OPINION BY
KEITH RAPP, JUDGE:
¶ 1 The plaintiff, Wrangler J. Gee (Gee), appeals an Order dismissing his action against the defendants, Jeffrey A, Belair and April D. Belair (collectively, Belairs).
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On September 21, 2014, Chloe Rose (Rose) gave birth to R.B. On February 18, 2015, Belairs finalized their adoption of R.B.
¶ 3 On November 30, 2015, Gee filed this action. He sought to establish that he was the biological father of R.B. He alleged that Rose did not inform him that he was the father and that she specifically told him he was not the father. He further alleged that he was not given notice of the adoption and that 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-2.1 was not followed, but the petition did not allege any specifies.
¶4 Belairs filed a special, appearance and motion to dismiss. In their motion, Belairs
relied upon three time limitation periods. First,' they alleged that Gee’s parental rights were terminated and the time to appeal from the termination order expired. Second, the time to appeal a-decree of adoption expired. Last, they rely upon the provisions of 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-7.2. This statute provides:
A. Except as .otherwise provided by paragraph 3 of subsection B of Section 7503-2.7 of this title:
1. When an interlocutory or final decree of adoption has been rendered, a decree terminating parental rights cannot be challenged on any ground, either by a direct or a collateral attack, more than three (3) months after its rendition. The minority of the natural parent shall not operate to prevent this time limit from running; and
2. No adoption may be, challenged on any ground either by a direct or collateral attack more than three (3) months after the entry of the final adoption decree regardless. of whether the decree is void or voidable, and the minority or incompetence of the natural parent shall not operate to prevent this time limit from running.
B. In any challenge on any ground either by a direct or collateral attack, the court shall not enter a decision which is contrary to the best interests of the adopted minor.
¶ 5 The trial court focused upon the three month provision. Gee argued that the'time period was tolled and did not commence until he discovered the fraud allegedly perpetrated by Rose. In their response, Belairs argued that the discovery rule did not apply according to the statute and any authority preceding the enactment of the statute no longer constituted authority due to the fact that the statute amended prior statutory law.
¶ 6 The trial court agreed with Belairs and dismissed the action. Gee appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7 Matters involving legislative intent present questions of law which are examined independently and without deference to the trial court’s ruling.
Heffron v. District Court of Oklahoma County,
2003 OK 75, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 1069, 1076. The appellate court has the plenary, independent, and nondefer-ential authority to reexamine a trial court’s legal rulings.
Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Investment Corp.,
1996 OK 125, 932 P.2d 1100 n.1.
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW
¶ 8 Thus Court holds that 10 O.S. 2011, § 7505-7.2 is a statute of repose and not a statute of limitations. This statute “sets an outer boundary in time beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would otherwise have been actionable.”
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co.,
1989 OK 139, ¶ 17, 782 P.2d 915, 919. “A statute of.limitations cuts off a vested substantive right by penalizing a party who rests on its rights.”
Jaworsky v. Frolich,
1992 OK 157, ¶ 10, 850 P.2d 1052, 1054-55. A statute of repose applies regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers the cause of action.
Jaworsky,
1992 OK 157, ¶ 16, 850 P.2d at 1056.
¶ 9 The distinction and function of statutes of repose and statutes of limitation are set out in
Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air,
2009 OK 65, ¶¶ 10-11, 222 P.3d 21, 25-26.
Before allowing Jean to invoke here the provisions of 12 O.S. 2001 §§ 95 and 109, we must first determine how a statute of limitations differs in its impact from one of
repose. Early treatise writers and judges considered time bars created by statutes of limitations, escheat and adverse possession as creating periods of repose. As the courts began to modify statutory limitations by superimposing the “discovery rule,” legislatures responded by enacting absolute (not tollable) time bars through statutes of repose. Modern statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are somewhat similar because they both provide repose for the defendant. They are nonetheless significantly different since a statute of limitation merely extinguishes the plaintiffs remedy while a statute of repose may defeat the accrual of a cause of action before one ever arises. In practical terms, a statute of repose marks the outer time boundary for judicial enforcement of a substantive right whereas a statute of limitation interposes itself only proeedurally to bar solely the remedy after a substantive right has vested and a claim accrued. Moreover, remedial time bars are tollable, whereas substantive-law time limits must be allowed to run and expire uninterrupted by any arrest or suspension.
