Gee v. Johnson

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-4406
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KASSIDY-JO GEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25 - 4406 (UNA)

MIKE JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Kassidy-Jo Gee, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Speaker of the

U.S. House of Representatives Mike Johnson and 130 sitting state and federal judges and justices,

alleging they are engaged in a criminal enterprise that traffics, tortures, and otherwise abuses

children. ECF No. 1. She has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF

No. 2. For the following reasons the court will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and

dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A court may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. When a

complaint is “‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision,” the

court lacks authority to hear the case and dismissal is warranted. Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)). That standard

includes cases that are “so attenuated and [in]substantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.”

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport,

193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)). Generally, sua sponte dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

is “reserved for complaints resting on truly fanciful factual allegations,” while motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “cull legally deficient complaints.” Best, 39 F.3d

at 331 n.5.

Here, Ms. Gee’s allegations are patently insubstantial and deprive the court of jurisdiction

to hear her case. For example, she claims that Chief Justice John Roberts “[e]nrich[es] himself

through the commodification of children” by participating in “judicial kidnapping” and a

“conspiracy to maintain a racketeering enterprise.” ECF No. 1, at 39.1 She also asserts that

Defendants’ “enterprise . . . orchestra[es] mass trafficking that constitutes a genocide of children

on a global scale.” Id. at 44. Ms. Gee contends that this “Judicial Racket Enterprise” has

“systematically weaponized Title IV funding, guardianship proceedings and custody litigation to

traffic children, launder federal funds, and silence dissent.” Id. at 53. “Beyond trafficking, the

enterprise perpetuated acts of cannibalism and other grotesque abuses shielded by the absence of

explicit federal prohibition of cannibalism and further protected by wealth, secrecy, and corrupt

judicial mechanisms.” Id. at 46. Based on these allegations, Ms. Gee seeks various forms of relief,

including “RICO forfeiture of all profits and assets obtained through the [criminal enterprise],”

“[d]issolution of Title IV trafficking incentives,” and more than $10 trillion in damages—

representing the net worth of several large financial institutions that have allegedly profited from

Defendants’ scheme. Id. at 72-73. Ms. Gee’s allegations of a widespread and global criminal

conspiracy are similar to those that courts have routinely dismissed for “patent insubstantiality.”

Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).

1 The citations to ECF No. 1 refer to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination.

2 For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Ms. Gee’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, ECF No. 2, and dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: February 17, 2026