Gates v. Pond

5 Ohio Cir. Dec. 297
CourtCuyahoga Circuit Court
DecidedMay 15, 1896
StatusPublished

This text of 5 Ohio Cir. Dec. 297 (Gates v. Pond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gates v. Pond, 5 Ohio Cir. Dec. 297 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1896).

Opinion

Marvin, ■ J.

This case is brought here for the purpose oí having this court give a construction to the will of Maria M. Brockett, deceased, and to give directions to the executor of that will as to what course to pursue in the final distribution of the estate* which comes into his hands as such executor.

Maria M. Brockett died in 1886. She was the wife of Dr. Brockett at the time of her death. Before her marriage to Dr. Brockett she had been the wife of a man by the name of Pond, and she was the mother of three children of Mr. Pond, and the mother of one child of Dr. Brockett. When she died, her eldest child, Daniel Herbert Pond, was about sixteen years of age, her son Harry about fourteen, her daughter, Ilda S. Pond, about ten and one-half, and her son, Karl Brockett, about four years of age. The petition avers that the Pond children of Mrs. Brockett are without any property other than that which comes to them from their mother, and neither the answer filed on behalf of Karl Brockett nor that filed on behalf of the Pond children denies that allegation.

The clause of the will which it is asked that the court shall construe-is the third item, and reads: “ All the balance of my estate, personal and real, I will and bequeath to my children share and share alike, the same to be kept invested by my executor hereinafter named until my daughter Ilda shall become of age, when the same is to be divided.” It then directs that the “ interest and income of said estate be used as far as needed in the judgment of my said executor and my sister, K. G. Corey, in the support, care and education of my children till the final distribution of said estate.” The question is whether by that item of the will the estate which is bequeathed is to be divided into four equal parts from the time that this will takes effect, to-wit: the death of the testatrix; that is to say, shall each of the four children have one-fourth part of that estate, together with the income of such one-fourth of said estate, lip to the time of the distribution, so that if anything is expended by the executor upon consultation and agreement with Mrs. Corey, in the education or maintenance and support of any one of the children, the amount thus expended shall be deducted from the income of that one child? Or [298]*298whether the executor is to be credited with the money thus expended against the estate generally, in making up his account. In no event, of course, is he authorized to use more than the income. Shall he take credit for that generally against the estate and divide the balance into four parts ? Or shall he treat the estate as though divided when he took it, or immediately upon taking it, and then let the expense for each child be charged against the income of that one-fourth part to which each child would thus be entitled ?

It is well settled that in construing a will, the language above all other things is to be examined to ascertain what was really the will of the testator — what was the thing that the testator meant to do. And it is settled by the authorities that that is to be determined by the words used, if they are so plain that there can be no mistake about them. But if there is any doubt in the words used, we may look to the surroundings, and see what the circumstances were, and what the testator would naturally desire to do.

If this item had ended with the words “When the same is to be divided,” there would have been no trouble about its construction. But following these words are those already quoted, “I direct that the interest and income of said estate be used as far as needed in the judgment of my said executor and my sister, E. G. Corey, in the support, care and education of my children till the final distribution of said estate. ” Does that mean that the income of’ the entire estate may be used, or rather that out of the income of the entire estate may be used such an amount as in the judgment of the executor and E- G. Corey is needed for the support and education of any one or more of these children ?

We learn by the pleadings because the petition avers and nobody denies it, that the Pond children were without any other means of support than that left by their mother, as I have already stated.

The boy, Earl Brockett, four years old at the death of his mother, had a father with whom he was living and who would by law be bound to take care of him, if he had no other means. I do not mean by that that he would not be bound to take care of him if he had other means. •Circumstances might be such that he would not expend that amount of money that ought to be expended, considering the amount of property that the boy is worth, compared with that which the father is worth. One of the things which Mrs. Brockett might well have considered and doubtless did considerwhen she executed this will,was the fact that her youngest child had a father to look after and take care of him; that the other children were now without any parent, and had no property except that which was bequeathed to them by her. It is urged that that being true, she might very well have understood that more money might reasonably be needed out of her estate for the support and education of the older children than would be needed for the support and education of this youngest son; that that not only is likely to have been in her mind from the fact that the youngest boy had a father, but from the further fact that by reason of his youth the money that wQuld be necessary for his education and support up to the time when the estate was to be divided, to wit, when the daughter Ilda •should become of full age, six and a half years after the death of her mother and seven and a half years after the execution of the will; that in the nature of things these older children might and would need more money expended for them than this young boy would need expended for him. That seems to be reasonable. It seems to us not an unnatural thing, not an improbable thing, that this mother when providing out of [299]*299her property for her children might well have thought that within the seven and one-half years, or thereabouts, which would elapse from the time the will was executed to the time she had provided for the distribution of the property, there might be considerable difference in the amount ■of money needed for the support and education of the several children, and that she might well have thought that it would be equitable and fair that the estate be kept together, and that out of the income generally of ■ that estate each of the children should have such support and education as would be reasonably needed up to the time when the daughter would become of full age, and at that time each of the Pond sons would be of full age, and that it would be equitable and fair to make the division then. But unless she used words which, fairly construed, indicate that that was what she desired, of course, the court should not so construe this item of the will however reasonable we may think such dis-. position of her property might be.

We are cited to a very considerable number of cases somewhat like this. Two Kentucky cases were cited to us, one of them found in 2nd Bibb at page 301, Trigg’s Administrator v. Robert Daniel.

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Bluebook (online)
5 Ohio Cir. Dec. 297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gates-v-pond-ohcirctcuyahoga-1896.