Gee v. Johnson
This text of 142 S.W. 625 (Gee v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Plaintiff in error, B. C. Gee, acting by next friend, brought this suit to rescind and cancel a trade by which he became the purchaser of a certain tract of land which included a gin plant, and for which he made a cash payment and executed certain promissory notes. The rescission was sought upon the ground that the plaintiff was insane at the time the trade was made. The defendants filed an answer which included a general denial. There was a jury trial which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff has brought the case to this court by writ of error.
“You are charged that if you believe the mind of the said B. G. Gee was impaired at the time of the said transaction, yet you further believe from the evidence that at the time of the transaction in question he had mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of said transaction with the defendant and did so understand it, then you will find for the defendant and so say.”
“You are further and specially charged that even though the plaintiff may have been adjudged insane, still if you believe from the evidence that at the time of the trans *626 action in question, he had sufficiently recovered and had mental capacity to understand and comprehend the nature and consequences of his act and did so understand same, you will then return a verdict for the defendants.”
Error is assigned upon the court’s charge and the requested instructions for several reasons presented in the brief of plaintiff in error. We think the charges referred to applied the proper test for the determination of the validity of contracts. Beach on Modern Law of Contracts, § 1378; Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 414. The requested instructions related to different phases of the case developed by the testimony; and we hardly think it would be proper to hold that they unduly emphasized the defendants’ theory. By the use of the words “specially charged,” in the one relating to the lunacy judgment, we think it was intended to convey the idea that while, as a general rule, a judgment is conclusive of the matters determined, yet in this case such was not the fact. That was a correct statement of the law, and we see no objection to expressing it in the language used in the instruction complained of.
No reversible error has been pointed out, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
142 S.W. 625, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gee-v-johnson-texapp-1911.