Garza v. State

635 S.W.2d 644
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided September 15, 1982·No. 07-81-0064-CR·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

COUNTISS, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.-04(a)(2) (Vernon 1974), and sentenced to eighty years in the penitentiary. By one ground of error, he contends the trial court denied his right to counsel. We affirm.

Appellant committed the offense for which he was convicted while he was an inmate in the Hale County jail. He and another inmate took a jailer hostage and attempted, unsuccessfully, to escape. During the episode, appellant stabbed the jailer and was shot by a deputy sheriff.

Counsel was appointed soon after appellant was indicted. Counsel immediately filed motions raising the issues of appellant’s competency and sanity and the trial court ordered a psychiatric examination. Despite appellant’s refusal to cooperate during the examination, the doctor concluded that appellant was competent and sane and reported his conclusions to the trial court.

Thereafter, at a pre-trial hearing, appellant told the trial court that he did not want to be represented by court-appointed counsel, because he was convicted when previously represented by court-appointed counsel. The trial court then gave appellant the first of many admonishments concerning the importance of representation by counsel and the dangers of self representation, and refused to dismiss the court-appointed counsel. 1 However, the court, after warning appellant that the case would be tried as scheduled, gave appellant an opportunity to determine whether his family could hire counsel.

When the case was called for trial appellant had not hired counsel, but refused to permit his court-appointed counsel to participate in the trial. After further admonishments, the trial proceeded with appellant *646 conducting his own defense. His court-appointed counsel remained in the courtroom and available throughout the trial. Because appellant could not read, he permitted counsel to read to him the names of the persons on the jury panel and the court’s charge and to assist in subpoenaing witnesses. Otherwise, he did not consult with his counsel.

After appellant was convicted and sentenced to eighty years in the penitentiary, he accepted court-appointed counsel for an appeal. We must determine whether the manner in which the trial court resolved the problems caused by appellant’s refusal to accept court-appointed counsel at the trial denied appellant’s right to counsel. 2

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court said a criminal defendant has the right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to conduct his own defense. However, before a trial court can permit self representation, it must advise the defendant “of the dangers and disadvantages of self representation so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.’ ” Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. When a defendant is adequately admonished and appears to understand the import of his decision, he is entitled to waive counsel and act as his own attorney.

Recently, in Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), our Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the application of the Faretta principle in Texas. Recognizing that its prior statements appeared to require more extensive admonishments than Faretta, the court held that Texas will not require more than Faretta demands. 3 The ultimate question for an appellate court is whether the entire record in the case illustrates a defendant’s knowledgeable exercise of his right to defend himself. The focus is on awareness, and the defendant’s awareness as revealed by the entire record is to be considered, along with the form of the admonishments, when deciding whether he proceeded “with eyes open.”

In Martin, after reviewing the entire record, the court concluded that the defendant was fully aware of his choice and that the trial court did not err in permitting self representation. In all respects, except two discussed later, the facts in this case are almost identical to the facts in Martin.

Here, as in Martin, appellant “ ‘advised that under no conditions will he want a court appointed attorney.’ ” Id. at 954, n. 6. In each case, appellant had experience with the criminal justice system and an appreciation of the situation in which he was placing himself. Also, in each case, appellant argued on appeal that the trial court’s admonishments were inadequate. In Martin, the gist of the admonishments was that appellant would be held to the same standard and required to follow the same rules of procedure and evidence as an attorney, and would be at a disadvantage in the courtroom. As discussed above, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the admonishments, when considered with the entire record in the case, revealed sufficient awareness to permit self representation.

We reach the same conclusion in this case. It is not necessary to rely on the entire record, as the court did in Martin, because the extensive admonishments and appellant’s responses, set out in the appen *647 dix, are sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy Faretta. However, when the admonishments and responses are considered with the rest of the record, especially appellant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system, it is even more apparent that appellant knew exactly what he was doing and made his choice “with his eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting self representation.

As we observed earlier, this case differs from Martin in two ways. First, this appellant obviously has little or no education. Although he did a credible job of presenting his version of the events in question, his venture ended in the disaster that usually accompanies self representation. Unfortunately for appellant, Faretta does not limit the right of self representation to the educated. The key is whether the defendant is aware of the burden he is assuming and this appellant was clearly aware.

Second, although appellant positively stated that he would represent himself, he was not enthusiastic about doing so. However, he was also unable to hire counsel and adamant in his refusal to permit court-appointed counsel to represent him. Thus, he gave the trial judge, who exercised great care and extreme patience, no choice except to proceed as he did. Appellant cannot escape punishment or receive another trial by refusing to observe the rules of our system of justice, if it is apparent from the record that he knew what he was doing.

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Garza v. State, 635 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).

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