Gause v. First Bank of Marianna

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Gause v. First Bank of Marianna

442 So. 2d 1062, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25212

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 16, 1983

DocketNo. AT-199

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 442 So. 2d 1062 (Gause v. First Bank of Marianna) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 442 So. 2d 1062, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25212 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, counterplaintiff below, appeals a “judgment” granting appel-lee/counterdefendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a three-count counterclaim. The decretal portion of the trial court’s “judgment” reads:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that Counter-defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

This order is merely authorization for entry of a final judgment; it does not, in and of itself, constitute an appealable final judgment. Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Co., 356 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Additionally, it appears from a review of the record that appellee’s motion for summary judgment applies only to Count I of appellant’s three-count counterclaim. Because all three of the counts in the counterclaim are interrelated and arise out of the same transaction, a final judgment as to only one count is a nonappeala-ble interlocutory order. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So.2d 1 (Fla.1974); McClain Construction Corp. v. C.S. Roberts, 351 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

ERVIN, C.J., and BOOTH and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant, counterplaintiff below, appeals a “judgment” granting appel-lee/counterdefendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a three-count counterclaim. The decretal portion of the trial court’s “judgment” reads:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that Counter-defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

This order is merely authorization for entry of a final judgment; it does not, in and of itself, constitute an appealable final judgment. Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Co., 356 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Additionally, it appears from a review of the record that appellee’s motion for summary judgment applies only to Count I of appellant’s three-count counterclaim. Because all three of the counts in the counterclaim are interrelated and arise out of the same transaction, a final judgment as to only one count is a nonappeala-ble interlocutory order. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So.2d 1 (Fla.1974); McClain Construction Corp. v. C.S. Roberts, 351 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

ERVIN, C.J., and BOOTH and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

442 So. 2d 1062, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gause-v-first-bank-of-marianna-fladistctapp-1983.

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