Gary J. Leyes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 14, 2018
Docket18A-CR-1396
StatusPublished

This text of Gary J. Leyes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Gary J. Leyes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gary J. Leyes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 14 2018, 6:53 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Brooklyn, Indiana James B. Martin Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gary J. Leyes, November 14, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1396 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 84D01-1701-F6-33 84D01-1704-F6-1049 84D01-1706-F6-1916

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1396 | November 14, 2018 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Gary J. Leyes entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed

to plead guilty to three Level 6 felonies and admit to being a habitual offender.

In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all remaining charges. The plea

agreement left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion but required each

sentence to be served consecutively. On May 23, 2018, the trial court sentenced

Leyes to an aggregate sentence of six-and-one-half years in the Indiana

Department of Correction (“DOC”). Leyes challenges the appropriateness of

his placement in the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Following a traffic stop on January 3, 2017, officers discovered drug

paraphernalia containing residue inside Leyes’s vehicle. The State charged

Leyes under cause number 84D01-1701-F6-33 (“Cause No. F6-33”) with Level

6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe and Level 6 felony maintaining a

common nuisance. The State also alleged that Leyes was a habitual offender.

On April 3, 2017, officers discovered drug paraphernalia containing residue in

Leyes’s possession. Leyes was charged under cause number 84D01-1704-F6-

1049 (“Cause No. F6-1049”) with Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug,

Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Class B misdemeanor criminal

mischief, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and again

alleged to be a habitual offender. While incarcerated pursuant to Cause No. F6-

1049, Leyes was found in possession of a metal tube containing heroin after a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1396 | November 14, 2018 Page 2 of 6 fellow inmate had to be revived by Narcan following an overdose. Leyes was

charged under a separate cause number with Level 5 felony trafficking with an

inmate, three counts of Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, and Level 6

felony possession of a narcotic drug. Leyes was granted pretrial release on June

15, 2017, but violated conditions of his release just three days later by removing

his electronic monitoring device. Leyes was charged with Level 6 felony escape

under cause number 84D01-1706-F6-1916 (“Cause No. F6-1916”).

[3] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Leyes pled guilty to Level 6 felony maintaining a

common nuisance under Cause No. F6-33, Level 6 felony possession of a

narcotic drug under Cause No. F6-1049, and Level 6 felony escape under Cause

No. F6-1916 and admitted to being a habitual offender. In exchange, the State

dismissed all remaining charges. Sentencing was left to the trial court’s

discretion, but each sentence was to be served consecutively. On May 16, 2018,

the trial court accepted the plea agreement and conducted a sentencing hearing.

Leyes requested home detention at Club Soda until a bed opened at Oak Street,

a program offering dual-diagnosis treatment. The trial court did not believe

locally offered placements were appropriate, noting that “[Leyes will be] a risk

to [himself] and a risk to the public if I just kick [him] out to probation right

now.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. On May 23, 2018, the trial court sentenced Leyes to an

aggregate sentence of six-and-one-half years of purposeful incarceration in the

DOC, finding that

[t]he following statutory aggravating factors are established: defendant has a lengthy history of criminal or delinquent behavior; and defendant recently violated conditions of pre-trial Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1396 | November 14, 2018 Page 3 of 6 release into community corrections. The evidence before the court does not establish any statutory mitigating factors. The court does acknowledge defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and request for help. However, defendant has been afforded multiple opportunities in his prior cases to address his mental health and substance abuse issues, and he has failed to take advantage of the same. There is a complete absence of any evidence that defendant would follow through and succeed on probation or direct placement in getting the help he needs. Defendant himself recognizes he is still subject to the “whirlpool” that keeps dragging him back to using. Neither a suspended sentence nor direct placement are appropriate.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 86.

Discussion and Decision [4] Leyes does not contest the length of his sentence, only his placement in the

DOC. We may revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature

of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).

“Sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s

judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d

1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Placement is an appropriate

focus for application of our Appellate Rule 7(B) authority. Biddinger v. State, 868

N.E.2d 407, 414 (Ind. 2007). When a defendant challenges his placement,

under Appellate Rule 7(B), the question is not whether another placement is

more appropriate but, rather, whether the given placement is inappropriate.

Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It is the defendant’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1396 | November 14, 2018 Page 4 of 6 burden to persuade us that the placement is inappropriate. Id. We have stated

that “it will be quite difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim that the

placement of his or her sentence is inappropriate,” noting that “trial courts

know the feasibility of alternative placements in particular counties or

communities.” Id.

[5] The nature of the offenses Leyes committed warrant placement in the DOC.

Leyes pled guilty to three Level 6 felonies, two of which were drug-related

crimes. Leyes committed all three felonies within a span of just six months, and

his violation of the conditions of pretrial release just three days after placement

proved that he was unable to handle the less stringent environment of

community corrections. Leyes’s actions demonstrate a need for the structured

environment provided at the DOC.

[6] Leyes’s character also warrants placement in the DOC. The trial court denied

Leyes’s requested placement at Oak Street, finding that he needed more than

locally-provided intervention and that he would be a risk to himself and the

public if released on probation.

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Related

Cardwell v. State
895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Biddinger v. State
868 N.E.2d 407 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Fonner v. State
876 N.E.2d 340 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)

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