1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 FERNANDO GASTELUM, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00637-TWR-AHG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL 14 v.
15 7-ELEVEN, INC., [ECF No. 30] 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Fernando Gastelum’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Recusal. 20 ECF No. 30. The Court finds the matter suitable for submission without oral argument 21 pursuant to CivLR 7.1(d)(1). 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 In his motion, Plaintiff requests that the undersigned recuse from the instant case. 24 ECF No. 30 at 3. Plaintiff seeks this Court’s recusal because the undersigned is biased 25 regarding the merits of the case due to a “vendetta against Mr. Strojnik” and, thus, the 26 undersigned is “personally invested in this matter.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 27 there is a “personal animosity between Mr. Strojnik and” the undersigned, due to 28 Mr. Strojnik’s conduct in a previous matter. Id.; see id. at 3 n.2 (“Something about 1 Mr. Strojnik telling Magistrate Goddard that he cannot teleport from the middle of the 2 Atlantic Ocean to a courtroom in San Diego, or something like that”). Plaintiff argues that 3 the undersigned is “using this proceeding to wage battle against him[,]” instead of focusing 4 on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint. 5 Id. at 3. Plaintiff disagrees with the undersigned’s Order to Show Cause and its requirement 6 that Plaintiff submit supplemental briefing “verify[ing] that he asked Mr. Strojnik to take 7 down the video at issue, and the date and the manner in which Plaintiff did so.” Id.; ECF 8 No. 29 at 2. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A judge “shall disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality 11 might reasonably be questioned” or where “[s]he has a personal bias or prejudice 12 concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b)(1); see generally Liteky v. United States, 510 13 U.S. 540 (1994) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 144). Under the two recusal statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 14 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, the substantive question is “[w]hether a reasonable person with 15 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 16 be questioned.” United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 17 United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). A 18 “reasonable person” is defined as a “well-informed, thoughtful observer,” as opposed to a 19 “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. 20 of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 21 “Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar 22 nonfactual matters” are not enough to require recusal. Id. (citing Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 23 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1993)). 24 “A motion under section 455 [or 144] is addressed to, and must be decided by, the 25 very judge whose impartiality is being questioned.” Spencer v. Jasso, No. 20cv909-ADA- 26 GSA-PC, 2023 WL 5021774, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023) (citing Bernard v. Coyne, 31 27 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 28 1986) (“We have held repeatedly that the challenged judge himself should rule on the legal 1 sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance”). “Absent a factual showing of a 2 reasonable basis for questioning his or her impartiality, or allegations of facts establishing 3 other disqualifying circumstances, a judge should participate in cases assigned. Conclusory 4 statements are of no effect. Nor are [a litigant’s] unsupported beliefs and assumptions. 5 Frivolous and improperly based suggestions that a judge recuse should be firmly declined.” 6 Raiser v. San Diego County, No. 19cv751-GPC-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6791, at *3 7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021) (quoting Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 8 Section 455(a) is also “limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires 9 as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made 10 by the judge during the course of trial.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913–14 11 (9th Cir. 2008); see Ryan v. County of Imperial, No. 21cv1076-JO-LR, 2022 WL 12 17744075, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Plaintiff’s arguments reflect a confusion about the distinctions between the duties of 15 the assigned magistrate judge and district judge in this matter, and other arguments reflect 16 a frustration with the process and a misunderstanding of the instant Order to Show Cause. 17 The Court will address these in turn. 18 A. Distinction between Magistrate Judges and District Judges 19 A magistrate judge has the authority to “hear and determine” nondispositive matters. 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 21 1259 (9th Cir. 2013). A dispositive matter impacts the “ultimate relief sought,” i.e., the 22 merits of the case. See CMKM Diamonds, 729 F.3d at 1260 (“where the denial of a motion 23 [] is effectively a denial of the ultimate relief sought, such a motion is considered 24 dispositive, and a magistrate judge lacks the authority to ‘determine’ the matter”). 25 Section 636, and this district’s corresponding Civil Local Rule 72.1, specifically enumerate 26 eight different types of matters to be treated as dispositive, including motions to dismiss 27 for failure to state a claim and motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 636(b)(1)(A); see also CivLR 72.1(b)–(c) (same). Other matters, such as those that fall 1 outside of those expressly enumerated matters may also be considered dispositive. United 2 States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (“we must look to the effect 3 of the motion, in order to determine whether it is properly characterized as dispositive or 4 non-dispositive”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, magistrate judges may have 5 candid discussions with the parties because they do not make any decisions on the merits 6 of the case. 7 In addition to determining only nondispositive matters, magistrate judges in this 8 district also conduct settlement conferences. CivLR 16.3(a) (“In each civil action, a 9 mandatory settlement conference must be scheduled before the assigned magistrate 10 judge”); CivLR 16.1(c) (“At the ENE conference, the judge and the parties will discuss the 11 claims and defenses and seek to settle the case”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 FERNANDO GASTELUM, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00637-TWR-AHG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL 14 v.
