UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION GARY NORRIS LINK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV426-196 ) COASTAL STATE ) PRISON, ET AL., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER The Court previously granted pro se plaintiff Gary Noris Link’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. See doc. 4. He has returned the required forms. See docs. 6 & 7. The Court, therefore, proceeds to screen Link’s Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards in screening a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001), so allegations in the Complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bumpus v. Watts, 448 F. App’x 3, 4 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011). Conclusory allegations, however, fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). Link’s Complaint alleges that there was a plumbing issue in his cell. Doc. 1 at 9. He put his arm out of an opening in the door, “demanding
justice from inhumane conditions.” Id. Defendant Holtgreven attempted to secure the “flap,” but was unable to because Link’s arm was blocking
it. Id. Holtgreven ordered him “several times” to remove his arm, but Link did not comply. Id. Holtgreven, then, “lifted the flap to its maximum height [and] violently slammed the flap on [Link’s] right hand causing a
laceration.” Id. It is well-settled that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019). “In considering an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim, [the court] must consider both a subjective and an objective component: (1) whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, and (2) if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Johnson v. Moody, 206 F. App’x 880, 883 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). While Link does not expressly allege Holtgreven’s state of mind, see doc. 1 at 9, and expressly alleges that he refused to follow Holtgreven’s apparently lawful order to
remove his hand from the door’s opening, given the Court’s obligation to draw inferences in his favor and the charitable construction afforded to
pro se pleadings, his excessive force claims are sufficient1 to be served upon Holtgreven. Link’s Complaint also names Coastal State Prison and another
individual Defendant, “DWS Karen Finch,” doc. 1 at 1, and “DWCT Briana Kaigler,” id. at 8. Coastal State Prison is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Thomas v. Coastal State Prison, 2023 WL
2432910, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). It is, therefore, DISMISSED. The Complaint does not include any allegations implicating Defendant Finch or Kaigler at all. See generally doc. 1. The
lack of any factual allegation implicating either of them in any claim, and
1 To be clear, the Court’s determination that Link’s Complaint is sufficient for service does not, in any way, express an opinion on the merits of those claims. the fact that it appears impossible that either could be implicated in Defendant Holtgreven’s allegedly excessive force, demonstrates that
Plaintiff’s Complaint is clearly insufficient to state any claim upon which relief may be granted against these defendants. Defendants Finch and Kaigler are, therefore, also DISMISSED.
Since the Court approves for service Link’s excessive force claims upon Defendant Holtgreven, a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1, and a
copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendant Holtgreven by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff.
The Court also provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the remainder of this action. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs service be effected by the United States Marshal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint
to a defendant by first-class mail and request the defendant waive formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local R. 4.5. A defendant has a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure
to return the waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until 60 days after the date the marshal sent the request for waiver. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(3). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Defendant in this action is
granted leave of court to take the deposition of Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). Defendants are further advised the Court’s standard 140-day discovery period will commence upon the
filing of the last answer. Local R. 26.1. Defendants shall ensure all discovery, including Plaintiff’s deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that discovery period.
If a Defendant takes the deposition of any other person, Defendants are ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As Plaintiff will not likely attend such a deposition, the
Defendant taking the deposition must notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on that Defendant written questions Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. Defendants shall present such questions to the witness in order and word-for-word during the deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Plaintiff must submit the questions
in a sealed envelope within 10 days of the notice of deposition. INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately
informing this Court and defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local R. 11.1. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the
Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION GARY NORRIS LINK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV426-196 ) COASTAL STATE ) PRISON, ET AL., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER The Court previously granted pro se plaintiff Gary Noris Link’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. See doc. 4. He has returned the required forms. See docs. 6 & 7. The Court, therefore, proceeds to screen Link’s Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards in screening a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001), so allegations in the Complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bumpus v. Watts, 448 F. App’x 3, 4 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011). Conclusory allegations, however, fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). Link’s Complaint alleges that there was a plumbing issue in his cell. Doc. 1 at 9. He put his arm out of an opening in the door, “demanding
justice from inhumane conditions.” Id. Defendant Holtgreven attempted to secure the “flap,” but was unable to because Link’s arm was blocking
it. Id. Holtgreven ordered him “several times” to remove his arm, but Link did not comply. Id. Holtgreven, then, “lifted the flap to its maximum height [and] violently slammed the flap on [Link’s] right hand causing a
laceration.” Id. It is well-settled that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019). “In considering an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim, [the court] must consider both a subjective and an objective component: (1) whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, and (2) if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Johnson v. Moody, 206 F. App’x 880, 883 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). While Link does not expressly allege Holtgreven’s state of mind, see doc. 1 at 9, and expressly alleges that he refused to follow Holtgreven’s apparently lawful order to
remove his hand from the door’s opening, given the Court’s obligation to draw inferences in his favor and the charitable construction afforded to
pro se pleadings, his excessive force claims are sufficient1 to be served upon Holtgreven. Link’s Complaint also names Coastal State Prison and another
individual Defendant, “DWS Karen Finch,” doc. 1 at 1, and “DWCT Briana Kaigler,” id. at 8. Coastal State Prison is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Thomas v. Coastal State Prison, 2023 WL
2432910, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). It is, therefore, DISMISSED. The Complaint does not include any allegations implicating Defendant Finch or Kaigler at all. See generally doc. 1. The
lack of any factual allegation implicating either of them in any claim, and
1 To be clear, the Court’s determination that Link’s Complaint is sufficient for service does not, in any way, express an opinion on the merits of those claims. the fact that it appears impossible that either could be implicated in Defendant Holtgreven’s allegedly excessive force, demonstrates that
Plaintiff’s Complaint is clearly insufficient to state any claim upon which relief may be granted against these defendants. Defendants Finch and Kaigler are, therefore, also DISMISSED.
