GAY v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided April 28, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-01311·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLISA D. GAY, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-1311 Vv. Hon. William S. Stickman IV A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, ef al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge Plaintiff Allisa D. Gay (‘Plaintiff’) sued Defendant Mueller Steam Specialty (“Mueller Steam”) and various manufacturers and distributors on October 8, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and alleged that Decedent Carl E. Gay (“Decedent’) developed mesothelioma from exposure to Defendant’s asbestos-containing products. On October 11, 2019, Defendant General Electric Co. filed a Notice of Removal to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Before the Court is Mueller Steam’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 881). The Court must determine whether Plaintiff has properly identified Mueller Steam’s product as a cause of Mr. Gay’s disease and, ultimately, death. For the following reasons, Mueller Steam’s Motion is granted. I. Background This case involves an alleged asbestos-related injury because of Mr. Gay’s employment in the United States Navy from 1946 to 1958, the United States Air Force from 1958 to 1967, General Electric Co. from 1967 to 1974, Stone and Webster from 1974 to 1989 and from his automotive

work starting in the 1940s. (See ECF Nos. 1-1; 1-2). Mr. Gay was diagnosed with mesothelioma in June 2019. (ECF No. 1-15, § 165; ECF No. 675). Mr. Gay was deposed over nine days—November 5-7, 11-13, 21-22, 25, 2019—and identified various manufacturers, suppliers and users of asbestos products. Mr. Gay died on April 12, 2020. (ECF No. 1-15, J 165; ECF No. 675). His daughter, Allisa D. Gay, was named executor of her father’s estate and filed an Amended Complaint on August 13, 2020. (ECF No. 692). Allisa Gay was substituted as Plaintiff. Ud.). I. Relevant Facts Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Gay developed mesothelioma from exposure to Defendant’s asbestos-containing products between 1974 and 1976 while working at the Beaver Valley Power Station as an employee of Stone & Webster. (ECF No. 943, p. 1). Plaintiff alleges Mr. Gay was exposed to asbestos from Mueller Steam’s strainers and steam traps. (/d.). Mr. Gay inspected all piping systems installed at the Beaver Valley Power Station. (ECF No. 943-1, J 24). He ensured all piping systems and equipment met the specifications required by the plant. (/d.). He was near construction workers who installed new equipment. (/d.). James Daugherty testified in an unrelated case about his experience at the Beaver Valley Power Station. (ECF No. 943-4). Mr. Daugherty began working at the Beaver Valley Power Station in 1976 after Mr. Gay left. (/d. at 2-3). Mr. Daugherty started training for a special license in 1978. Ud. at 4). That work required that he enter and inspect Unit 1 of the Beaver Valley Power Station where Mr. Gay had worked. (/d. at 4-5). Mr. Daugherty identified Mueller steam traps in Unit 1 and remembered seeing them starting in 1979. (/d. at 7-8).

III. Standard of Review Summary judgment is warranted if the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material if it must be decided to resolve the substantive claim or defense to which the motion is directed. In other words, there is a genuine dispute of material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jd. at 255. It refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence. Jd. “Real questions about credibility, gaps in the evidence, and doubts as to the sufficiency of the movant’s proof” will defeat a motion for summary judgment. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). IV. Applicable Law A. Pennsylvania Law Applies The parties agree that Pennsylvania substantive law applies. For that reason, the Court will apply Pennsylvania law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). B. Causation Standard Before imposing liability on a defendant in a product liability action, Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff to show not only that the plaintiff was exposed to a defective product manufactured or sold by the defendant but that the plaintiff's exposure was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury. Richards v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 660 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 943 A.2d 216, 224-26 (Pa. 2007); accord Robertson v. Allied Signal Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 375 (3rd Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law). The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court held in asbestos litigation that “it is appropriate for courts, at the summary judgment stage, to make a reasoned assessment concerning whether, in the light of the evidence concerning frequency, regularity, and proximity of a plaintiff’s/decedent’s asserted exposure, a jury would be entitled to make the necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between defendant’s product and the asserted injury.” Gregg, 943 A.2d at 226-27 (adopting the frequency, regularity and proximity standard in asbestos cases). As a result, a plaintiff must prove he was exposed to asbestos from a defendant’s product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity so that a jury could make the necessary inference of an adequate causal connection between that product and the asserted injury. Jd. at 227. As for proximity, a plaintiff cannot merely show that the product was present at the plaintiff s workplace; he must present evidence to establish that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos fibers of the specific product of a manufacturer. Kardos v. Armstrong Pumps, Inc., 222 A.3d 393, 399 (Pa. Super. 2019); Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 804 A.2d 643, 652 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 829 A.2d 1158 (2003). V. ANALYSIS Defendant moves for summary judgment because it is not liable for injuries caused by asbestos products for three reasons. First, Mr. Gay did not identify Mueller Steam in either his deposition or his affidavit. Second, Mueller Steam did not sell steam traps during the time Mr. Gay worked at the Beaver Valley Power Station. Finally, Plaintiffs evidence failed to establish that Mr. Gay was exposed to Mueller Steam products with the requisite frequency, regularity and proximity. “At the heart of an asbestos case is at least product identification—that is, a plaintiff cannot triumph against a manufacturer unless he shows that the victim came across the manufacturer’s

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