Gary Taylor v. SeaHarbor Insurance and Mariam Abdalla

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 02-26-00232-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00232-CV ___________________________

GARY TAYLOR, Appellant

V.

SEAHARBOR INSURANCE AND MARIAM ABDALLA, Appellees

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-010054-1

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Gary Taylor, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal the trial court’s

order granting Appellee SeaHarbor Insurance’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and

dismissing Taylor’s claims against SeaHarbor. Because it is not a final judgment or an

appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

We have jurisdiction to consider appeals only from final judgments and from

certain interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 51.014(a). A final judgment is one that disposes of every pending claim and party or

that “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all

parties.” See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Unless a statutory exception applies, an order

that does not dispose of all pending parties and claims remains interlocutory and

unappealable until the trial court signs a final judgment. See id. An order granting a

Rule 91a motion to dismiss has not been designated as an appealable interlocutory

order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a).

Taylor sued SeaHarbor and another defendant, Mariam Abdalla. The order

from which Taylor attempts to appeal does not address Taylor’s claims against

Abdalla, and the trial court clerk has confirmed that Abdalla has not been disposed of

but remains a pending party. After we received Taylor’s notice of appeal, we notified

him of our concern that we may not have jurisdiction over his appeal because the

order from which he attempts to appeal does not appear to be a final judgment or an

2 appealable interlocutory order. We warned him that unless he filed a response by

May 4, 2026, showing grounds for continuing the appeal, it could be dismissed for

want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Taylor did not file a response.

Because the order from which Taylor attempts to appeal is neither a final

judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Gaff v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 02-24-

00486-CV, 2025 WL 1478175, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2025, no pet.)

(dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal from order that granted Rule 91a motion to

dismiss but did not dismiss all parties).

Per Curiam

Delivered: May 28, 2026