Since the Court approves for service Link’s excessive force claims upon Defendant Holtgreven, a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1, and a
copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendant Holtgreven by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff.
The Court also provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the remainder of this action. INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs service be effected by the United States Marshal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint
to a defendant by first-class mail and request the defendant waive formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local R. 4.5. A defendant has a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure
to return the waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until 60 days after the date the marshal sent the request for waiver. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(3). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Defendant in this action is
granted leave of court to take the deposition of Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). Defendants are further advised the Court’s standard 140-day discovery period will commence upon the
filing of the last answer. Local R. 26.1. Defendants shall ensure all discovery, including Plaintiff’s deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that discovery period.
If a Defendant takes the deposition of any other person, Defendants are ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As Plaintiff will not likely attend such a deposition, the
Defendant taking the deposition must notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on that Defendant written questions Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. Defendants shall present such questions to the witness in order and word-for-word during the deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Plaintiff must submit the questions
in a sealed envelope within 10 days of the notice of deposition. INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately
informing this Court and defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local R. 11.1. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the
Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court on each Defendant (or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, the Defendant’s attorney). Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which
a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to each Defendant or the Defendant’s counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. “Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the
action, [and] the file number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to obtain facts and information about the case from a Defendant, Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The discovery period in this case will expire
140 days after the filing of the last answer. Local R. 26.1. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the Court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within this time period.
Id. Discovery materials should not be filed routinely with the Clerk of Court; exceptions include: when the Court directs filing; when a party
needs such materials in connection with a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary; and when needed for use at trial. Local R. 26.4.
Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes of the instant case, this
means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or organizations who are not named as a defendant. Interrogatories are not to contain more than 25 questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff
wishes to propound more than 25 interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the Court. If Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he should first contact the attorney for Defendants and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a
statement certifying that he has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 37(a)(2)(A); Local R. 26.5.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain
them from the Clerk of Court at the standard cost of fifty cents ($.50) per page. If Plaintiff seeks copies, he should request them directly from the Clerk of Court and is advised that the Court will
authorize and require the collection of fees from his prison trust fund account to pay the cost of the copies at the aforementioned rate of fifty cents ($.50) per page.
If Plaintiff does not press this case forward, the court may dismiss it for failure to prosecute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Local R. 41.1. It is Plaintiff’s duty to cooperate in any discovery initiated by a
Defendant. Upon no less than five days’ notice of the scheduled deposition date, Plaintiff must appear and permit his deposition to be taken and must answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.
As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to “counsel of record” directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff proceeding
without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial
Order. A plaintiff who is incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which may be scheduled by the Court.
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A Defendant may choose to ask the Court to dismiss this action by filing a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or both. Under this Court’s Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve his response to the motion within 14 days of its service. Failure to respond shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion. Local R. 7.5. Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that he does not oppose the Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution if Plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within 21 days after service of the motion. Local R. 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to
the motion. Furthermore, each material fact set forth in a Defendant’s statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically
controverted by an opposition statement. If a Defendant files a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff will have the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That
burden cannot be met by reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. If a Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavit, Plaintiff must file counter-affidavits if he wants to
contest Defendant’s statement of the facts. If Plaintiff fails to file opposing affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, any factual assertions made in the Defendant’s affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment may be entered against Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Finally, the Court must assess Link’s filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Link’s Prisoner Trust Account Statement indicates no deposits to or balance in his prisoner trust account. Doc. 7 at 1. He, therefore,
does not owe an initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring an initial fee assessment “when funds exist,” based upon
average deposits to or balance in a prisoner’s account, under a specific 20 percent formula). His account custodian shall set aside 20 percent of all future deposits to the account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each
time the set aside amount reaches $10, until the balance of the Court’s $350 filing fee has been paid in full. In the event plaintiff is transferred to another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this
Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. The balance due from plaintiff shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in accordance with the terms of the payment directive portion of this Order. SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of September, 2026.
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA