Geller v. City of Baton Rouge

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Louisiana
DecidedNovember 6, 2019
Docket3:17-cv-00324
StatusUnknown

This text of Geller v. City of Baton Rouge (Geller v. City of Baton Rouge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Geller v. City of Baton Rouge, (M.D. La. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MAX GELLER CIVIL ACTION NO. VERSUS 17-324-JWD-EWD CITY OF BATON ROUGE, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL Before the court is a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Sheriff Sid. J. Gautreaux III and Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees (the “Motion to Compel”)1 filed by plaintiff, Max Geller (“Plaintiff”). Defendant, Sid. J. Gautreaux, III, Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish (“Sheriff Gautreaux”), has filed an Opposition.2 For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Compel3 is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Sheriff Gautreaux shall respond to Interrogatories 15 and 17, as well as revised Interrogatory 10 and revised Requests for Production 19 and 20 within ten (10) days of this Ruling and Order. Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied. I. Background This suit arises out of the July 5, 2016 shooting of Alton Sterling and the subsequent protests that occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on July 8-10, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that while participating in a peaceful protest on July 10, 2016 near the intersection of East Boulevard and France Street, he was “brutally attacked and beaten,” 4 “arrested on charges of simple obstruction

1 R. Doc. 137. 2 R. Doc. 138. 3 R. Doc. 137. 4 R. Doc. 60, Third Amended, Supplemental and Superseding Complaint for Damages for Deprivation of Civil Rights, ¶¶ 13-15. See also, R. Doc. 60, ¶ 51 (“The officers threw Max Geller to the ground, slammed his head into the ground, held him down and kicked Mr. Geller.”) of a highway of commerce, per La. R.S. 14:97 and resisting an officer, per La. R.S. 14:108,”5 and denied medical care. Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19836 and 1985(3),7 and 1986.8 The Court previously deferred ruling on Sheriff Gautreaux’s defense of qualified immunity and allowed limited discovery regarding the identity of the officers involved in the alleged

underlying constitutional violations.9 During an August 7, 2019 status conference, Plaintiff sought to compel discovery targeted to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim.10 The Court granted Plaintiff leave to propound written discovery “narrowly targeted to plaintiff’s conspiracy claim; specifically, times, places, and other circumstances of agreements preceding the alleged violation of Mr.

5 R. Doc. 60, ¶ 55. 6 See, R. Doc. 60, ¶¶ 84-106 (asserting violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 7 See, R. Doc. 60, ¶¶ 107-115 (asserting a claim against all defendants for conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). 8 See, R. Doc. 60, ¶¶ (asserting a claim against all defendants for neglecting to prevent deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights). 9 See, R. Doc. 114, pp. 23-24 (discussing Plaintiff’s allegations that he was dragged near a swat vehicle and struck in the head by a rifle butt or another blunt object and explaining that “THUS, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE OTHER, QUOTE, "POLICE OFFICERS," CLOSED QUOTE, THAT WERE REFERRED TO EARLIER, AND SPECIFICALLY ONE THAT STRUCK A PLAINTIFF IN THE HEAD WITH A RIFLE BUTT OR OTHER BLUNT OBJECT, MIGHT BE AN EBRSO DEPUTY.”); p. 22 (“THE COURT IS GOING TO ALLOW LIMITED WRITTEN DISCOVERY ON THE NARROW ISSUE OF WHETHER ANY EBRSO DEPUTY WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLAINTIFF'S ARREST OR IN THE AFTERMATH OF HIS ARREST.”); Geller, 17-324, R. Doc. 111, p. 2 (“while Plaintiff has adequately pled a single policy decision that may have been the moving force of constitutional violations and that was made with deliberate indifference, limited discovery is needed to determine if Plaintiff can plead an underlying constitutional violation by an individual EBRSO deputy. Discovery will be limited to written discovery on the narrow issue of which individual EBRSO deputies (if any) were involved in the alleged constitutional violations.”). 10 While counsel for Plaintiff recognized that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim had been previously dismissed, counsel correctly pointed out that the Court has also stated Plaintiff could have an opportunity to amend. See, R. Doc. 114, p. 63:7-12 (“WHILE PLAINTIFF HAS ALLEGED EVIDENCE OF A CONSPIRACY AND A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF PARALLEL CONDUCT, HE HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE THE TIME, PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE AGREEMENTS -- THE AGREEMENT TOOK PLACE AND WITHOUT MORE PLAINTIFF’S CONSPIRACY CLAIM FAILS.”); p. 71:1-8 (“TO THE EXTENT THE COURT HAS DISMISSED ANY CLAIMS, THE COURT WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH WISE JUDICIAL PRACTICE AND GIVE PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. I DO WANT TO REMIND BOTH SIDES OF THEIR RULE 11 OBLIGATIONS. THIS CASE IS VERY COMPLEX AND REQUIRES DETAILED ANALYSIS OF MOTIONS, SO I ASK BOTH SIDES TO HAVE A GOOD FAITH BASIS FOR DOING ANYTHING THAT THEY DO IN THE NEXT ROUND.”). Geller’s constitutional rights and the identification of officers actually physically involved in the alleged underlying constitutional violations.”11 II. Law and Analysis A. The Motion to Compel is Granted as to Interrogatories 15 and 17; Interrogatories 1, 7, and 10, Requests for Production 19, 20, and 21 Are Not Within the Scope of Allowable Discovery at this Stage; Sheriff Gautreaux Shall Also Respond to Revised Interrogatory 10 and Revised Requests for Production 19 and 20. “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”12 Here, the Court has limited discovery to narrow and specific issues.13 Accordingly, while the scope of discovery is generally “construed broadly to encompass ‘any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other

11 R. Doc. 133, p. 11. During the August 7, 2019 status conference, the Court explained that “the only area for further discovery regarding plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is discovery into the existence and specifics of an agreement.” R. Doc. 133, p. 8. 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 13 As stated above, this Court previously deferred ruling on Sheriff Gautreaux’s assertion of qualified immunity to allow limited discovery. See, Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]his court has established a careful procedure under which a district court may defer its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense….a district court must first find that the plaintiffs [sic] pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity….After the district court finds a plaintiff has so pleaded, if the court remains unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts, it may issue a discovery order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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Geller v. City of Baton Rouge, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/geller-v-city-of-baton-rouge-lamd-2019.