Gelpi v. Shall
This text of 355 So. 2d 1014 (Gelpi v. Shall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Robley J. GELPI, Jr. and Alexander A. Thieneman, Jr.
v.
Florian M. SHALL.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
*1015 Casey, Babin & Casey, Joseph S. Casey, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponder & Richardson, Lamar M. Richardson, Jr., Mandeville, for defendant-appellee.
Before LEMMON, STOULIG and GARSAUD, JJ.
GARSAUD, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants are the owners of plots 229 and 230 of Cleary Subdivision in Jefferson Parish, which lots are contiguous to plot 245 and a portion of plot 246, belonging to defendant. Plaintiffs filed this suit in boundary under Civil Code Article 823 on January 21, 1976 to establish the western boundary line of their property and the eastern boundary line of defendant's property. To this petition defendant filed exceptions of ten, twenty, and thirty years' prescription. After the trial of these exceptions, the trial judge found the prescription of ten and twenty years (C.C. Art. 853) to be inapplicable under Fiorello v. Knecht, 334 So.2d 761 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1976), and these are not urged in this appeal. The trial judge, however, sustained the exception of thirty year prescription provided for in Civil Code Article 852 and plaintiffs appeal from that judgment.
Defendant, Florian Shall, purchased plot 245 and a portion of plot 246 from Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Estain, by deed dated March 20, 1951. The Estains had acquired the property on September 2, 1931, and had operated a dairy, using a barn located within the disputed area from the 1930's until the sale to the defendant. (Tr. of November 5, 1976, pp. 34-35) Defendant's property has been fenced at least since his acquisition in 1951 along the boundaries indicated by old pipes set in concrete on the survey of F. G. Stewart dated December 1, 1950 (identified as exhibit P-3), which was attached to the Act of Sale in which defendant acquired this property. As the trial judge correctly described in his Reasons for Judgment,
"It was the contention of the defendant that his property has been separated from that of the plaintiffs' by a fence which had been in continuous existence for a period of over thirty years and ran along a line marked by an old pipe set in concrete at the southeastern corner of defendant's property, an old gate standing at approximately the mid-point of defendant's alleged eastern boundary, and a pipe set at the northeastern corner of defendant's property."
This description coincides with the boundaries indicated on the Stewart survey, exhibit P-3.
Plaintiffs are real estate developers who acquired plots 229 and 230 in 1975. They testified that they were aware that the fences and barn of defendant encroached on their property when they purchased the land. (Tr. of November 5, 1976, pp. 47-48 and 50-57) The plaintiffs argue that there was no actual uninterrupted possession within visible bounds for the required period and that the real boundary is reflected by the surveys of John Krebs, dated June 18, 1975, and Gerald B. Dunn, dated October 21, 1976. The disputed area varies from 24 to 29.3 feet in width, running the length of the common boundary shared by these parties.
*1016 The issue is simply one of fact, especially with reference to whether the visible boundaries existed from January 1946, when the Estains, defendant's predecessor in title, possessed the land.
A person pleading prescription of thirty years bears the burden of proving unequivocal, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession by a preponderance of the evidence. Bradford v. Thomas, 344 So.2d 717 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977); Humble v. Dewey, 215 So.2d 378 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1968). The requirements for establishment of the prescription of thirty years are clearly stated in Sessum v. Hemperley, 233 La. 444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957), and most recently reiterated by our Supreme Court in William T. Burton Industries, Inc. v. Wellman, 343 So.2d 996 (1977):
"[W]here there is a visible boundary which has been in existence for thirty years or more and the defendant in a boundary action and his predecessors in title have, in addition to the land described in the title, actually possessed land extending to that visible boundary, a plea of prescription of thirty years should be sustained. It is our view that for the rule to be applicable two conditions must concur: First, there must be a visible boundary, artificial or otherwise; second, there must be actual uninterrupted possession, either in person or through ancestors in title, for thirty years or more of the land extending beyond that described in the title and embraced within the visible bounds." 96 So.2d at 843.
The testimony to establish the two essential factors called for in a case of this kind was something less than precise, which is to be expected, given the number of years that have elapsed. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that the evidence preponderated in favor of defendant, who, although he had the burden of proof on the trial of this exception, sustained his burden to the satisfaction of the trial judge. Where a boundary is located is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, and should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Fiorello v. Knecht, 334 So.2d 761 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1976); Union Producing Company v. Placid Oil Company, 178 So.2d 392 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1965), writ refused 248 La. 447, 179 So.2d 432 (1965); Latiolais v. Robert, 8 So.2d 347 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1942).
Not only is there clearly no manifest error on the part of the trial judge, but there is also an extensive and very well-reasoned exposition by the trial judge of the rationale for his judgment, a substantial part of which we quote and adopt:
"After a thorough review of the record, this Court finds that the testimony and evidence adduced at the trial preponderately establishes that the fence line in question on the eastern boundary as delineated by the Stewart survey (P-3) was constructed more than thirty years before the institution of this suit by defendant's author in title, separating the present properties of plaintiffs and defendant; that it was maintained as a visible existing boundary between said estates; and that the land so enclosed was actually possessed by the defendant and his author in title for more than thirty years. This Court has found inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses produced by the defendant and the plaintiffs. However, this Court attributes these inconsistencies to the inability of a person to recall with exactitude, facts as they existed thirty to forty years ago.
"The record overwhelmingly establishes that since the defendant, Mr. Florian Shall, took title to his property in 1951, it has been fenced along a line on the eastern boundary as delineated by the Stewart survey made a few months prior to Mr. Shall's purchase of the property and said fence was still standing when this suit was instituted in January of 1976. At the trial several witnesses testified that they recalled that the fence was standing some six to eight months prior to trial of this exception, which would be in March of 1976. The record also establishes that Mr. Shall used the area between the fence and the barn for a drainage ditch which extended from alongside his barn down to his southern most boundary line. The difficult question to be answered by *1017 this Court was whether or not said fence and ditch were present before Mr.
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