Gary Scherer v. David J. Eagle

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: October 6, 2021
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01606
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10

11 GARY SCHERER, Case No. 2:21-cv-01606-ODW (PDx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 14 DAVID J. EAGLE, et al., APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF 15 Defendants. DEFAULT JUDGMENT [26] 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Gary Scherer applies for default judgment against Defendants David J. 19 Eagle, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the Eagle Family Trust, and Mattress 20 Pros LLC for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Appl. 21 Default J. (“Appl.”), ECF No. 26.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 22 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Scherer’s Application.1 23 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 On February 22, 2021, Scherer filed a Complaint alleging the following facts. 25 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 26 27

28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of the Application, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 Scherer uses a wheelchair due to a medical condition that significantly impairs 2 his mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1.) In January 2020, Scherer visited the Mattress Pros store at 3 5600 Laurel Canyon Blvd in Valley Village, California to avail himself of its goods and 4 assess the business for compliance with disability access laws. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendants 5 own and operate the store. (Id.) Scherer alleges that Defendants failed to provide 6 wheelchair accessible paths of travel inside the store and along the south and west 7 pathways leading to the store entrance. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 17.) Specifically, Scherer alleges 8 that mattresses stacked on the outside walkway narrowed the path of travel. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 9 15.) Scherer’s knowledge of these alleged barriers deters him from returning to the 10 store until the store is accessible. (Id. ¶ 23.) 11 On February 22, 2021, Scherer initiated this action against Defendants asserting 12 two causes of action: violation of the ADA and violation of the California Unruh Civil 13 Rights Act (“Unruh”). (Compl. ¶¶ 25–35.) On March 17, 2021, the Court declined to 14 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Scherer’s Unruh claim and dismissed that claim 15 without prejudice. (Min. Order 9, ECF No. 16.) Upon Scherer’s requests, on March 31, 16 2021, the Clerk entered default against Eagle, and on April 9, 2021, the Clerk entered 17 default against Mattress Pros. (Defaults by Clerk, ECF Nos. 23, 25.) 18 Scherer now moves for default judgment against both Defendants. (See Appl.) 19 He seeks an injunction under the ADA directing Defendants to provide wheelchair 20 accessible paths of travel at and around the store, and an award of attorney’s fees and 21 litigation expenses in the amount of $2,612.20. (Id. 2.) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 55(b) authorizes a district court to 24 grant a default judgment after the Clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed. R. Civ. 25 P. 55(b). Before a court can enter a default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff 26 must satisfy the procedural requirements set forth in FRCP 54(c) and 55, as well as 27 Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2. Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant submit a 28 declaration establishing: (1) when and against which party default was entered; 1 (2) identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the 2 defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or active service member; (4) that the 3 Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3931, does not apply; and (5) that the 4 defaulting party was properly served with notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). C.D. 5 Cal. L.R. 55-1. Local Rule 55-2 allows plaintiffs claiming unliquidated damages to 6 prove those damages by declaration. L.R. 55-2. 7 If these procedural requirements are satisfied, a district court has discretion to 8 enter default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “[A] 9 defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered 10 judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal 11 2002). In exercising discretion, a court must consider several factors (the “Eitel 12 factors”): 13 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of 14 money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 15 material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and 16 (7) the strong policy underlying the [FRCP] favoring decisions on the merits. 17 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, after the Clerk 18 enters default, the defendant’s liability is conclusively established, and the well-pleaded 19 factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, except those pertaining to 20 damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per 21 curiam) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 Scherer has satisfied the procedural prerequisites to moving for default judgment, 24 and the Eitel factors weigh in favor of issuing the ADA injunction Scherer requests. 25 However, counsel’s requested attorneys’ fees are excessive. Thus, the Court will grant 26 the motion and enter default judgment with reduced attorneys’ fees. 27 28 1 A. Procedural Requirements 2 The Clerk entered default against each Defendant at Scherer’s request in 3 accordance with FRCP 55(a). In compliance with Local Rule 55-1, Scherer’s counsel 4 declares: (a) the Clerk entered default against Defendants (b) on the Complaint that 5 Scherer filed on February 22, 2021; (c) Defendants are not infants or incompetent 6 persons; (d) Defendants are not covered under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; 7 and (e) Scherer served Defendants with notice of this Application by first class United 8 States mail on March 5, 2021, and March 12, 2021, respectively. (Decl. of Faythe 9 Gutierrez Ex. 9 ¶¶ 2, 5 (“Gutierrez Decl.”), ECF No. 26-11.) Thus, Scherer has 10 complied with the procedural requirements for the entry of a default judgment. 11 B. Factors 12 Once a plaintiff satisfies the foregoing procedural requirements, the court 13 proceeds to exercise its discretion in entering default judgment, using the Eitel factors 14 as a guide. Here, the Court finds that the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment 15 against Defendants on Scherer’s ADA claim for obstructed paths of travel. 16 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 17 Under the first factor, courts determine whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice 18 if a default judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Denial of default leads to 19 prejudice when it leaves a plaintiff without a remedy or recourse to recover 20 compensation. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 21 (C.D. Cal. 2010); PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Defendants have failed to appear 22 or participate in this action, except for an attempt by Mattress Pros to file documents 23 pro se, which were stricken for lack of a licensed attorney to represent the LLC. (Appl. 24 Permission Electronic Filing, ECF No. 19; Order Striking Electronically Filed Docs., 25 ECF No. 20.) Absent entry of default judgment, Scherer will have no way to compel 26 Defendants to re-arrange their mattresses in a way that allows him equal enjoyment of 27 the store and a path of travel on the sidewalk outside. Accordingly, this factor weighs 28 in favor of default judgment. 1 2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of Complaint 2 The second and third Eitel factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which 3 the [plaintiff] may recover.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 4 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting PepsiCo, 238 F. 5 Supp. 2d at 1175). To weigh these two factors, the Court must evaluate the merits of 6 Scherer’s ADA cause of action. 7 “Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the 8 ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 9 accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . .’” Oliver v. Ralphs 10 Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 11 12182(a)). As relevant here, discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural 12 barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 13 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). To succeed on his ADA claim, Scherer must establish 14 that (1) he is “disabled within the meaning of the ADA,” (2) Defendants “own[], lease[], 15 or operate[] a place of public accommodation,” (3) Defendants denied Scherer public 16 accommodation because of his disability, (4) the store “presents an architectural barrier 17 prohibited under the ADA,” and (5) “the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 18 Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007–08 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Molski 19 v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled on other grounds by 20 Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2020)). 21 First, under the ADA, a “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that 22 substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The 23 ADA lists walking as a “major life activit[y].” Id. § 12102(2)(A). Scherer alleges that 24 he uses a wheelchair due to a medical condition that significantly impairs his ability to 25 walk. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Scherer’s allegation thus establishes that he is disabled under the 26 ADA definition. 27 Second, under the ADA, those who own, lease, or operate places of public 28 accommodation are prohibited from discriminating against an individual on the basis of 1 disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Public accommodations include sales establishments. 2 Id. § 12181(7)(E). Scherer’s allegations and evidence indicate that defendant Mattress 3 Pros LLC owns the business that operates out of the premises at issue. (Gutierrez Decl. 4 ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 11.) This suffices to show that Mattress Pros owns, leases, or operates a 5 place of public accommodation subject to Title III of the ADA. 6 Scherer also presents evidence indicating that “defendant David J. Eagle” owns 7 the property. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 4.) But Scherer sued Eagle in two capacities: 8 individually and as a trustee of a trust. These are two separate legal capacities, and 9 Scherer fails to specify in which capacity Eagle owns the property. Without further 10 evidence, the Court will not make a guess, nor will the Court enter judgment against 11 both. 12 More fundamentally, Scherer’s bare assertion about Eagle’s relationship to the 13 property fails because there is no further evidence that Eagle, as the owner of the 14 property, is in any way responsible (in theory or in fact) for where Mattress Pros places 15 its own mattresses. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 3–4.) This failure is unsurprising, as it is 16 implausible that Eagle, as the building owner, is responsible for the placement of 17 merchandise procured and possessed solely by a commercial tenant. It is therefore 18 implausible that the placement of the mattresses constitutes an act of discrimination by 19 Eagle. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion IN PART 20 by DISMISSING Eagle from this action WITH PREJUDICE. The remaining 21 discussion applies to Mattress Pros only. 22 As to the third and fourth elements, “a public accommodation shall maintain . . . 23 facilities . . . readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. 24 § 36.211(a). The standards governing compliance with the ADA are set forth in the 25 ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), which is “essentially an encyclopedia of 26 design standards.” Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905. The applicable ADAAG standard relating 27 to accessible routes provides that the clear width of walking surfaces at public 28 accommodations must be a minimum of 36 inches. 2010 ADAAG § 403.5.1. 1 Scherer contends the store lacks accessible paths of travel that violate the ADA. 2 (Compl. ¶ 25–31.) Specifically, Scherer alleges that the south and west paths of travel 3 leading to the store were partially blocked by mattresses, thereby causing those paths 4 of travel to be narrower than 36 inches, in violation of the ADA. (Compl. ¶ 14.) 5 Scherer’s investigator’s photos show that Mattress Pros operates out of a storefront in 6 an outdoor strip mall-type commercial property. (Appl. Ex. 4 (“Store Photos”); ECF 7 No. 26-6; Decl. of Evens Louis (“Louis Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 26-5 (authentication).) 8 The photos show several mattresses leaning against the outside store window. (See 9 Store Photos 4–62, 14–15; Louis Decl. ¶ 4.) The mattresses cover most of the sidewalk 10 that abuts the front of the store, leaving only a few inches between the mattresses and 11 the curb where the sidewalk drops off and meets the parking lot. Thus, the resulting 12 paths of travel are only a few inches wide. It is unclear from these photographs whether 13 this is the “south” or the “west” walkway, but the photos clearly show a common-area 14 pathway in front of the Mattress Pros store obstructed with mattresses. (See Store 15 Photos 4–6, 14–15.) 16 Furthermore, a series of photos taken inside the store show similar path-of-travel 17 violations. (Store Photos 17–23.) The photos show that the storeroom is filled with 18 mattresses stacked flat, in a grid-like pattern, with paths of travel between the stacks of 19 mattresses. (Id.) Louis declares, and the photos show, that some of these paths of travel 20 were less than 36 inches in width. (Louis Decl. ¶ 3.) 21 Scherer’s evidence thus demonstrates that the walkways leading up to the store, 22 and some pathways within the store, were partially obstructed by mattresses, reducing 23 the paths of travel to narrower than 36 inches. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15; Louis Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) 24 Defendants have not submitted any evidence on these issues. Thus, the Court concludes 25 that some of the aisles within the store and some of the walkways leading up to the store 26 do not satisfy the requirement for an accessible path of travel. See Gayle v. Borg, 27 28 2 The store photos are unpaginated. The Court considers the first photo to be page 1. 1 No. CV 18-09055-SJO-JC, 2020 WL 2334113, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding 2 similar path-of-travel violations at a gas station). 3 Fifth, Scherer alleges the barriers are easily removed without much difficulty or 4 expense. (Compl. ¶ 22.) The ADA provides rearranging furniture as one of many 5 examples of removing barriers. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(4). Mattresses are movable 6 objects, and a mattress business is undeniably capable of moving mattresses. Absent 7 any countervailing showing, the Court finds that removal of the barrier by rearranging 8 the mattresses is “readily achievable.” As such, the second and third Eitel factors favor 9 default judgment. 10 3. Amount at Stake 11 The fourth Eitel factor balances the amount of money at stake with the 12 “seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176; Eitel, 13 782 F.2d at 1471. The amount at stake must be proportionate to the harm alleged. 14 Landstar, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 15 The ADA’s enforcement provisions “provide only for injunctive relief. Damages 16 are not available to individuals.” Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d 1133, 17 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Scherer seeks injunctive relief and does not seek monetary 18 damages. (Appl. 2.) As such, assuming the injunction is appropriately tailored, the 19 relief sought will be proportionate to Defendants’ conduct and appropriate on default 20 judgment. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 21 4. Possibility of Dispute 22 The fifth Eitel factor is whether the material facts are in dispute. PepsiCo, 238 F. 23 Supp. 2d at 1177. Scherer’s evidence makes clear that the way Mattress Pros stacks its 24 mattresses causes path-of-travel violations. (See Store Photos; Louis Decl. ¶ 4.) 25 Further, because the allegations in Scherer’s Complaint are presumed true, Defendants’ 26 failure to appear in this action results in a finding that “no factual disputes exist that 27 would preclude entry of default judgment.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 28 Accordingly, this factor favors entry of default judgment. 1 5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect 2 The sixth Eitel factor is whether the defendant’s default is the result of excusable 3 neglect. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, Scherer served Defendants with both 4 the Complaint and the Application for Default Judgment. (Proof of Service of Compl., 5 ECF No. 15; Proof of Service of Appl., ECF No. 26-13.) Defendants were thus on 6 notice and failed to respond. Mattress Pro attempted to file documents pro se, but these 7 were stricken for lack of a licensed attorney representing the LLC. (Appl. Permission 8 Electronic Filing; Order Striking Electronically Filed Docs.) This suggests Defendants’ 9 lack of participation is due more to a choice not to appear than to excusable neglect. 10 Accordingly, this factor favors entry of default judgment. 11 6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 12 Under the seventh Eitel factor, “default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. 13 Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 14 782 F.2d at 1472 (citing Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 15 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, when the defendant fails to answer the plaintiff’s complaint, 16 “a decision on the merits [is] impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d 17 at 1177. As Defendants failed to appear or otherwise respond, a determination on the 18 merits is impossible. Accordingly, this factor does not preclude entry of default 19 judgment. 20 On balance, the Eitel factors support entry of default judgment against Mattress 21 Pros on Scherer’s ADA cause of action, based on the noncompliant paths of travel. 22 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Scherer’s Application IN PART. The Court will 23 enter judgment against Mattress Pros and will dismiss Eagle in both his capacities. 24 Plaintiff proposes an injunction under which defendants “are ordered to provide 25 wheelchair accessible paths of travel at the Mattress Pros store . . . in compliance with 26 the [ADAAG].” (Proposed J., ECF No. 26-12.) Plaintiff’s proposed injunction is too 27 conclusory and generalized. The Court will issue an appropriately narrow injunction as 28 part of the judgment. 1 C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 2 Scherer prevailed on his ADA claim and may therefore recover attorneys’ fees 3 under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Scherer may also recover costs as provided in 29 U.S.C. 4 § 1920, FRCP 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54-2. Scherer’s attorneys request $1742.20 in 5 fees and $870.00 in costs. (Decl. of Russell Handy (“Handy Decl.”) 9–10, ECF 6 No. 26-3.) 7 In an application for default judgment, when attorneys’ fees are sought pursuant 8 to a statute, fees are generally calculated according to the schedule provided by the 9 court. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. Attorneys may request fees in excess of the schedule, as 10 Scherer’s attorneys have done. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. When a party makes such a 11 request, “the court is obligated to calculate a ‘reasonable’ fee in the usual manner, 12 without using the fee schedule as a starting point.” Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 13 893 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2018). The usual manner is the lodestar method, which 14 multiplies the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. 15 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Courts have discretion to determine the 16 reasonableness of the fees requested and may consider a number of pertinent factors. 17 Id. at 433; Langer v. Butler, No. SA CV 19-0829-DOC (JDEx), 2019 WL 6332167, 18 at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) (citing Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 n.1 19 (9th Cir. 1988) (listing twelve factors)).3 Courts should also exclude hours that are 20 excessive, redundant, or not reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 21 First, the Court finds that the number of hours billed for this case (5.27 hours) is 22 reasonable. (Handy Decl. ¶¶ 9–10.) 23 24

