Gavrilova v. Mukasey

Ninth Circuit

Gavrilova v. Mukasey

311 F. App'x 41

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 29, 2009

DocketNo. 08-73534

StatusPublished

This text of 311 F. App'x 41 (Gavrilova v. Mukasey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gavrilova v. Mukasey, 311 F. App'x 41 (9th Cir. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

This is a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order de[42]*42nying petitioner’s second motion to reopen deportation proceedings.

We review the BIA’s ruling on a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008).

The regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of deportation was entered on June 15, 1998. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on January 29, 2008, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of deportation was entered and petitioner has not established that any exceptions to this time limit apply. See id.

Further, the regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as also barred by numerical limitations.

Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary disposition in part is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).

Further, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.2002). Ac-eordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss in part is granted.

All other pending motions are denied as moot. The temporary stay of removal shall continue in effect until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM

**

This is a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order de[42]*42nying petitioner’s second motion to reopen deportation proceedings.

We review the BIA’s ruling on a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008).

The regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of deportation was entered on June 15, 1998. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on January 29, 2008, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of deportation was entered and petitioner has not established that any exceptions to this time limit apply. See id.

Further, the regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as also barred by numerical limitations.

Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary disposition in part is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).

Further, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.2002). Ac-eordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss in part is granted.

All other pending motions are denied as moot. The temporary stay of removal shall continue in effect until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

311 F. App'x 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gavrilova-v-mukasey-ca9-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack