Gary Warren v. Uspc

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2023
• Docket: 22-16709
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARY RONALD WARREN, No. 22-16709

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01584-SPL-MTM

v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; UNITED STATES PROBATION AND PAROLE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2023**

Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Gary Ronald Warren appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action seeking to enjoin special conditions of parole. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Omar v. Sea-Land

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Warren’s action sua sponte because

Warren failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Warren’s motion for

a preliminary injunction because Warren failed to demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d

953, 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review), abrogated on other

grounds by United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2023).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Warren’s motion for

appointment of counsel because Warren failed to demonstrate exceptional

circumstances justifying appointment of counsel. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d

1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and concluding that no

“exceptional circumstances” justified appointing counsel where plaintiff was

unlikely to succeed on the merits and had been able to articulate his legal claims in

light of the complexity of issues involved).

AFFIRMED.

2 22-16709