Gattis v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 498, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ROBERT GATTIS, § § Defendant Below, § No. 498, 2024 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 90004567DI (K) § Appellee. §

Submitted: February 26, 2025 Decided: April 3, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Robert Gattis, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order denying his motion for issuance of a new sentencing order reflecting his

election to be sentenced under the pre-Truth-in-Sentencing Act provisions of Title

11.1 The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on

the ground that it is manifest on the face of Gattis’s opening brief that the appeal is

without merit. We agree and affirm.

1 Among other things, the Truth-in-Sentencing Act of 1989 (“TIS Act”) eliminated parole for Title 11 and Title 16 offenses. State v. Barnes, 116 A.3d 883, 884 (Del. 2015). (2) In 1992, a jury found Gattis guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree

burglary, two counts of possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a

felony (“PDWDCF”), and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited

(“PDWBPP”). The convictions arose from Gattis shooting his girlfriend on May 9,

1990. After a majority of the jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the

mitigating factors, the Superior Court sentenced Gattis to death for first-degree

murder. The court also sentenced Gattis to fifty-three years of Level V incarceration

for the other convictions. This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on

appeal.2 Gattis subsequently filed unsuccessful challenges to his convictions and

sentences in Delaware and federal courts.3

(3) In 2012, Gattis petitioned for commutation of his death sentence to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Board of Pardons recommended

the commutation of Gattis’s death sentence with conditions. The Governor accepted

the recommendation and granted Gattis’s petition for commutation subject to

conditions. The conditions included Gattis forever dropping all legal challenges to

his conviction and sentence, as commuted, remaining in the James T. Vaughn

Correctional Center for the remainder of his natural life unless constitutionally

2 Gattis v State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994). 3 See, e.g., Gattis v. Delaware, 513 U.S. 843 (1994) (denying Gattis’s petition for a writ of certiorari); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s denial of Gattis’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276 (Del. 2008) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Gattis’s second motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61). 2 required medical care was necessary, and knowingly and voluntarily accepting the

conditions as determined in the Superior Court.

(4) The Superior Court conducted a colloquy with Gattis concerning his

acceptance of the commutation conditions, including his waiver of any future legal

proceedings. During his sworn colloquy, Gattis waived his right to, among other

things, challenge any aspect of his commuted sentence for first-degree murder and

his sentences for first-degree burglary, PDWDCF, and PDWBPP. Gattis and his

counsel also signed a Waiver of Any Further Legal Proceedings as a Condition of

Commutation of Sentence that set forth the rights he was waiving. The Superior

Court found that Gattis knowingly and voluntarily accepted the conditions for

commutation of his death sentence. Subject to the conditions, the Governor

commuted Gattis’s death sentence to life without the possibility of parole on January

19, 2012.

(5) In 2024, Gattis moved for a new sentencing order reflecting his election

under 11 Del. C. § 4216(d) to be sentenced under the pre-TIS Act provisions of Title

11.4 He claimed that this was necessary to fix incorrect references to TIS Act

sentences on his offender status sheet. The Superior Court denied the motion,

finding that Gattis was serving a mandatory life sentence and had accepted certain

4 Section 4216(d) provides that an “individual convicted of a crime on or after January 1, 1990, which crime occurred prior to June 30, 1990, may elect to be sentenced under the provisions of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act of 1989 rather than under the prior provisions of this title.” 3 conditions, including his service of a natural life term in prison, as part of the

commutation of his death sentence. This appeal followed.

(6) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for

abuse of discretion.5 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the

claim de novo.6 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the

Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which

it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by

statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of

conviction did not authorize.7

(7) In his opening brief, Gattis argues that the Superior Court erred in

denying his motion because the TIS Act did not apply to the crimes he committed

before June 29, 1990. He fails, however, to address his acceptance of the conditions

for commutation of his death sentence by the Governor in 2012. The Delaware

Constitution “vests the Governor, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons,

with sole power to grant reprieves, commutations of sentence, and pardons.”8 The

power to commute a sentence includes the power to impose “conditions which do

5 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 6 Id. 7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 8 State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 147 (Del. Dec. 8, 2016) (citing Del. Const. art. VII, § 1). 4 not themselves offend the Constitution, but which are not specifically provided for

by statute.”9

(8) As the Superior Court recognized, the conditions for commutation of

Gattis’s death sentence included Gattis agreeing to spend the remainder of his natural

life in prison. Gattis also knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge

any aspect of his commuted sentence for first-degree murder and his sentences for

first-degree burglary, PDWDCF, and PDWBPP. Given Gattis’s acceptance of the

conditions for commutation of his death sentence and waiver of his right to challenge

any aspect of his sentences, the Superior Court did not err in denying his motion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice

9 Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 (1974). See also Heath v. State, 983 A.2d 77, 80 (Del. 2009) (“The Board may attach to its recommendation, and the Governor may attach to her pardon, any condition deemed appropriate.”). 5