Gattermeir-Elliott Real Estate Co. v. K.H., Inc.

184 S.W.3d 188, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 200, 2006 WL 400170
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 22, 2006
DocketNo. 26874
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 184 S.W.3d 188 (Gattermeir-Elliott Real Estate Co. v. K.H., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gattermeir-Elliott Real Estate Co. v. K.H., Inc., 184 S.W.3d 188, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 200, 2006 WL 400170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal after a bench trial from a judgment in favor of the owner of commercial property and against a real estate broker. The broker contends that the owner leased property, which broker was hired to market and sell, to individuals that broker had “submitted” the property to and whose names were disclosed to the owner pursuant to the contract. The trial court found the following: by contract, the owner of the property reserved the right to sell the property itself; the broker did not submit the property to either of the lessees, nor participate in the negotiations leading up to the execution of the lease agreement; the broker did not comply with the requirements of the contract in order to be entitled to any commission; and, therefore, the broker had no right to a commission under the contract. We shall affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. State ex rel. Nixon v. Alternate Fuels, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Mo.App. S.D.2005). We affirm.

Gattermeir-Elliott Real Estate Co., L.L.C. (“Broker”) brought a five-count petition against K.H., Inc., JWB Land Company, L.L.C., BWJ Properties, L.L.C. and John Belt1 (collectively, “Owner”). In its petition, Broker contended that it originally entered into a contract on February 6, 2001, with K.H., Inc., to sell a business known as Backwater Jack’s Restaurant (“the property”). Under the contract, Owner agreed to pay Broker compensation of 10% of the sale price for the property, on an exclusive agency basis, “when and if [Broker] produces a prospect ready, willing, and able to purchase the property at the sale price”; however, the parties agree that Owner reserved the right to sell the property on its own. The property was not sold during the initial period of the agreement; subsequently, JWB Land Company, L.L.C. and BWJ Properties, L.L.C. were added as parties to the agreement as “Owner”2 and the sale price was changed to $1,525,000 on September 20, 2002.

The contract provided:

3. Owner will pay Broker compensation of 10% to be received when and if Broker produces a prospect ready, willing, and able to purchase the property at the sale price and on the terms listed below or later agreed upon, and the prospect indicates in writing an intention to purchase the property, with the parties recognizing that Broker is not authorized to bind Owner to execute a sale contract unless so authorized by Owner, in writing, and if a deposit is made on a sale and is then forfeited, one-half of the deposit (not to exceed the compensation which Broker would have been otherwise entitled to receive) will be paid to or retained by (as the case may be) Broker. In addition, Owner agrees to pay Broker a marketing fee of $_on (check whichever applies) the date of this Agreement or the date that the other compensation above provided is payable.
4. Owner will pay Broker the above compensation if the property is sold, exchanged, or leased by any other person during the term of this Agreement or if a sale, exchange, or lease is made, directly or indirectly, within 360 days after the expiration of this Agreement or [190]*190any extension hereof, to any person to whom Broker has submitted the property and whose name was disclosed to Owner, in writing, by registered or certified mail within 10 days after the expiration of this Agreement or any extension hereof.

Broker further contended it submitted the property by its agent, Michael Elliott (“Elliott”), to Billy Borders (“Borders”) and Gary Prewitt (“Prewitt”), the subsequent lessees, before the contract expired in November 2002, that Owner received written and other notice that Broker had submitted the property to Borders and Prewitt during the term of the Agreement, that Broker was the procuring cause of any sale, exchange or lease of the property, and the property was sold, exchanged or leased by Owner in November or December 2002, during the term of the agreement. Broker brought claims for a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and tortious interference with a business expectancy.3

Broker brings three points on appeal. First, it claims the trial court erred in concluding that its claim fails under seetion 429.616 4 because the statute only prohibits untimely suits based on a broker’s lien and this suit is based on Broker’s rights arising under the written contract and not the broker’s lien.5 Second, Broker contends the trial court erred in finding that the property was not submitted to the eventual lessees unless a physical showing and/or disclosure of financial or confidential information was made because the property was submitted when it was brought to the prospect’s attention, as by advertising or introduction, with the intent that it be accepted. Finally, Broker contends the trial court erred in concluding that the property was not leased to Borders.6

In Point I, Broker challenges a finding by the trial court that Broker’s claim fails under section 429.6167 because the statute prohibits untimely suits that are based on a broker’s lien and not for a suit brought on a breach of contract. Even though Broker had filed a hen against the property, Broker claims this particular action was not brought upon a broker’s lien but upon the contract. A review of the petition clearly reflects that [191]*191Broker did not bring a suit to enforce its claimed lien; however, it is not necessary to reach a determination concerning the exact meaning and effect of section 429.616 because the trial court gave judgment to Owner on Broker’s claim for a breach of contract, notwithstanding Owner’s claim that section 429.616 bars the action, and specifically found Broker did not have an action on the contract. Broker does not claim any other basis for a judgment on its behalf based upon the Ken in any of its other points relied on and any discussion regarding a broker’s lien claim would simply be an advisory opinion. This Court does not render advisory opinions. State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Mo. banc 2005); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). We decline to review Point I.

Likewise, we do not address Point III, as a resolution of that issue would not affect in any way the disposition of this matter. Broker contends in Point III that the court erred in determining that a Kmit-ed Kability company, of which Borders was a member, was the actual lessee of the subsequent contract for a lease. Significantly, Broker does not contend it had a contractual relationship of any kind with Borders or the limited liability corporation and neither was named as a defendant in the original suit. An extended discussion of the factual determination made by the court in this regard would serve no purpose as it does not aid in the resolution of the issue before this Court, whether Broker is entitled to a commission on its written contract with Owner.

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Bluebook (online)
184 S.W.3d 188, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 200, 2006 WL 400170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gattermeir-elliott-real-estate-co-v-kh-inc-moctapp-2006.