15 7-ELEVEN, INC., [ECF No. 30] 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Fernando Gastelum’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Recusal. 20 ECF No. 30. The Court finds the matter suitable for submission without oral argument 21 pursuant to CivLR 7.1(d)(1). 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 In his motion, Plaintiff requests that the undersigned recuse from the instant case. 24 ECF No. 30 at 3. Plaintiff seeks this Court’s recusal because the undersigned is biased 25 regarding the merits of the case due to a “vendetta against Mr. Strojnik” and, thus, the 26 undersigned is “personally invested in this matter.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 27 there is a “personal animosity between Mr. Strojnik and” the undersigned, due to 28 Mr. Strojnik’s conduct in a previous matter. Id.; see id. at 3 n.2 (“Something about 1 Mr. Strojnik telling Magistrate Goddard that he cannot teleport from the middle of the 2 Atlantic Ocean to a courtroom in San Diego, or something like that”). Plaintiff argues that 3 the undersigned is “using this proceeding to wage battle against him[,]” instead of focusing 4 on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint. 5 Id. at 3. Plaintiff disagrees with the undersigned’s Order to Show Cause and its requirement 6 that Plaintiff submit supplemental briefing “verify[ing] that he asked Mr. Strojnik to take 7 down the video at issue, and the date and the manner in which Plaintiff did so.” Id.; ECF 8 No. 29 at 2. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A judge “shall disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality 11 might reasonably be questioned” or where “[s]he has a personal bias or prejudice 12 concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b)(1); see generally Liteky v. United States, 510 13 U.S. 540 (1994) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 144). Under the two recusal statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 14 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, the substantive question is “[w]hether a reasonable person with 15 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 16 be questioned.” United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 17 United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). A 18 “reasonable person” is defined as a “well-informed, thoughtful observer,” as opposed to a 19 “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. 20 of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 21 “Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar 22 nonfactual matters” are not enough to require recusal. Id. (citing Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 23 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1993)). 24 “A motion under section 455 [or 144] is addressed to, and must be decided by, the 25 very judge whose impartiality is being questioned.” Spencer v. Jasso, No. 20cv909-ADA- 26 GSA-PC, 2023 WL 5021774, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023) (citing Bernard v. Coyne, 31 27 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 28 1986) (“We have held repeatedly that the challenged judge himself should rule on the legal 1 sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance”). “Absent a factual showing of a 2 reasonable basis for questioning his or her impartiality, or allegations of facts establishing 3 other disqualifying circumstances, a judge should participate in cases assigned. Conclusory 4 statements are of no effect. Nor are [a litigant’s] unsupported beliefs and assumptions. 5 Frivolous and improperly based suggestions that a judge recuse should be firmly declined.” 6 Raiser v. San Diego County, No. 19cv751-GPC-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6791, at *3 7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021) (quoting Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 8 Section 455(a) is also “limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires 9 as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made 10 by the judge during the course of trial.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913–14 11 (9th Cir. 2008); see Ryan v. County of Imperial, No. 21cv1076-JO-LR, 2022 WL 12 17744075, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Plaintiff’s arguments reflect a confusion about the distinctions between the duties of 15 the assigned magistrate judge and district judge in this matter, and other arguments reflect 16 a frustration with the process and a misunderstanding of the instant Order to Show Cause. 17 The Court will address these in turn. 18 A. Distinction between Magistrate Judges and District Judges 19 A magistrate judge has the authority to “hear and determine” nondispositive matters. 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 21 1259 (9th Cir. 2013). A dispositive matter impacts the “ultimate relief sought,” i.e., the 22 merits of the case. See CMKM Diamonds, 729 F.3d at 1260 (“where the denial of a motion 23 [] is effectively a denial of the ultimate relief sought, such a motion is considered 24 dispositive, and a magistrate judge lacks the authority to ‘determine’ the matter”). 25 Section 636, and this district’s corresponding Civil Local Rule 72.1, specifically enumerate 26 eight different types of matters to be treated as dispositive, including motions to dismiss 27 for failure to state a claim and motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 636(b)(1)(A); see also CivLR 72.1(b)–(c) (same). Other matters, such as those that fall 1 outside of those expressly enumerated matters may also be considered dispositive. United 2 States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (“we must look to the effect 3 of the motion, in order to determine whether it is properly characterized as dispositive or 4 non-dispositive”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, magistrate judges may have 5 candid discussions with the parties because they do not make any decisions on the merits 6 of the case. 7 In addition to determining only nondispositive matters, magistrate judges in this 8 district also conduct settlement conferences. CivLR 16.3(a) (“In each civil action, a 9 mandatory settlement conference must be scheduled before the assigned magistrate 10 judge”); CivLR 16.1(c) (“At the ENE conference, the judge and the parties will discuss the 11 claims and defenses and seek to settle the case”). The settlement conferences are “off the 12 record, privileged and confidential.” CivLR 16.3(h); see CivLR 16.1(c)(1)(b) (“The ENE 13 conference will be informal, off the record, privileged, and confidential.”). The local rules 14 also state that “[t]he judge conducting the settlement conference will be disqualified from 15 trying the case unless there is an agreement by all the parties to waive this restriction.” 16 CivLR 16.3(c). As such, because the magistrate judge does not determine dispositive 17 matters and will not try the case, the magistrate judge is able to have confidential 18 communications in the context of settlement regarding the value and merits of the parties’ 19 claims. 20 Here, in the instant motion, Plaintiff’s argument that the undersigned’s focus on the 21 conduct at the meet and confer, which was ordered in furtherance of the Early Neutral 22 Evaluation Conference, instead of “determin[ing] whether or not 7-Eleven violated 23 Plaintiff’s disability rights,” shows bias is inapplicable. ECF No. 30 at 3. As discussed 24 above, the division between district judges and magistrate judges exists so that such 25 conflicts or bias do not arise—i.e., the magistrate judge can give the parties her candid 26 assessment of the case in confidence, in order to foster a settlement, because her assessment 27 is not binding and is never relayed to the district judge. Further, due to this division between 28 district judges and magistrate judges, the pending Order to Show Cause is precisely what 1 the undersigned should be focusing on instead of the merits; maintaining the 2 confidentiality of settlement proceedings is paramount. See cf. Ewing v. Aliera Healthcare, 3 No. 19cv845-CAB-LL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128071, at *4–*5 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) 4 (denying recusal motion when plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the court 5 displayed bias when it permitted certain people to attend the ENE while excluding others, 6 noting that the court “exercised her discretion to exclude the woman who accompanied 7 Plaintiff at the ENE conference who Plaintiff claimed is his assistant because she is not a 8 party to the litigation nor an attorney representing her client”). 9 B. Plaintiff’s Allegation that there are Implications on the Merits of 10 the Case due to a Purported Vendetta Against a Non-Party 11 Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned is utilizing the instant proceeding to act on an 12 animosity toward Mr. Strojnik, in lieu of focusing on the merits of the ADA claims. ECF 13 No. 30 at 3 (asserting that the undersigned is “using [Plaintiff] as a pawn in her vendetta 14 against Mr. Strojnik”). First, as explained above, the undersigned does not make any 15 decisions on the merits of this case. Second, the Court holds no animosity toward 16 Mr. Strojnik and assures Plaintiff that his case is not being used for any crusade. The 17 undersigned’s prior order of sanctions against Mr. Strojnik in a previous case1 does not 18 create a bias in the instant case. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 19 (1994) (affirming denial of disqualification, explaining that “opinions formed by the judge 20 on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, 21 or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they 22 display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 23 impossible”); United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming 24 denial of recusal motion when judge had dismissed prior civil case, ordered sanctions 25
26 27 1 See ECF No. 115, Strojnik v. Evans Hotels, LLC, No. 19cv650-BAS-AHG (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2020) (ordering sanctions in the amount of $759.20 against Mr. Strojnik for failure 28 1 against the attorney, and referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, explaining that 2 “[a]dverse findings do not equate to bias”); Eb-Bran Prods. v. Ritchie, No. 06-11564, 2006 3 WL 1662629, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2006) (denying recusal motion when court had 4 sanctioned plaintiff and plaintiff’s attorney in previous case, explaining that “judicial 5 rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”); see cf. 6 Young v. Univ. of Hawai’i, No. 20-cv-231-DKW-RT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144067, at 7 *9 (D. Haw. Aug. 11, 2020) (denying recusal motion when court had previously 8 admonished plaintiff for his failure to follow local rules); United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 9 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1993) (“the source of the appearance of partiality must arise from 10 some source other than the judge’s previous involvement with cases that concerned the 11 parties or witnesses in the present case”). 12 Third, and most importantly, the Court reiterates that Mr. Strojnik has no proper role 13 in this case. The pending Order to Show Cause is directed at Plaintiff, not Mr. Strojnik. See 14 ECF No. 13. The Court reiterates that “Plaintiff must show cause why he should not be 15 sanctioned” for consenting to the publication of a video of a confidential proceeding and 16 “representing to the Court that he is acting in propria persona when it appears that he is in 17 fact being represented by Mr. Strojnik.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see ECF No. 31 at 29 18 (Plaintiff admitted that he never asked Mr. Strojnik to take down the video upon receiving 19 the Order to Show Cause); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se 20 filings held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Any 21 sanctions issued pursuant to the Order to Show Cause will be directed at Plaintiff for his 22 own actions, not at Mr. Strojnik. See cf. Raiser, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6791, at *3 23 (denying recusal motion because “the Court’s prior rulings that plaintiff considers unfair 24 or unfavorable to him are not a valid basis to disqualify a judge from a case.”). 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show any adequate basis for recusal. As 27 such, and in light of the facts and evidence presented, no reasonable person would question 28 this Court’s impartiality. Because “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no 1 legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require[,]” the 2 || undersigned declines to recuse in this matter. Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation 3 marks omitted). 4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. 5 || ECF No. 30. See United States v. Hinkman, No. 04-cr-127-S-RCT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6 ||58969, at *24 (D. Idaho Apr. 22, 2005) (“it has long been established that a party cannot 7 || force a judge to recuse h[er]self by engaging in personal attacks on the judge: Nor can that 8 || artifice prevail, which insinuates that the decision of this court will be the effect of personal 9 ||resentment; for, if 1t could, every man could evade the punishment due to his offenses, by 10 || first pouring a torrent of abuse upon his judges, and then asserting that they act from 11 || passion.”) (citing Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443-44 12 || (9th Cir. 1995)). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: August 19, 2025 15 _ AnwioenH. Honorable Allison H. Goddard 16 United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28