Geagan's Case

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Geagan's Case

17 N.E.2d 172, 301 Mass. 319, 1938 Mass. LEXIS 1048

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedOctober 25, 1938

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 17 N.E.2d 172 (Geagan's Case) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Geagan's Case, 17 N.E.2d 172, 301 Mass. 319, 1938 Mass. LEXIS 1048 (Mass. 1938).

Pincite

Opinion

Lummus, J.

From a decree awarding compensation for the death of the employee, the city appealed. The employee received a compensable personal injury, a comminuted fracture of the ankle, and was taken to a hospital. While there, six days after the injury, an operation was performed upon him for the relief of an old hydrocele unconnected with the injury. Twenty-one days afterwards his death was caused by an embolus that reached his lung.

Upon all the evidence the embolus might have resulted from either the fracture or the operation. The burden was on the claimant to show by the preponderance of the evi[320]*320deuce that the fracture was the cause. The board as the tribunal of fact was entitled to believe the expert testimony for the claimant that the fracture would destroy much tissue, break many blood vessels, and form clots, while the operation would cause little bleeding, for the veins involved are small and speedily tied; and that the great weight of probability points to the fracture as the cause. Upon this evidence the finding in favor of the claimant was “warranted. DeFilippo’s Case, 284 Mass. 531, 534r-535. Bennett v. Fitzgerald, 284 Mass. 535, 538. Sheppard’s Case, 287 Mass. 459, 463. McAuliffe v. Metcalfe, 289 Mass. 67. Robinson’s Case, 299 Mass. 499, 502.

Decree affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Lummus, J.

From a decree awarding compensation for the death of the employee, the city appealed. The employee received a compensable personal injury, a comminuted fracture of the ankle, and was taken to a hospital. While there, six days after the injury, an operation was performed upon him for the relief of an old hydrocele unconnected with the injury. Twenty-one days afterwards his death was caused by an embolus that reached his lung.

Upon all the evidence the embolus might have resulted from either the fracture or the operation. The burden was on the claimant to show by the preponderance of the evi[320]*320deuce that the fracture was the cause. The board as the tribunal of fact was entitled to believe the expert testimony for the claimant that the fracture would destroy much tissue, break many blood vessels, and form clots, while the operation would cause little bleeding, for the veins involved are small and speedily tied; and that the great weight of probability points to the fracture as the cause. Upon this evidence the finding in favor of the claimant was “warranted. DeFilippo’s Case, 284 Mass. 531, 534r-535. Bennett v. Fitzgerald, 284 Mass. 535, 538. Sheppard’s Case, 287 Mass. 459, 463. McAuliffe v. Metcalfe, 289 Mass. 67. Robinson’s Case, 299 Mass. 499, 502.

Decree affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

17 N.E.2d 172, 301 Mass. 319, 1938 Mass. LEXIS 1048, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/geagans-case-mass-1938.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack