Gary Galbraith v. Department of Treasury

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 10, 2019
Docket345347
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gary Galbraith v. Department of Treasury (Gary Galbraith v. Department of Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gary Galbraith v. Department of Treasury, (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

GARY GALBRAITH and LISA A. GALBRAITH, UNPUBLISHED October 10, 2019 Petitioners-Appellants,

v No. 345347 Michigan Tax Tribunal DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 17-004900-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and JANSEN and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners Gary Galbraith and Lisa A. Galbraith appeal as of right the Michigan Tax Tribunal’s (MTT’s) final opinion and judgment upholding respondent Department of Treasury’s denial of petitioners’ request for a principal residence exemption (PRE) rebate for tax years 1996 through 2013. On appeal, petitioners argue that they presented evidence proving that they claimed the PRE in 1995 and equitable estoppel should prevent respondent from denying receipt of their request for the PRE. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioners purchased a single-family home and believed that they had received PRE status for the property in 1996 based on the filing of a property transfer affidavit with the city shortly after the sale. Petitioners owned the home and used it as their principal residence from December 1995 forward. In 2017, petitioners realized that they had unwittingly paid non- homestead taxes on their home for over 20 years.

Petitioners then filed a PRE affidavit with the city of Sterling Heights, indicating that they had owned and occupied the property as of December 22, 1995. The city’s local board of review granted the PRE for the 2014 tax year onward. However, the city had no record that petitioners had claimed the exemption, through affidavit or otherwise, when they purchased the home in 1995, and, thus, denied a rebate for the 1996 through 2013 tax years.

Petitioners then submitted to respondent a form requesting the PRE for the tax period based on a “qualified error” pertaining to the correct taxable status of the property, namely that

-1- the “[t]axpayer filed a timely [PRE] affidavit . . . and qualified for a [PRE] but the assessor failed to grant the exemption.” Respondent denied the request.

Petitioners appealed respondent’s denial by filing a petition in the MTT. Petitioners provided their December 22, 1995 property transfer affidavit, which was timestamped as received by the city on January 19, 1996. Petitioners also provided a December 22, 1995 Homestead Exemption Update (HEU) form, which was divided into four sections: (1) Property Information, (2) Seller Information, (3) Buyer Information, and (4) Local Governments. At the top, the HEU form read: “Filing [of the form] is voluntary.” Under the “Seller Information” section, the form indicated that “[b]y completing this portion of the form, the seller rescinds any exemption currently in place for the property . . .” This section was completed and included the sellers’ signatures dated December 22, 1995. The “Buyer Information” section of the form, which petitioners completed and signed on the same date, provided that “[b]y completing this portion of the form, the buyer may claim an exemption for the property . . . . No other affidavit is needed.” “Local Governments” section read:

Was an exemption in place for this property before the transfer? □ Yes □ No

If no, what is the first year you will post this exemption to the tax rolls?

This section of the form was not completed and the HEU form, unlike the property transfer affidavit, was not timestamped.

Following a hearing, the referee filed a proposed opinion and judgment upholding the denial of the PRE rebate. In doing so, the referee determined there was no evidence that petitioners had filed for a PRE as the HEU form did not show, through a timestamp or otherwise, that it was filed with the city.

Petitioners filed exceptions to the referee’s proposed opinion and judgment. Petitioners argued that the referee had failed to consider an inference arising from the fact that the sellers’ exempt status was rescinded1 consistent with the HEU form. According to petitioners, this was evidence that the city had timely received the HEU form and simply failed to record their PRE. Moreover, given the passage of time, petitioners suggested that it was not surprising that the city’s records did not contain the HEU form, adding that the city had likely lost or misplaced it. Thus, there was a qualified error, entitling them to a rebate.

The city thereafter sent petitioners a letter, explaining that their file for petitioners’ property was temporarily missing. In scanning the file to add it to the digital property record, the city “most likely misfiled” it afterward. The city noted that the database it used before 2003 only had PRE information for 2002. The city added that it would do its best to locate the missing file amongst the 40,000 files in its office and offered two suggestions: (1) petitioners should check their closing packet as “many people retain copies of their exemption forms with their closing

1 The record reveals that this occurred sometime before 2005.

-2- papers” or (2) petitioners should check with respondent “[a]s all PRE[]s and Rescissions are sent” there.

In the interim, the MTT rejected petitioners’ exceptions and adopted the referee’s proposed opinion and judgment as its final opinion and judgment. The MTT found that proof of ownership and occupancy and the “presumptive HEU filing” was insufficient to satisfy petitioners’ burden of proving that the HEU form was timely filed with the city.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, raising the same argument regarding the relevancy of the HEU form and asserting that it was fundamentally unfair to allow the city to assert that their file was missing and that petitioners had failed to meet their burden. Petitioners also argued that respondent should be estopped from asserting that they had failed to meet their burden when their failure was attributable to their inability to access their file.

The MTT denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Regarding the missing file, the MTT determined that “[a]lthough it is unfortunate that the city cannot locate [p]etitioners’ records, the [MTT] lacks powers of equity to consider the fairness of a circumstance when determining whether a party has met its burden of proof.”

Petitioners appeal by right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Absent an allegation of fraud, this Court’s review of a tax tribunal decision is limited to determining whether the tribunal committed an error of law or applied the wrong legal principles.” Eastbrook Homes, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 296 Mich App 336, 343; 820 NW2d 242 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e must affirm the [MTT]’s findings of fact if competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record supports them.” Pontiac Country Club v Waterford Twp, 299 Mich App 427, 439; 830 NW2d 785 (2013). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla of evidence, although it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v Warren, 193 Mich App 348, 352-353; 483 NW2d 416 (1992).

The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Vanderwerp v Plainfield Charter Twp, 278 Mich App 624, 627; 752 NW2d 479 (2008). “The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Sch, 485 Mich 69, 76; 780 NW2d 753 (2010). The best indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the statute’s language, which, if clear and unambiguous, we must apply as written. Ford Motor Co v City of Woodhaven, 475 Mich 425, 438-439; 716 NW2d 247 (2006).

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Related

Briggs Tax Service, LLC v. Detroit Public Schools
780 N.W.2d 753 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2010)
Ford Motor Company v. City of Woodhaven
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Skinner v. Square D Co.
516 N.W.2d 475 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1994)
Vanderwerp v. Plainfield Charter Township
752 N.W.2d 479 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2008)
Conagra, Inc v. Farmers State Bank
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Federal-Mogul Corp. v. Department of Treasury
411 N.W.2d 169 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1987)
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. City of Warren
483 N.W.2d 416 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1992)
Estate of Marguerite Schubert v. Department of Treasury
912 N.W.2d 569 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2017)
Lewis R Hardenbergh v. Department of Treasury
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Eastbrook Homes, Inc. v. Department of Treasury
820 N.W.2d 242 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2012)
Pontiac Country Club v. Waterford Township
299 Mich. App. 427 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2013)

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Gary Galbraith v. Department of Treasury, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gary-galbraith-v-department-of-treasury-michctapp-2019.