The time prescribed by a statute of repose runs from a specific act or event regardless of when the harm or damage may occur. A statutoiy limitation period, on the other hand, runs from the time all the requisite elements of a cause of action occur. It may or may not allow for the plaintiffs discovery of the injurious event to extend the period of limitation. Section 109 stands defined as a statute of repose. As we stated before: “[sjection 109 is not a statute of limitations; it is a statute of repose. Rather than disturbing a vested substantive right, ‘a statute of repose marks [the right’s] boundary.’ It sets an outer boundary in time beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would have otherwise been actionable” (citations omitted).
¶ 10 Thus, a statute of limitations proeedurally bars a remedy after the substantive right has accrued. A statute of repose sets a time limit within which the action may be brought and that time limit begins from a specific act or event.
Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc.,
2009 OK 14, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1168, 1171-72.
A statute of repose operates upon the substantive right to recover damages and will extinguish that right even if the action has not yet accrued. That is, the right to a cause of action to recover damages will expire even though there has not been an injury leading to the discovery of the negligent act that caused the damages.
Id.
(citation omitted.)
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OPINION BY
KEITH RAPP, JUDGE:
¶ 1 The plaintiff, Wrangler J. Gee (Gee), appeals an Order dismissing his action against the defendants, Jeffrey A, Belair and April D. Belair (collectively, Belairs).
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On September 21, 2014, Chloe Rose (Rose) gave birth to R.B. On February 18, 2015, Belairs finalized their adoption of R.B.
¶ 3 On November 30, 2015, Gee filed this action. He sought to establish that he was the biological father of R.B. He alleged that Rose did not inform him that he was the father and that she specifically told him he was not the father. He further alleged that he was not given notice of the adoption and that 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-2.1 was not followed, but the petition did not allege any specifies.
¶4 Belairs filed a special, appearance and motion to dismiss. In their motion, Belairs
relied upon three time limitation periods. First,' they alleged that Gee’s parental rights were terminated and the time to appeal from the termination order expired. Second, the time to appeal a-decree of adoption expired. Last, they rely upon the provisions of 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-7.2. This statute provides:
A. Except as .otherwise provided by paragraph 3 of subsection B of Section 7503-2.7 of this title:
1. When an interlocutory or final decree of adoption has been rendered, a decree terminating parental rights cannot be challenged on any ground, either by a direct or a collateral attack, more than three (3) months after its rendition. The minority of the natural parent shall not operate to prevent this time limit from running; and
2. No adoption may be, challenged on any ground either by a direct or collateral attack more than three (3) months after the entry of the final adoption decree regardless. of whether the decree is void or voidable, and the minority or incompetence of the natural parent shall not operate to prevent this time limit from running.
B. In any challenge on any ground either by a direct or collateral attack, the court shall not enter a decision which is contrary to the best interests of the adopted minor.
¶ 5 The trial court focused upon the three month provision. Gee argued that the'time period was tolled and did not commence until he discovered the fraud allegedly perpetrated by Rose. In their response, Belairs argued that the discovery rule did not apply according to the statute and any authority preceding the enactment of the statute no longer constituted authority due to the fact that the statute amended prior statutory law.
¶ 6 The trial court agreed with Belairs and dismissed the action. Gee appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7 Matters involving legislative intent present questions of law which are examined independently and without deference to the trial court’s ruling.
Heffron v. District Court of Oklahoma County,
2003 OK 75, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 1069, 1076. The appellate court has the plenary, independent, and nondefer-ential authority to reexamine a trial court’s legal rulings.
Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Investment Corp.,
1996 OK 125, 932 P.2d 1100 n.1.
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW
¶ 8 Thus Court holds that 10 O.S. 2011, § 7505-7.2 is a statute of repose and not a statute of limitations. This statute “sets an outer boundary in time beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would otherwise have been actionable.”
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co.,
1989 OK 139, ¶ 17, 782 P.2d 915, 919. “A statute of.limitations cuts off a vested substantive right by penalizing a party who rests on its rights.”