25 3 The factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other 26 employment by the attorney as a result of accepting the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the 27 amount involved and the result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney(s); 28 (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Quesada. 850 F.3d at 539 n.1. 1 As for hourly rates, three lawyers worked on Scherer’s case: Mark Potter (billing 2 at $595/hour), Amanda Seabock (billing at $450/hour), and Faythe Gutierrez (billing at 3 $400/hour). (Handy Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) Marcus Handy requests fees at $200 per hour as a 4 paralegal, and the legal assistants seek fees at $100 per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) After 5 considering the qualifications of the attorneys who billed for this case, the itemized 6 billing records detailing their time, and the type of work required for a routine ADA 7 case such as this, the Court concludes that the requested hourly rates are excessive. 8 This is a routine ADA case in which Plaintiff’s counsel has reused the same 9 documents and “carbon-copy complaints” in other cases. Tate v. Deoca, No. CV 14- 10 08739-SJO-MRW, 2018 WL 5914220, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018) (citing cases and 11 cautioning against awarding counsel a windfall for such copy-and-paste work); (see 12 Handy Decl. ¶ 3 (noting Potter has litigated thousands of ADA cases).) Indeed, “[a] 13 simple comparison of the filings in this case with the filings in thousands of other cases 14 filed by Plaintiff’s counsel in this district reveals almost no original work.” Tate, 15 2018 WL 5914220, at *8. 16 This Court is guided not by the amount requested but by the “fees awarded by 17 other judges in the same locality in similar cases.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 18 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Given that this action is nearly 19 identical to the thousands of other cases filed by Scherer’s counsel, and after reviewing 20 awards in similar cases, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s requested hourly rates as follows: 21 $425/hour for Potter, $350/hour for Seabock, $250/hour for Gutierrez, $150/hour for 22 Marcus Handy. See Villegas v. Wong-One, LLC, No. CV 20-7291-RSWL-ASX, 23 2021 WL 2987151, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2021) (reducing hourly rates to $425/hour 24 for Potter, $350/hour for Seabock, and $250/hour for Gutierrez); Garcia v. Padilla, No. 25 2:20-cv-03033-SVW-JPR, 2020 WL 8027786, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (same). 26 The $100/hour rate billed by Counsel’s legal assistants is reasonable and need 27 not be reduced. See Love v. Mustafa, No. 20CV02071PJHAGT, 2021 WL 2905427, 28 1 || at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021) (finding $100/hour a reasonable rate for paralegal fees 2} in an ADA case). 3 Accordingly, the reduced attorney fee award is $1,195.20. 4 As for investigator costs, in recent similar cases, counsel’s firm requested $100, 5 | as opposed to $400 in the present action. See e.g., Uriarte-Limon v. Torres, No. 2:20- 6 | CV-02862-SVW-JC, 2020 WL 5260480, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2020). Moreover, in 7 || cases where counsel’s firm has submitted investigator costs of $400, this Court has 8 || routinely reduced these costs to $100. See e.g., Cagle v. Multani, No. CV 20-3038- 9] MWF (PDX), 2020 WL 7861969, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020). Reducing the 10 || investigator cost award is especially appropriate in this case because nothing about this 11 || investigation suggests that it was particularly time- or labor-intensive. Moreover, 12 | Scherer has not provided any other supporting evidence to support a $400 investigator 13 | expense besides the billing statement. The Court reduces the investigator costs to $100, 14 | and awards Plaintiff $570 in costs. 15 Vv. CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 17 | IN PART Plaintiff's Application for Default Judgment. (ECF No. 26.) The Court will 18 | issue judgment against Mattress Pros containing an appropriately tailored ADA 19 injunction and an award of $1,195.20 in attorneys’ fees and $570.00 in costs. Eagle is 20 || ordered DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in both his individual and trustee 21 || capacities. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 October 6, 2021 □□ 26 , “ Led liad 28 OTIS D. WRIGHT, I UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE