Gary v. Cockley

65 F. 497, 8 Ohio F. Dec. 352, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 8, 1895
DocketNo. 210
StatusPublished

This text of 65 F. 497 (Gary v. Cockley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gary v. Cockley, 65 F. 497, 8 Ohio F. Dec. 352, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237 (6th Cir. 1895).

Opinion

LURTON, Circuit Judge,

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

In the view we have of the merits of this case, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the definiteness or sufficiency of the protest and claim filed witli t he collector. Were the hollow billets imported by appellee steel or iron? They were imported from Saudviken, Sweden. The invoice described them as “hollow steed billets,” and they were so entered at the collector's office. They are described in the record as metal billets, tubular in form, about 18 inches in length, having a diameter of 3j inches, the wall of the cylinder having a thickness of about: three-eighths of an inch. The Shelby Steel-Tube Company, for whom these billets were imported, manufactured from them cold-drawn weldless or seamless steel tubes, which are used in the .manufacture of bicycles or boiler tubes, tubes for surgical uses, and other tubes where strength and lightness is desirable with small bulk. The articles thus made are advertised and sold as steel tubes. These billets were the first of the kind imported, and were in form unknown to the trade of this country at the passage of the McKinley act of 3890. The contention of the appellee is that it is immaterial whether they were sold and bought as steel billets, or that the tubes made from them are sold as steel tubes, or that the material is such as in trade is known as “steel.” Elis contention is that; “steel,” within the meaning of the tariff act, is defined by the act itself, and that these billets are not “steel,” within the definition of paragraph 150 of the McKinley act. In Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468-471, 12 Sup. Ct. 55, the question involved was the rate of duty upon an article defined In the tariff as “gilling twine.” Mr. Justice lírown said in that case:

“It is a cardinal rule of this court that, in fixing the classification of goods for the payment of duties, the name or designation of the goods is to ho understood in its known commercial sense, and that their denomination in the market when the law was passed will control their classification, without regard to their scientific designation, the material of which they may be made, or the use to which they may he applied.”

For this proposition ho cites a number of authorities.

The case at bar is altogether different, and not within the principle so clearly stated in the paragraph just cited. “Grilling twine” was not defined in the act. Where the act, undertakes particularly and definitely to define what is meant by an article upon which, a specific duty is levied, such definition is at least very persuasive in ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers, fiuth. fit. Const. § 327; End. Interp. fit. par. 365. A manifest distinction exists between definite interpretation clauses which are special and those which are general. The provisions defining the legislative meaning of a particular word used in the act containing the interpretation clause may well he regarded as a part of the law itself, and construed accordingly. Suth. St. Const. § 231, and case so cited. Undoubtedly cases may arise, as observed by Lord Denman, in which, interpretation clauses will rather embarrass the court than afford assistance, inasmuch as the interpretation danse must itself he interpreted, and may itself [500]*500become matter of controversy. Nutter v. Board of Health, 4 Q. B. Div. 375; Reg. v. Justices, 7 Adol. & E. 480.

That the billets in question have all the physical characteristics of steel in strength, elasticity, and homogeneity of character is abundantly shown by the evidence. In chemical composition this metal also responds to approved tests for steel. The difficulty is to draw a distinction between certain grades of malleable iron and grades of mild or soft steel. Iron and steel shade into each other, and the known chemical and physical tests furnish no absolute guide by which we may always determine just when iron ceases to be iron or steel ceases to be steel. In Greenwood on Iron and Steel, a work regarded by all the experts who have been examined in this case as of very high authority, it is said of malleable or wrought iron, that it was “formerly described as iron in the lowest degree of carburization; but, with the advance which has happened in late years in the manufacture of steel, all attempts to frame a definition of ‘malleable iron’ upon a chemical basis have been futile, since in its lowest per cent, of carbon, comparative freedom from such impurities as silicon, sulphur, phosphorus, etc., occurring so largely in pig iron, it is rivalled and even excelled by the mild steels produced by the Siemens and the Bessemer processes. Definitions based upon its mechanical qualities are also equally unsuccessful, for'the superior qualities of malleability, tensile strength, ductility, and welding, which, until a comparatively recent date, were considered to be the special attributes of malleable iron, are all possessed in an equal number or superior degree by the mild steels now produced in such large quantities, and with the utmost uniformity and regularity, by the processes above mentioned.” “Steel” he defines to be “a compound of pure iron, with small percentages, ranging usually from .1 to 1.25 per cent, of carbon, existing not as graphite, but either as combined or dissolved carbon, the latter view now receiving influential support.” “All other elements, although several are invariably present in greater or less proportion, must still be regarded as impurities in the steel, notwithstanding that it may be advantageous to introduce some of them to impart special qualities to the metal, or to neutralize the effect of the presence of other of them.” His own definition of “wrought iron,” as well as of “steel,” he bases upon the mode of production. Thus, he says malleable or wrought iron “would embrace the commercial varieties obtained either as the result of the decarburization, and more or less complete separation of several of the impurities of pig iron during the process of puddling, or as the product of the direct treatment of certain^ores in the Catalan bloomery, Siemens rotary, or other furnace, in which a semi-fused product is obtained, possessing the malleability of wrought iron.” The term “steel,” “embracing also what is known as ‘ingot iron,”’ “would be reserved to distinguish such varieties of iron as are delivered in a state of fusion, allowing of the metal being cast, at once into a malleable ingot from the furnace, crucible, or other vessel in which it is produced.” Greenw. Iron & Steel (4th Ed.) 203.

This definition of “steel” is supported by some of the experts examined by the importer. It is evident that congress has adopted a [501]*501definition of “steel” which is based in part upon the mode of production. That definition is found in paragraph 150 of the McKinley act, and is in these words:

“All metal produced from iron or its ores, which is cast and malleable, of whatever description or form, without regard to the percentage of carbon contained therein, whether produced by cementation, or converted, cast, or made from iron or its ores, by the crucible, Bessemer, Clapp-Grifiiths, pneumatic.

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Related

American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington
141 U.S. 468 (Supreme Court, 1891)

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Bluebook (online)
65 F. 497, 8 Ohio F. Dec. 352, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gary-v-cockley-ca6-1895.