Gaskin Ex Rel. Gaskin v. Pennsylvania

197 F. App'x 141

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 25, 2006
• Docket: 05-4627
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In September 2005, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved a settlement agreement of a class action, concluding a long and complex case which began some eleven years earlier. See Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F.Supp.2d 628 (E.D.Pa.2005). Linda Bryan, the parent of several non-named class members, appeals the District Court’s approval of the settlement agreement. Her written objections to the settlement, filed after she received the notice of settlement sent to the class, were her first (and only) involvement in the case in the District Court. For the reasons below, we will dismiss the appeal.

As an initial matter, we note that Bryan is representing pro se both herself and her children. While she may file a notice of appeal on behalf of her children, Bryan may not represented them in federal court as a non-lawyer parent. Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 877 (3d Cir.1991). Bryan was apprised of this via letter dated October 28, 2005, and advised that unless she secured counsel for her children within twenty-one days, their appeal would be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. See 3rd Cir. Local Appellate Misc. Rule 107.2. The time has long passed, and we will therefore dismiss the appeal as to the children.

As Bryan cannot represent her children, she must herself have standing to appeal the District Court’s order approving the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court has held that a non-party must intervene in order to appeal the approval of a class action settlement. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988) (“we hold that because petitioners were not parties to the underlying lawsuit, and because they failed to intervene for purposes of appeal, they may not appeal from the consent decree approving that lawsuit’s settlement”).

It appears that Bryan did attempt to intervene. However, her submission did not comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 24. The motion to intervene — to the extent it may be so termed — consists of no more than a portion of a sentence on the last page of a document she filed titled “Objections to Settlement of Class Action by Parent Pro Se, Linda J. Bryan.” See Bryan’s Appendix, doc. 25 at p. 26 (“parent requests permission to join class-action suit”) (formatting changed). Pursuant to Rule 24(c), a motion to intervene “shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.” Bryan’s submission provided no basis for the District Court to determine whether her claims have “a question of fact or law” in common with the Gaskin lawsuit. Rather, the twenty-six pages of rambling objections and questions she submitted to the District Court do not meet the minimal standard for a proper pleading and, so far as we can determine, contain no arguments or allegations that meaningfully relate to the Gaskin case. Although we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.2003), we cannot construe Bryan’s document as a valid motion. For these reasons, we do not fault the District Court for taking no action on her motion.

It follows, however, that Bryan did not intervene. As a result, she lacks standing to appeal the order approving the settlement agreement. S.E.C. v. Black, 163 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir.1998) (stating that “Marino only requires that a court deny an appeal from non-parties who have not obtained or sought intervenor status.”). We will, therefore, dismiss her appeal as well.