Jaworsky v. Frolich,
1992 OK 157, ¶ 10, 850 P.2d 1052, 1054-55. A statute of repose applies regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers the cause of action.
Jaworsky,
1992 OK 157, ¶ 16, 850 P.2d at 1056.
¶ 9 The distinction and function of statutes of repose and statutes of limitation are set out in
Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air,
2009 OK 65, ¶¶ 10-11, 222 P.3d 21, 25-26.
Before allowing Jean to invoke here the provisions of 12 O.S. 2001 §§ 95 and 109, we must first determine how a statute of limitations differs in its impact from one of
repose. Early treatise writers and judges considered time bars created by statutes of limitations, escheat and adverse possession as creating periods of repose. As the courts began to modify statutory limitations by superimposing the “discovery rule,” legislatures responded by enacting absolute (not tollable) time bars through statutes of repose. Modern statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are somewhat similar because they both provide repose for the defendant. They are nonetheless significantly different since a statute of limitation merely extinguishes the plaintiffs remedy while a statute of repose may defeat the accrual of a cause of action before one ever arises. In practical terms, a statute of repose marks the outer time boundary for judicial enforcement of a substantive right whereas a statute of limitation interposes itself only proeedurally to bar solely the remedy after a substantive right has vested and a claim accrued. Moreover, remedial time bars are tollable, whereas substantive-law time limits must be allowed to run and expire uninterrupted by any arrest or suspension.
The time prescribed by a statute of repose runs from a specific act or event regardless of when the harm or damage may occur. A statutoiy limitation period, on the other hand, runs from the time all the requisite elements of a cause of action occur. It may or may not allow for the plaintiffs discovery of the injurious event to extend the period of limitation. Section 109 stands defined as a statute of repose. As we stated before: “[sjection 109 is not a statute of limitations; it is a statute of repose. Rather than disturbing a vested substantive right, ‘a statute of repose marks [the right’s] boundary.’ It sets an outer boundary in time beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would have otherwise been actionable” (citations omitted).
¶ 10 Thus, a statute of limitations proeedurally bars a remedy after the substantive right has accrued. A statute of repose sets a time limit within which the action may be brought and that time limit begins from a specific act or event.
Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc.,
2009 OK 14, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 1168, 1171-72.
A statute of repose operates upon the substantive right to recover damages and will extinguish that right even if the action has not yet accrued. That is, the right to a cause of action to recover damages will expire even though there has not been an injury leading to the discovery of the negligent act that caused the damages.
Id.
(citation omitted.)
¶ 11 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals applied these rules to the statutory deadline for a father to challenge acknowledgment of paternity and held that 10 O.S. 2011, § 7700-308 is a statute of repose.
Sprowles v. Thompson,
2010 OK CIV APP 80, 239 P.3d 981. “It operates to cut off the right to challenge an acknowledgement of paternity two (2) years after the acknowl-edgement was signed, regardless of whether the cause of action has accrued,
i.e.,
whether the individual has discovered the fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.”
Sprowles,
2010 OK CIV APP 80, ¶ 14, 239 P.3d at 984. There is no material legal distinction between the statute here barring a challenge to a final adoption and the statute in
Sprowles.
¶ 12 Here, the trial court construed 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-7.2 as a statute of limitations and ruled that Gee’s action was barred by the statute. The trial court correctly dismissed the action, but the action by the trial court misinterpreted the statute because the statute is a statute of repose not limitation. A correct judgment will not be
reversed because the court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for its decision.
Hall v. GEO Group, Inc.,
2014 OK 22, ¶ 17, 324 P.3d 399, 405-06.
CONCLUSION
¶ 13 Gee brought his action to decide paternity and other relief, including a challenge to Belairs’ adoption of R.B. Gee filed his action more than three months after: the Belairs’ adoption of. R.B. became final. This Court holds, that the three month time period to bring an action challenging prescribed in 10 O.S.2011, § 7505-7.2, is a statute of repose. Gee’s action is barred. Therefore, the trial court reached a correct judgment and the judgment is affirmed for the reasons stated in this Opinion.
¶ 14 AFFIRMED.
FISCHER, P.J., and GOODMAN, J., concur.