Gary Ladale Criston v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 06-24-00200-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00200-CR

GARY LADALE CRISTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 52955-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gary Ladale Criston pled guilty to possession of less than one gram of cocaine, a state

jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (Supp.). Criston also pled true

to the State’s habitual punishment enhancement allegations. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 12.425(b). Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, the trial court sentenced Criston to ten

years’ imprisonment and imposed a $1,550.00 fine but suspended the sentence in favor of

placing Criston on community supervision for five years. The State later alleged that Criston

violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by possessing methamphetamine

and a usable quantity of marihuana, failing to complete community supervision as ordered, and

possessing a firearm as a felon. After a revocation hearing, the trial court found the State’s

allegations true, revoked Criston’s community supervision, and sentenced him to five years’

imprisonment with a $1,550.00 fine. The trial court also assessed $425.00 in attorney fees for

his court-appointed counsel during revocation. Criston appeals.

Criston’s counsel filed a brief stating that she reviewed the record and found no

genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief sets out the procedural

history of the case and summarizes the evidence elicited during the course of the trial court

proceedings. Since counsel provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why

there are no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of Anders

v. California. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d

403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10

2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978). Counsel also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal.

On March 31, 2025, counsel mailed to Criston copies of the brief, the motion to

withdraw, and a motion for pro se access to the appellate record lacking only Criston’s signature.

Criston was informed of his rights to review the record and file a pro se response. Also on

March 31, we informed Criston that his motion for pro se access to the appellate record was due

on or before April 16. On April 24, this Court further informed Criston that the case would be

set for submission on the briefs on May 15. We received neither a pro se response from Criston

nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and have independently determined that no

reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Charles van Cleef Justice

1 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 3 CONCURRENCE IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART

I agree with the majority opinion that, after a review of the entire appellate record, we

have independently determined that no reversible error exists. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–

27. For that reason, I concur with the majority.

That said, non-reversible error is found in the trial court’s assessment of attorney fees

during the revocation proceedings. The record shows that the trial court found Criston indigent

before the revocation hearing and appointed counsel for him. “A defendant who is determined

by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings

in the case unless a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances occurs.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04 (p) (Supp.). Attorney fees may only be assessed “as a

reimbursement fee” “[i]f the judge determines that a defendant has financial resources that

enable the defendant to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (Supp.). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability

to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering

reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d

759, 765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d

552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); Moody v. State, No. 06-24-00122-CR, 2025 WL 470143, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(quoting Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 765–66). Even so, and without any factual basis to support

the determination that Criston had the financial resources to pay, both the trial court’s judgment

4 and the clerk’s record reflect that Criston was ordered to pay $425.00 in attorney fees for court-

appointed counsel during revocation.

In Anders cases, appellate courts “have the authority to reform judgments and affirm as

modified in cases where there is nonreversible error.” Sharpe v. State, 607 S.W.3d 446, 448

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (quoting Ferguson v. State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2014, pet. struck), overruled on other grounds by Cummins v. State, 646 S.W.3d

605 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d)). Because the appellate record fails to show some

factual basis to support the determination that Criston had the ability to pay any attorney fees, I

would delete the assessment of attorney fees against him. For these reasons, I respectfully

dissent.

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice

Date Submitted: May 15, 2025 Date Decided: April 22, 2026

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