Gauvin M.J. Monaghan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
This text of Gauvin M.J. Monaghan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Gauvin M.J. Monaghan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 20 2018, 7:33 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alexander L. Hoover Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, Attorney General of Indiana P.C. Nappanee, Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Gauvin M.J. Monaghan, June 20, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-144 v. Appeal from the Marshall Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50D01-1611-MR-2
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-144 | June 20, 2018 Page 1 of 5 Statement of the Case [1] Gauvin M.J. Monaghan appeals his sentence following his conviction for
murder, a felony. He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether
his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In late October 2016, Monaghan and his roommate, Maeson Coffin, became
angry with their landlord, Paul Costello, when he asked them to pay overdue
rent. Monaghan and Coffin murdered Costello and hid his dead body under a
plastic drum and a large piece of sheet metal near an outbuilding on Costello’s
property. Monaghan and Coffin then stole Costello’s car and drove it to
Monaghan’s mother’s house in New York. Monaghan’s girlfriend later
contacted the Marshall County Sheriff’s Department to report that she thought
Monaghan and Coffin had murdered Costello, and local law enforcement
officers found Monaghan and Coffin in New York.
[3] The State charged Monaghan with murder, a felony, and auto theft, as a Level
6 felony. The State then amended the information and charged Monaghan
with conspiracy to commit murder; murder; burglary, as a Level 4 felony; auto
theft, as a Level 6 felony; and theft, as a Level 6 felony. In November 2017,
Monaghan pleaded guilty to murder. In exchange for that plea, the State
dismissed the remaining charges. The trial court entered judgment of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-144 | June 20, 2018 Page 2 of 5 conviction accordingly and sentenced Monaghan to sixty-five years executed.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision [4] Monaghan contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character.1 Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he
Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The
Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:
The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).
[5] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we
1 In his brief on appeal, Monaghan acknowledges that his contention under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires “a distinct and separate analysis” from that required for an abuse of discretion contention. Appellant’s Br. at 7. And Monaghan clearly asserts only an argument under Appellate Rule 7(B). Thus, to the extent Monaghan’s argument might be more appropriately framed as an abuse of discretion in sentencing, that issue is waived.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-144 | June 20, 2018 Page 3 of 5 regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of
the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather
whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,
268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless
overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[6] Here, the trial court identified the following mitigating factors: lack of adult
criminal history; his guilty plea; and his remorse. And the trial court identified
the following aggravating factors: his juvenile adjudications; his high risk to
reoffend; his theft of the victim’s car and flight to another state; his attempt to
hide the dead body; his bad conduct in jail after his arrest; and that his “acts
exceeded what was necessary to obtain conviction of the offense charged.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 167. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
Monaghan to sixty-five years executed.
[7] Monaghan contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense. The circumstances of the crime indicate otherwise. Monaghan
beat Costello, a seventy-nine-year-old man, to death with a blunt instrument for
“no reason.” Tr. at 14. Indeed, Monaghan acknowledges that he killed
Costello in “a cold-blooded manner of binding him in chains after being
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-144 | June 20, 2018 Page 4 of 5 stripped[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 9. But he maintains that Monaghan’s young age
(eighteen) at the time of the offense “act[s] as a reason to believe that [he]
deserves something less than the maximum possible sentence.” Id. at 10.
Monaghan asserts that the trial court should have considered his young age as a
mitigator. But he does not explain how this factor bears on the nature of the
offense for purposes of Appellate Rule 7(B). We cannot say that Monaghan’s
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.
[8] Monaghan contends that his “character is difficult to evaluate in the case at bar
due to a lack of a record in respect to his character.” Id. But Monaghan asserts
that, given his “limited juvenile history,” guilty plea, expression of remorse, and
“rough childhood,” his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. Id. at
11.
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