Gavigan v. State

55 Miss. 533
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 55 Miss. 533 (Gavigan v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gavigan v. State, 55 Miss. 533 (Mich. 1878).

Opinion

Simrall, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The first error assigned, impugning the organization of the court in which the plaintiff in error was tried and' convicted, is cured by the return to the certiorari.

The second error is that the special venire was not ordered. [539]*539on the application of the district attorney, or of the accused. For that irregularity the writ would have been quashed, on the motion of the defendant. No demand was made for another venire; but the defendant went to trial without any-question raised as to the source whence the jury was taken, or any exception as to the manner in which the panel was made, or to its individual members. The irregularity is cured or waived by force of the statute (Code, sec. 2843) which makes all laws relating to the mode of selecting, drawing, summoning, and impaneling all juries directory merely, and makes all juries legal, though drawn, summoned, and impaneled in an informal and irregular mode, “ after they have been impaneled and sworn.”

It is too late, after the jury has been impaneled and sworn, to make objection to the venire facias, to the panel, or the manner in which it was constituted. If not made earlier, it will be construed as a waiver. Head’s Case, 44 Miss. 731; Darrah’s Case, 44 Miss. 795.

It is alleged that the diagram of the locality and vicinage of the homicide was not sufficiently proved. There is an absence of the usual preliminary evidence that it is a correct delineation. But it was used in evidence on the trial, and was referred to by the witnesses on both sides, to show the relations of objects and persons explanatory of their testimony. The witnesses speak of it as a true description of the position of objects and persons, and allude to it for that purpose.

It was sufficiently proved — and, if it had not been, its use on the trial would be presumed to have been acquiesced in by defendant, since lie made then no exception to it.

Did the accused, by his affidavits, bring himself within the rules which govern motions for new trials on the ground of newly-discovered testimony?

It has been repeatedly ruled in this state that applications are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A reversal will not be made for that reason unless there has been an abuse of discretion which the court can see was injurious to [540]*540the accused. The early case of Noe, 4 How. 331, seems to deny a review in the appellate court altogether. The subsequent cases relax the rule. For the extent of it see Ogle's Case, 33 Miss. 383; McDaniel's Case, 8 Smed. & M. 401, 443; Jones' Case, MS. opinion.

The testimony should not be merely cumulative; and the court ought to be satisfied that the application is made in good faith, and, if practicable, that the absent Avitness will prove the matters stated in the affidavit of the accused. To meet the requirement imposed on the applicant, he must embody the facts he expects to prove in his own affidavit, supported by the affidavit of the absent Avitness, if it be practicable to produce it, so that the court may see that the motion is made in good faith, and that the testimony is material. The defendant states that the discovery of this witness has been made since the trial, and that he resides in Warren County (the place of the trial). But he fails to produce an affidavit from him, or offer any explanation Avhy he does not. He did not request a postponement of a hearing, on the motion to give time to get the affidavit, or ask, if the time Avere too short, for a continuance of the motion to the next term.

The affidavit of Stevens that he had heard the absent Avitness make substantially the same statement is too remote and uncertain. If there had been an inability to produce the affidavit of the Avitness, and that had been shown, Stevens’ SAvorn statement would have been of some value, if the court Avere satisfied that justice required the presence of the Avitness. These principles have been frequently announced in this court. Bulon v. Linton's Heirs, 2 How. 891; Hare v. Sproul, 2 How. 772; Wright v. Alexander, 11 Smed. & M. 411; Garnett v. Kirkman, 41 Miss. 9; Long's Case, 52 Miss. 30. In Hinds v. Terry, Walk. 80, it Avas said: The truth of the suggestion of newly-discovered eAddeuce must be established. The showing on this ground was not sufficient.

Ought the verdict to have been set aside because of the partiality and bias of the juror Barefield? This cause rests on [541]*541the affidavits of the bailiff, Jones, and of A. Shultz, and the oral examination of Jones at the hearing. The substance of Jones’ statement is that he heard Ferguson, who ivas a member of the first jury that tried this case, tell Barefield many of the facts of the case, and how the jurors stood on that trial, and the names of those who caused the jury to hang. To this Barefield replied that such jurors were fools, and ought to have agreed with the others. After the trial the affiant asked Barefield how he “became a juror when he knew so much about the facts in the case.” Barefield replied, because the lawyers did not ask him if he knew anything about the case at all.

Shultz stated that Barefield told him that it was his (Bare-field’s) invariable custom, when he heard of a killing in Vicksburg, to go there and learn all about it. Further, he states that Barefield was, from the beginning, in favor of conviction. The court had the bailiff, Jones, sworn, and examined him as to the matters in his affidavit. He said that his affidavit Avas correct substantially, with the following corrections, viz. : “ Barefield did tell him that Ferguson had told him (Barefield) that a man on the jury was such a d — d fool that he Avould not Avails around the court-house, because he was afraid a photographer across the street would take his picture.” Bare-field never said anything about the reason why the jury could not agree, nor did he express any opinion whether Gavigan Avas guilty or not, nor did he say anything about the case. These corrections and retractions by the bailiff about annul his affidavit, and leave him in not a favorable light as an officer of the court.

It is certified to us, in the bill of exceptions, that Barefield •on his voire dire was fully examined .by the district attorney as to whether he kneAv anything about the facts, and had formed and expressed an opinion: to all which questions he answered no. He was then tendered by the state to the accused, when one of his counsel only asked him if he was a son of Hugh Barefield, and, upon his answering yes, he was accepted. [542]*542This effort to impeach the verdict, on the ground of the partiality and bias of this juror, was not sustained.

Ought the verdict to have been set aside because not supported by the evidence, or as against the evidence?

The defense made by the plaintiff in error was that he committed the homicide in necessary self-defense. The testimony abundantly shows that, at the time the accused fired the first shot, he was in no real danger of losing his life, or of suffering any bodily harm. When the second shot was fired, the deceased was in the act of turning around to make his escape ; when the third shot was fired, he had fled across the street aud was in the act of entering Mrs. McCune’s house.

But was he in

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Bluebook (online)
55 Miss. 533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gavigan-v-state-miss-1878.