Gary Lee v. Igloo Products Corp.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GARY LEE, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-01526-JAM-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 14 IGLOO PRODUCTS CORP., 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff alleges his finger was pinched and severely 18 injured by an Igloo-brand cooler while removing the cooler from 19 the bed of his truck. Plaintiff theorizes that the accident was 20 caused by an alleged design defect in the cooler and/or by 21 Igloo’s failure to warn of the risk of injury and asserts claims 22 for strict products liability and negligence as a result. 23 Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing they 24 are “long on generic conclusions” while being “woefully short on 25 supporting facts.” 26 As discussed further below, the Court agrees that 27 Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pled and dismisses 28 Plaintiff’s claims with leave to amend. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Defendant Igloo Products Corp. designs and manufactures 3 numerous products intended to cool food and beverages, including 4 a “Latitude 90 Roller Cooler” (the “Cooler”). First Am. Compl. 5 (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 22. Plaintiff Gary Lee alleges that on or 6 about June 3, 2023, he was taking the Cooler out of his truck bed 7 when the tow handle pinched the fingers of his left hand against 8 the body of the Cooler (the “Accident”). Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff 9 alleges that the Accident occurred as a result of the defective 10 design of the Cooler, which allowed Plaintiff’s hand to be 11 pinched between the tow handle and Cooler during the normal, 12 foreseeable use of the product. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges 13 that he continues to have numbness and pain in this left index 14 finger, which is attributable to nerve damage. Id. ¶ 16. 15 Plaintiff also alleges that, on November 13, 2025, the 16 Consumer Products Safety Commission (“CPSC”) announced a recall 17 of more than 1,000,000 of Defendant’s coolers, which included the 18 subject Cooler, after receiving “12 reports of fingertip 19 injuries, including fingertip amputations, bone fractures, and 20 lacerations” as a result of the tow handle pinching consumers’ 21 fingertips against the Coolers. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges 22 this indicates “Defendant knew or should have known of these 23 defects but has nevertheless put profit ahead of safety by 24 continuing to sell their Coolers to consumers, failing to warn 25 said consumers of the serious risks posed by the defects, and 26 failing to timely recall the dangerously defective Coolers 27 regardless of the risk of significant injuries to Plaintiff and 28 consumers like him.” Id. ¶ 18. 1 Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint on 2 September 22, 2025, alleging four causes of action for (1) Strict 3 Products Liability – Design Defect; (2) Strict Products Liability 4 – Failure to Warn; (3) Negligence/Negligent Products Liability – 5 Negligent Design Defect; and (4) Negligence/Negligent Products 6 Liability – Negligent Failure to Warn. Id. ¶¶ 25–60. In 7 response, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8 23), Plaintiff filed a timely Opposition (ECF No. 24), and 9 Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 25). The matter was submitted 10 without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). ECF No. 27. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 13 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 14 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted 15 only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or 16 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 17 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 18 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true 19 and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 20 party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 21 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 22 Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if 23 the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an 24 entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. 25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 26 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement 27 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.” 1 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, 2 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient 3 factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 4 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic 5 recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has 6 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 7 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 8 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 9 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide 10 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely 11 given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 12 motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the 13 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] 14 futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 15 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 16 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 III. OPINION 18 A. Plaintiff Has Inadequately Pled His Strict Liability 19 and Negligence Design Defect Claims (Counts I and III) 20 Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action are predicated 21 on the existence of a design defect in the Cooler. FAC ¶¶ 26–36, 22 45–50. Defendant argues that both causes of action fail at the 23 outset because Plaintiff does not adequately identify which 24 design defect theory he intends to plead, (1) the consumer 25 expectations test or (2) the risk-benefit test. Mot. Dismiss at 26 3–4, ECF No. 23. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed 27 to adequately plead either design defect theory, as he neither 28 describes how the Cooler failed to meet the minimum safety 1 expectations of an ordinary consumer as required by the consumer 2 expectations test, nor explains how the particular design defect 3 of the Cooler caused him harm as required by the risk-benefit 4 test. Id. at 4–6. Finally, Defendant contends Plaintiff 5 inadequately pleads causation. Id. at 6–8. 6 The Court finds Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a strict 7 liability design defect claim. California recognizes strict 8 liability for three types of product defects – manufacturing 9 defects, design defects, and warning defects (inadequate warnings 10 or failure to warn). Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Co., 53 11 Cal. 3d 987, 995 (1991). Under the “design defect” theory, a 12 design may be defective in one of two ways. Soule v. Gen. Motors 13 Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 566-67 (1994). First, under the “consumer 14 expectations test,” a product’s design is defective if it has 15 failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would 16 expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. 17 Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 (1978). Second, 18 under the “risk-benefit test,” a product’s design is defective if 19 the design embodies “excessive preventable danger,” that is, the 20 risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits of 21 such design. Id. “To meet the strictures of Twombly and Iqbal, 22 Plaintiffs should identify which design defect theory is being 23 utilized and allege facts to support that theory.” In re Toyota 24 Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Pracs. and 25 Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1220 (2010). A bare 26 allegation that the product suffered from a “design defect” is an 27 insufficient legal conclusion. Lucas v. City of Visalia, 726 F. 28 Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 1 Here, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff fails to adequately 2 identify which design defect theory he wishes to utilize. 