GEBAR BYRD v. SHANON EATON

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 19, 2026
Docket4:25-cv-01615
StatusUnknown

This text of GEBAR BYRD v. SHANON EATON (GEBAR BYRD v. SHANON EATON) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GEBAR BYRD v. SHANON EATON, (E.D. Mo. 2026).

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

GEBAR BYRD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-01615-CMS ) SHANON EATON, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Self-represented Plaintiff Gebar Byrd brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights. The matter is now before the Court upon the motion of Plaintiff for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. ECF No. 3. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion and assess an initial partial filing fee of $27.10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). As Plaintiff is now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on such review, the Court will dismiss the complaint for frivolity and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because this case is being dismissed, Plaintiff’s motion for counsel (ECF No. 2) will be denied as moot. Initial Partial Filing Fee Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff is a state prisoner at Southeast Correctional Center (SECC) in Charleston, Missouri. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. In support of his motion to proceed without prepaying fees and costs, Plaintiff submitted an inmate account statement showing average monthly deposits of $11.30 and an average monthly balance of $135.50 (as of the tenth of each month). ECF No. 4. The Court finds that Plaintiff has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee and will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $27.10, which is twenty percent of Plaintiff’s average monthly balance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well- pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).

To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The Complaint Plaintiff brings this action on the Court’s form complaint for seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. ECF No. 1 at 1. He names one defendant in her individual capacity, Shanon Eaton, a police officer in University City, Missouri. Id. at 1-2. According to Plaintiff, he was “unlawfully arrested” on May 26, 2010, by Defendant Eaton, based on a “supposed[]” warrant issued out of Kaskaskia County, Illinois. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he was not read his rights or given an explanation as to why he was being arrested. He further asserts that he has been unlawfully detained since this arrest and that he has become “a prisoner of war.” Id. For relief, Plaintiff requests that his state-court judgment be vacated and that he be unconditionally released. He also seeks 25 million dollars in damages. Id. Plaintiff’s State-Court Judgment

Based on a review of Court records, it appears that Plaintiff Gebar Byrd was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, on October 14, 2011, on charges of murder, involuntary manslaughter, endangering the welfare of a child, and domestic assault. December 2011, Plaintiff was sentenced to life plus a consecutive twenty-one years. Id. His

appeals and motion for post-conviction relief in state court were all denied, as was his § 2254 petition before this Court. Id. (denied Sept. 27, 2023). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and denied his two petitions for authorization to file a successive habeas application. Id. at ECF Nos. 39-41, 43-44 (petitions denied June 20, 2024 and April 25, 2025). Discussion Based on a careful review and liberal construction of the allegations of Plaintiff’s § 1983 Complaint, the Court will dismiss this matter for frivolity and failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks release from confinement, it would be futile to construe this case as being brought under § 2254 for habeas relief because the

case would still be subject to dismissal. First, Plaintiff’s § 1983 Complaint—based on an allegedly unlawful arrest from 2010—is time-barred. Because 42 U.S.C.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
421 U.S. 454 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
GEBAR BYRD v. SHANON EATON, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gebar-byrd-v-shanon-eaton-moed-2026.