Gearon v. Loudoun County School Board

844 F. Supp. 1097, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19846, 1993 WL 595198
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedDecember 22, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 93-730-A
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 844 F. Supp. 1097 (Gearon v. Loudoun County School Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gearon v. Loudoun County School Board, 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19846, 1993 WL 595198 (E.D. Va. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRYAN, District Judge.

The issue in this action is whether the defendant, Loudoun County School Board (the School Board), and its Division Superintendent and the principals at the four high schools in Loudoun County, Virginia, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by permitting certain remarks made by students at high school graduation ceremonies in the Spring of 1993.

When originally brought, prior to the June 24, 1993 graduation ceremonies in all four high schools, the plaintiffs obtained from the district court on June 21, 1993, a preliminary injunction. That injunction was lifted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on June 23, 1993. The action is now before the court for a decision on the merits. Although the matters initially giving rise to the action concerned the 1993 spring graduation, which obviously has passed, the defendants seek to follow and the plaintiffs resist following the same procedures in the future. No party suggests the controversy is moot.

Commendably the parties have entered into a comprehensive Stipulation of Facts, although the defendants have objected to the relevance of some of the facts stipulated. The stipulation and affidavits, by agreement of counsel, allow the court to avoid holding an evidentiary hearing. Similarly, because extensive oral argument was heard on both the application for the preliminary injunction and the recent motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the parties have waived oral argument, submitting instead proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The position of the parties in this matter may be summarized, perhaps over-simplistically, as follows:

The defendants assert that the remarks delivered were student-initiated, student-written and student-delivered, and, therefore, lacked the pervasive government involvement condemned in Lee v. Weisman, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1970). They rely heavily on Jones v. Clear Creak Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.1992). They also assert the students’ purpose in the remarks was to “solemnize” the graduation ceremonies, and that such a purpose does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause; and that the prayer at issue neither advances nor inhibits religion.

*1099 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, primarily argue that prayer in graduation ceremonies is per se unconstitutional regardless of the manner in which the decision to have prayer is made and how the prayer is presented. Plaintiffs rely on Lee for the proposition that, at the secondary school level, it is offensive to the Establishment Clause for the state to place students in a coercive setting where their options are to (1) not attend their graduation, (2) attend and be disruptive, or (3) attend and participate in the ceremony regardless of their objections to the religious nature of the ceremony. Plaintiffs further argue that the state sponsorship of a graduation ceremony cannot be insulated from government entanglement by delegating to a majority of the members of the graduating class the decision whether prayers are to be included. 1

As their secondary position, the plaintiffs assert that under the circumstances of this case there is excessive governmental entanglement with the religious aspect of the graduation ceremony, the action of the defendants does not reflect a clearly secular purpose, and the affect thereof is to advance or inhibit religion. Thus, on these facts, the Establishment Clause is violated. Lemon v. Kurbzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).

The court is persuaded that the correct view is the one represented by plaintiffs’ primary argument, i.e., a constitutional violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary school graduation setting, a prayer is offered, regardless of who makes the decision that the prayer will be given and who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks. Alternatively, the court agrees with the secondary position of the plaintiffs.

The degree of state sponsorship of the prayer at issue in Lee made it an “easy” case. 2 Even so, the broad principles set forth by the Court concerning the coercive pressures, peer and public, on dissenting students were an essential part of the Court’s decision and cannot be ignored.

In Lee, the Court noted that the efforts by school officials in their directions for the contents of the prayers “were a good faith attempt by the school to ensure that the sectarianism which is so often the flashpoint for religious animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony.” Id. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2656. As pointed out by the Court, however:

The question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all when the object is to produce a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.

Id.

The Lee Court continued the discussion of the coercion accompanying high school graduation:

The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction.

Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2658. The Court noted that, in exercising such supervision and control, “[t]he [government] ... in effect require[s] participation in a religious exercise.” Id. The Court concluded:

No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2661.

State sponsorship, i.e., involvement in, a graduation ceremony is inherent. A high school graduation, and certainly one’s right *1100 and desire to attend, is an important ingredient of school life — as much so as attending class. To involuntarily subject a student at such an event to a display of religion that is offensive or not agreeable to his or her own religion or lack of religion is to constructively exclude that student from graduation, given the options the student has. The Establishment Clause does not permit this to occur.

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Bluebook (online)
844 F. Supp. 1097, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19846, 1993 WL 595198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gearon-v-loudoun-county-school-board-vaed-1993.