Gary Stephen Craig v. Cookie Crews et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Kentucky
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00458
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

GARY STEPHEN CRAIG PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-458-JHM

COOKIE CREWS et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Gary Stephen Craig filed the instant pro se civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is now before the Court upon an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the instant action will be dismissed. I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff sues Cookie Crews, the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections; Ladeidra N. Jones, the Chairperson of the Kentucky Parole Board; Natalie Popham, an assistant parole supervisor; and Addison Fletcher, a parole officer. Plaintiff states that he is 74 years old and “has been on supervised parole since approximately 2003 following a 1974 conviction.” He states that he has served parole “without a single violation.” He asserts, “Despite exemplary conduct Plaintiff remains under active and extremely restrictive arbitrary supervision unlike similarly situated parolees who are transitioned to unsupervised status within approximately 3 years.” He continues, “In an act of arbitrary personal discretion, Defendants confiscated Plaintiff’s television cable equipment, cell phone, and computer, citing no formal violation or Parole Board-approved condition, and in violation of Parole Board Regulations regarding parole conditions.” He also states that he is prohibited from having unsupervised contact with persons under the age of 18, including family members, even though his underlying offense did not involve a minor. He maintains that his travel out of the county and state are restricted. He asserts that the parole conditions were imposed by Defendants arbitrarily without “[f]ormal notification of changes to parole terms”; a hearing or opportunity to appeal to the Parole Board; or “[w]ritten notice or documentation of justification, medical or

behavioral concerns, or Board approval, as required by property promulgated Parole Board Regulations in effect.” He reports that he was denied habeas corpus relief in state court. Plaintiff alleges denial of his rights to equal protection and due process. As relief, he seeks injunctive relief in the form of “removing the excessive restrictions and restoring Plaintiff’s personal property and familial contact” and “requiring Defendants to remove Plaintiff from active parole status.” He also seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. II. STANDARD Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608–09. On review, a district

court must dismiss a case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less stringent “does not require [the Court] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court

2 from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. ANALYSIS Habeas corpus “is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or

duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the conditions of his parole, which is a form of confinement, so his claims are also only cognizable in habeas corpus. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963) (parole conditions place a paroled prisoner in “custody” for habeas purposes); Coates v. Gorham, No. 13-2145, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 25396, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014) (“[W]e have held that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the manner in which his parole is to be served.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint challenging the conditions of his parole is barred by Heck. See Holson v. Good, 579 F. App’x 363, 365 (6th Cir. 2014) (dismissing § 1983 claims challenging

the conditions of the plaintiff’s parole as barred by Heck); Szymanski v. MDOC-Parole Bd., No. 24-cv-12536, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26310, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025) (same) (collecting cases); Franklin v. Rausch, No. 3:20-cv-515, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165894, at *16 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2022) (same). The Court notes that Plaintiff states that he was denied habeas relief in state court, but he has not sought habeas relief in federal court. For these reasons, the action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted by separate Order. The action will be dismissed without prejudice. See Franklin, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165894, at *16 (dismissing § 1983 claim challenging the length and terms

3 of the plaintiff's parole without prejudice) (citing Justice v. Pickell, No. 05-74882-DT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5375, *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2006)). Date: November 25, 2025

Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge United States District Court

ce: Plaintiff, pro se 4414.010