3 Although Plaintiff’s allegations contain vague language akin to 4 both the consumer expectations and risk-benefit test such as 5 “ordinary consumer” and “purported benefits,” see FAC ¶ 33, he 6 fails to explicitly identify which test(s) he intends to plead 7 and which allegations support each theory. 8 Moreover, Plaintiff’s design defect allegations are 9 generally couched in conclusory language. For example, “[u]nder 10 the consumer expectations test, [a plaintiff] should describe how 11 the [product] failed to meet the minimum safety expectations of 12 an ordinary consumer of [the product].” Lucas, 726 F. Supp. at 13 1155 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, 14 Plaintiff merely alleges “the Igloo cooler contained a design 15 defect,” and “[d]ue to its defective design, the cooler failed to 16 perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used 17 in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” FAC ¶¶ 29, 33. 18 These allegations plainly fail to describe how, under the 19 circumstances Plaintiff was handling the Cooler, the Cooler 20 failed to meet the minimum safety expectations of an ordinary 21 consumer. Moreover, “[u]nder the risk-benefits test, [a 22 plaintiff] should allege that the risks of the design outweigh 23 the benefits, and then explain how the particular design of the 24 [product] caused [plaintiffs] harm.” Lucas, 726 F. Supp. at 1155 25 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, 26 Plaintiff alleges the Accident “occurred as a result of the 27 defective design of the subject cooler, which allowed Plaintiff’s 28 hand to [be] pinched between the tow handle and cooler during the 1 normal, foreseeable use of the product.” FAC ¶ 15. Missing from 2 these allegations is any identification of which aspect of the 3 Cooler’s design made it defective. As such, the Court finds 4 there are insufficient facts to support a design defect claim. 5 Cf., e.g., In re Toyota, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1220-21 (denying 6 motion to dismiss design defect claim because plaintiff 7 identified three design defects and described how they made 8 certain vehicles unable to perform as an ordinary consumer would 9 expect and in a way that the risks were not outweighed by the 10 benefits). Plaintiff’s lack of specificity about which 11 allegations pertain to which theory of strict products liability 12 is fatal to the survival of this claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s strict 13 liability design defect claim is not “plausible on its face.” 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 15 Plaintiff also fails to plead a negligent design defect 16 claim. California permits a negligent products liability claim 17 predicated upon an alleged design defect, manufacturing defect, 18 or failure to warn. Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 5th 19 110, 125 (2017). To establish negligent design or manufacturing, 20 a plaintiff must prove (1) a defect caused injury, and (2) the 21 defect was due to negligence of the defendant. Id. With respect 22 to an alleged design defect, the plaintiff “must identify what 23 aspect of [the product] makes it defective.” Marroquin v. 24 Pfizer, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1164 (E.D. Cal. 2019). As 25 explained above, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege which 26 aspect of the Cooler makes it defective. 27 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s First and Third 28 Causes of Action with leave to amend. 1 B. Plaintiff Has Inadequately Pled His Strict Liability 2 and Negligence Failure to Warn Claims (Counts II and 3 IV) 4 Plaintiff’s Second and Fourth Causes of Action are premised 5 on Defendant’s failure to warn of the Cooler’s hazardous tow 6 handle. FAC ¶¶ 38–43, 52–60. Defendant argues that these claims 7 fail because Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that Defendant knew 8 or should have known of the hazard prior to the Accident. Mot. 9 Dismiss at 8–9. 10 The Court agrees. A strict liability failure to warn claim 11 under California law requires a plaintiff to prove the “defendant 12 did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or 13 knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best 14 scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of 15 manufacture and distribution.” Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002. 16 Whether the risk was known or knowable is assessed at the time 17 the product was distributed. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 43 18 Cal. 4th 56, 64 (2008) (“Typically, under California law, we hold 19 manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their 20 failure to warn of dangers that were known to the scientific 21 community at the time they manufactured and distributed their 22 product.”); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1060 n.8 23 (1988) (“[A] manufacturer’s knowledge should be measured at the 24 time a [product] is distributed because it is at this point that 25 the manufacturer relinquishes control of the product.”). 26 Similarly, a negligent failure to warn claim under California law 27 requires a plaintiff to establish “a manufacturer or distributor 28 did not warn of a particular risk for reasons that fell below the 1 acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent 2 manufacturer would have known and warned about.” Anderson, 53 3 Cal. 3d at 1002. In either case, strict liability or negligence, 4 the plaintiff must show the defendant had some level of awareness 5 — i.e., the defendant knew, or should have known — of a 6 “particular risk.” 7 Here, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that 8 Defendant knew or should have known of the alleged Cooler defect 9 at the time of the Accident. At most, Plaintiff alleges that 10 Defendant should have known because the CPSC recalled more than 11 1,000,000 of Defendant’s coolers, including the subject Cooler, 12 on “November 13, 2025”[sic], and prior to the recall, Defendant 13 had received multiple reports of injuries involving the same or 14 similar cooler model. FAC ¶¶ 17, 57. However, Plaintiff fails to 15 allege when Defendant received these complaints. As the Ninth 16 Circuit has observed, courts often “reject[] undated customer 17 complaints offered as a factual basis for a manufacturer’s 18 knowledge of a defect because they provide no indication whether 19 the manufacturer was aware of the defect at the time of sale.” 20 Wilson v. Hewlitt-Packard Co., 668 F. 3d 1141, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 21 2012) (emphasis in original). Apart from these complaints, 22 Plaintiff offers no other reason why Defendant “knew or should 23 have known” of the alleged defect before the Accident. 24 Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Second and Fourth 25 Causes of Action with leave to amend. 26 IV. ORDER 27 For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 28 No. 23) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First through Fourth Causes of ee nee ene ee ne non nn nen ne en non nnn nnn enn ON ED eee

1 Action are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff elects to 2 file an amended complaint, he must do so within twenty (20) days 3 of this Order. Defendant shall file their response to the 4 amended complaint within twenty (20) days thereafter. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: February 20, 2026

8 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10