Gasser v. Sperry

376 S.E.2d 478, 93 N.C. App. 72, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 74
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedFebruary 21, 1989
Docket8828DC513
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 376 S.E.2d 478 (Gasser v. Sperry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gasser v. Sperry, 376 S.E.2d 478, 93 N.C. App. 72, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

GREENE, Judge.

This appeal arises from plaintiff’s attempt to enforce a Florida order granting her custody of three minor children born during her marriage to defendant. Upon the parties’ Florida divorce in November 1984, a Florida court granted plaintiff custody of all four children born during the marriage. However, it appears the Florida court modified the original custody order in March 1987 to transfer custody of the daughter Erin Rebekah Sperry to defendant while leaving custody of the three other children with plaintiff. After this order (the “First Modification Order”) was entered, plaintiff and the three remaining minor children moved to North Carolina. However, in June 1987, the Florida court entered another order (the “Second Modification Order”) which transferred custody of the remaining three minor children to defendant.

*73 In September 1987, plaintiff filed suit in North Carolina to enforce her right to custody of the minor children. Plaintiff alleged the Florida court did not have jurisdiction to enter the Second Modification Order. Conversely, defendant asserted the Second Modification Order was a valid judgment entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of North Carolina and requested the North Carolina court order plaintiff to deliver the remaining minor children in accord with the Second Modification Order. Pending plaintiffs Florida appeal of the Second Modification Order, the North Carolina trial court determined the Second Modification Order was entitled to full faith and credit and ordered custody of the minor children transferred to defendant.

However, the North Carolina trial court’s order stated that, “this Order [is] being entered subject to being modified if the Florida Court shall hereafter sustain the appeal of [plaintiff], and if said Order is sustained, the courts of North Carolina and Florida shall have further proceedings to determine jurisdiction.” After the North Carolina court’s order was appealed to this court and the case argued, the Florida District Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the Florida trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the Second Modification Order and vacated that order. The Florida Supreme Court has declined to review that decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals. As the North Carolina trial court’s order was entered subject to the Florida determination which has now occurred, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case for further proceedings.

If either party on remand desires our own courts to enforce or modify any remaining Florida orders concerning custody of these children, such efforts shall be governed by the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 1 (“PKPA”) and our own *74 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”). 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1738A (West Supp. 1988); N.C.G.S. Sec. 50A (1984). The PKPA establishes national policy in the area of custody jurisdiction. To *75 the extent any state custody statutes conflict with its provisions, the PKPA controls. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. ---, 108 S.Ct. 513, 517, 98 L.Ed. 2d 512, 521 (1988) (PKPA imposes uniform national standards for allocating and enforcing custody determinations).

Appeal dismissed.

Judge BECTON concurs. Judge EAGLES concurs in the result.
1

. 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A:

Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations

(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(b) As used in this section, the term —
(1) “child” means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) “contestant” means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child;
*74 (3) “custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications;
(4) “home State” means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(5) “modification” and “modify” refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or not;
(6) “person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody;
(7) “physical custody” means actual possession and control of a child; and
(8) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States.
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if—
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child’s home State within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
*75

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
376 S.E.2d 478, 93 N.C. App. 72, 1989 N.C. App. LEXIS 74, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gasser-v-sperry-ncctapp-1989.