agency informed Munson that his within-grade increase due October 2, 1994 was denied. The stated basis for the denial was that his performance rating was less than fully acceptable on the record developed at that time. On January 18, 1995, Munson timely requested reconsideration of the denial by the agency. While the request for reconsideration was pending, the agency without explanation granted Munson a within-grade increase, effective March 5, 1995. Thereafter, Munson filed grievances with the agency, arguing that the March 5, 1995 within-grade increase should be made retroactive to October 2, 1994. The grievances were subsequently denied.

On November 3, 1997, Munson petitioned the Board for review of his request for reconsideration of the denial of his October 2,1994 within-grade increase. On July 22, 1999, the Board dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Munson had filed grievances through procedures in a collective bargaining agreement and that the agency’s practice of following these procedures made the procedures “binding and enforceable as to both parties,” foreclosing further re *1360 view. See Munson v. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 M.S.P.R. 80 (M.S.P.B.1999). Munson appealed the dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction to this court. Because the grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement had never taken effect and, thus, did not preclude Munson’s appeal to the Board, we reversed and remanded the case back to the Board. See Munson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 216 F.3d 1037 (Fed.Cir.2000) (‘Munson I”).

On remand, the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) determined that the appeal to the Board filed November 3, 1997, was not timely based on a requirement that an appeal be filed within thirty calendar days of the effective date of an action or receipt of notice of the action, citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b). See Munson v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. DC-531D-98-0094-M-1 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 22, 2000) (“Initial Decision”). The AJ noted that Munson filed his appeal approximately two years and eleven months after the within-grade increase was effectively denied. The AJ also concluded that Munson should have been and was aware of his appeal rights long before his appeal was filed and, thus, was not diligent. The AJ further found that Munson had not established good cause for the untimely filing.

On petition for review, the Board affirmed the Initial Decision by a split panel. The Board characterized the AJ’s Initial Decision as holding that the triggering event for timeliness was the date on which Munson received notification of the March 5, 1995 within-grade increase. See Final Decision at 588. The Board upheld the AJ’s determination that, even without notification of his appeal rights from the agency, Munson should have known of his appeal rights long before he filed, the appeal and that there was no good cause for delay. See id. at 589. In particular, the Board pointed to testimony of Munson as indicating that he knew of these rights:

So in this particular case had my waiting period [for my next within-grade increase] been one year, then I would have filed an appeal in 1995. If my waiting period had been two years, then I would have filed in — within 30 days after October 1996.
As it was, my waiting period was three years, so the only date that I thought it would be prudent, I had better file an appeal or I’d lose my rights came about in November of — well, the date — the triggering date would be October 12, 1997, and I did file within 30 days of that.

Id.

Munson appeals the dismissal of his petition and argues: (a) that the decision in Munson I forecloses the Board from consideration of the timeliness issue; (b) that the appeal was in fact timely filed; and (c) that the Final Decision denied him due process. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of review in an appeal from a decision by the Board is strictly limited by statute. Specifically, we must affirm the Board’s decision, unless we find it to be: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); Stearn v. Dep’t of the Navy, 280 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2002).

B. ANALYSIS

I

Munson first raises the argument that the Board was foreclosed from consid *1361 ering the timeliness issue on remand because the Board, in Munson I, was ordered to adjudicate the merits of the case. We disagree. Although the timeliness issue was previously raised, neither the AJ nor the Board reached that issue in the decisions leading to Munson I. The sole issue decided in Munson I was jurisdiction. Consequently, the matter of timeliness was not before this court in that case. For that reason, the Board was not precluded from addressing it on remand..

II

To receive a within-grade increase, an employee’s work must be at “an acceptable level of competence,” as determined by the head of the agency in question. 5 U.S.C.

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