G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 3, 2024
DocketA170745
StatusUnpublished

This text of G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4 (G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4, (Cal. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Filed 9/3/24 G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

G.D. et al, Petitioners, A170745 v. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Nos. 6709-DEP, 6710-DEP, SONOMA COUNTY, 6711-DEP, 6712-DEP) Respondent;

SONOMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.

In this dependency proceeding, G.D. (Mother) filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the dependency court’s order terminating services designed to reunify her with her four children (collectively, the Children) and setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (.26 hearing). R.S. (Father) filed a notice of intention to file his own writ, but never filed one.1

1 We refer to Mother and Father collectively as Parents, even though

only Mother seeks relief here.

1 Mother argues there was no substantial evidence to support the dependency court’s finding of a substantial risk of detriment to the Children if they were returned to her care. To support her argument, she claims she completed her case plan and ameliorated the original conditions that led to removal, an unsanitary and unsafe home coupled with verbal arguments exacerbated by alcohol. She also argues that a mental breakdown she suffered during her efforts to reunify did not cause detriment and she is amenable to abide by whatever she is asked to do so that the Children may be placed in her care with a family maintenance plan. The Sonoma County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a return to Mother’s writ petition, contending the dependency court was within its discretion to terminate services and set a .26 hearing. Having reviewed the record, we see no error and will deny writ relief. I. A. Appellate courts review a dependency court’s finding of detriment for substantial evidence, asking only whether the finding is supported by evidence that is “ ‘reasonable, credible[,] and of solid value . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) We construe the record in the light most favorable to the dependency court’s findings. (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43.) We “do not consider whether there is evidence from which the juvenile court could have drawn a different conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did draw.” (In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101, 108.) The issue of whether placement of children with their parent would be detrimental is to be examined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. (A.H. v. Superior

2 Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059 [“[d]etriment can be shown many different ways”] (A.H.).) B. Looking at the totality of circumstances here, substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s finding that returning the Children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or well-being. After full review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the detriment findings the court made at the 18-month review hearing and we see no error in setting the .26 hearing. Although Mother participated diligently in her case plan, she failed to demonstrate any insight into the conditions facing the Children—unstable housing, substance abuse by Parents, and domestic discord between Parents, all of which was exacerbated by Mother’s untreated mental illness. Nor did she show any awareness that these conditions were causing harm to the Children. Mother places great emphasis on her compliance with her case plan. But even granting that Mother showed she had a consistent and largely positive record of visitation with the Children, and further granting that she met many of the other objectives of her case plan, compliance with a case plan is not dispositive. The issue of detriment is to be examined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. (A.H., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059.) As explained by one court, “Detriment is a familiar standard in child welfare determinations; but . . . the notion of detriment is at best a nebulous standard that depends on the context of the inquiry.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490.) Under this context-specific standard, Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a) gives dependency courts “broad discretion to evaluate not only the child’s physical safety but also his or her emotional well-being.” (In re C.C., at p. 1490.)

3 C. What follows is a summary of the aspects of the record we find to be most important. It is drawn from the Department’s periodic status review reports and from testimony presented at the 18-month hearing. 1. Drug and alcohol abuse and instability of housing were major issues here. At the 18-month review hearing, the social worker explained that one of her top concerns regarding the Children’s safety was how alcohol and mental health affected Parents’ ability to maintain safe and secure housing, “which was the theme from the beginning.” The juvenile court “may properly rely upon the agency’s expertise for guidance.” (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 814.) The social worker testified that Parents’ living situation during reunification was unstable overall. The Interfaith Shelter Network (IFSN) had difficulty at times working with Parents during reunification. In the early stage of the reunification period and as services continued, the Department’s assessment was that the family faced a great deal of uncertainty, as Parents were separated and not able to communicate about basic information regarding the Children, including visitation, homework, who would have primary custody if the Children were returned, and the general vision of what they wanted for the Children. The Department expressed concerns about Father’s instability, as he was homeless and had no car, but also noted Father was acknowledging the benefits he received from his participation in a domestic violence group and therapy. The Department also referred to Mother’s “recent mental health struggles.” Parents tried but were never successful in finding stable housing. After receiving a housing voucher, Parents worked with IFSN to locate housing. But IFSN had difficulty working with them. As of April 2024,

4 Parents had turned down multiple available units over the previous year for various reasons. Although they temporarily resided in IFSN’s transitional housing program, they had to leave and were permanently banned from the program due to safety concerns regarding Mother’s mental health. Parents’ voucher was due to expire, but they were unwilling to enter an adult shelter. IFSN confirmed it was difficult to find a landlord willing to take on “ ‘high- risk’ ” tenants like Parents, and reported that Father was difficult to work with because he was easily triggered and had unreasonable expectations. Parents refused to live in shelters and rejected homes offered to them for various reasons, including that the offered homes did not have a backyard, they could not keep their large pit bull dog, and/or they would not be allowed to smoke marijuana on the property. They also were banned from recommended transitional housing due to safety concerns. As a result, their living situation continued to be unstable throughout most of the reunification period, as they alternatively couch-surfed and lived in a relative’s home, their vehicle, and a hotel room.

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G.D. v. Superior Court CA1/4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gd-v-superior-court-ca14-calctapp-2024.