Gary Dewitt Odom v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
This text of Gary Dewitt Odom v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Gary Dewitt Odom v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1280-MR
GARY DEWITT ODOM APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 80-CR-000716
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE: Gary DeWitt Odom appeals pro se from the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction relief
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January of 1981, Odom was convicted after a jury trial and
sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance,
two felony counts of receiving stolen property, and second-degree assault. Due to
various parole violations as well as additional federal felony convictions, Odom
has still not served his Kentucky sentence.
In 2018, Odom filed a motion to amend his sentence pursuant to CR
60.02(e) and (f). In his motion, Odom argued that he had been sentenced too
harshly because the original sentencing judge wrongly thought Odom was
responsible for the murder of a police officer. Odom asked for resentencing from
consecutive to concurrent sentencing and release. Odom additionally requested
release because the Department of Corrections and the Parole Board allegedly
miscalculated his sentencing credits and were holding him unlawfully.
On May 13, 2019, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order
denying Odom’s CR 60.02 motions. On May 21, 2019, Odom filed a motion for
reconsideration with the trial court requesting that it reconsider its denial of his CR
60.02 motion. Odom did not cite any rule under the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure as the basis of his May 21, 2019 motion for reconsideration. The trial
court summarily denied Odom’s motion for reconsideration on December 2, 2019.
-2- While his motion for reconsideration was pending with the trial court,
Odom also filed a notice of appeal with this Court stating that he was appealing
from the trial court’s May 13, 2019 order denying his CR 60.02 motion. Odom
filed no new notices of appeal after the trial court’s denial of his motion to
reconsider.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, although he did not designate it as such,
Odom’s motion for reconsideration acted as a timely motion to alter, amend, or
vacate that judgment under CR 59.05, which tolled the time for filing a notice of
appeal. See CR 73.02(1)(e)(i). The notice of appeal became effective as of the
date of the trial court’s decision disposing of his motion for reconsideration and
this appeal is properly before us. Id.
Turning to the applicable law in this case, under CR 60.02, “a court
may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party . . . from its final judgment, order,
or proceeding[.]” Relief under CR 60.02 is “an extraordinary and residual remedy
to correct or vacate a judgment upon facts or grounds . . . not available by appeal
or otherwise, which were discovered after the rendition of the judgment without
fault of the party seeking relief.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 701
(Ky. 1956). However, a CR 60.02(f) motion must be “made within a reasonable
time.” See CR 60.02. Indeed, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time in which to
-3- move to vacate a judgment under CR 60.02 is a matter that addresses itself to the
discretion of the trial court.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky.
1983). Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required to assess the reasonable
time restriction inherent in CR 60.02 motions because this determination is left to
the discretion of the [trial] Court.” Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 596
(Ky. App. 2009) (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858).
Here, Odom argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to CR 60.02
(e) and (f). Considering, however, that over three decades have passed between
the court’s entry of its final judgment and sentence against Odom and Odom’s
filing of his present CR 60.02 motion, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Odom’s CR 60.02 motion as it was not brought
within a “reasonable time.” Id.
CONCLUSION
Because Odom’s CR 60.02 motion was not brought within a
reasonable time, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order denying such
motion.
ALL CONCUR.
-4- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary DeWitt Odom, pro se Daniel Cameron West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney Kay Han Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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